Index: openssl/Configure
diff -u openssl/Configure:1.8.6.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.8.2.2
--- openssl/Configure:1.8.6.1.4.1.2.1	Thu Jul  3 12:12:31 2014
+++ openssl/Configure	Thu Jul  3 12:31:57 2014
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 
 # see INSTALL for instructions.
 
-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [enable-montasm] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
 
 # Options:
 #
@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@
 #               default).  This needn't be set in advance, you can
 #               just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
 #
+# --pk11-libname  PKCS#11 library name.
+#               (No default)
+#
+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only
+#               (No default)
+#
 # --with-krb5-dir  Declare where Kerberos 5 lives.  The libraries are expected
 #		to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in
 #		include/.  A value is required.
@@ -336,7 +342,7 @@
 "linux-ppc",	"gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL::linux_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 #### IA-32 targets...
 "linux-ia32-icc",	"icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "linux-aout",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_out_asm}",
 ####
 "linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@@ -344,7 +350,7 @@
 "linux-ia64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"linux-x86_64",	"gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"linux-x86_64",	"gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 #### SPARC Linux setups
 # Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
 # assisted with debugging of following two configs.
@@ -591,6 +597,10 @@
 my $idx_ranlib = $idx++;
 my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
 
+# PKCS#11 engine patch
+my $pk11_libname="";
+my $pk11_flavor="";
+
 my $prefix="";
 my $libdir="";
 my $openssldir="";
@@ -829,6 +839,14 @@
 				{
 				$flags.=$_." ";
 				}
+			elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/)
+				{
+				$pk11_libname=$1;
+				}
+			elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/)
+				{
+				$pk11_flavor=$1;
+				}
 			elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
 				{
 				$prefix=$1;
@@ -964,6 +982,22 @@
 	exit 0;
 }
 
+if (! $pk11_libname)
+        {
+        print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n";
+        print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
+        exit 1;
+        }
+
+if (! $pk11_flavor
+    || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only"))
+	{
+	print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n";
+	print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n";
+	print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
+	exit 1;
+	}
+
 if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
 	$target = "Cygwin".$1;
 }
@@ -1079,6 +1113,25 @@
 	print "\n";
 	}
 
+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator")
+	{
+	$openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
+	$default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
+	$depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
+	$options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so";
+	print "    no-hw-pkcs11so  [pk11-flavor]";
+	print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
+	}
+else
+	{
+	$openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
+	$default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
+	$depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
+	$options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca";
+	print "    no-hw-pkcs11ca  [pk11-flavor]";
+	print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
+}
+
 my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds;
 
 $IsMK1MF=1 if ($target eq "mingw" && $^O ne "cygwin" && !is_msys());
@@ -1130,6 +1183,8 @@
 if ($flags ne "")	{ $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
 else			{ $no_user_cflags=1;       }
 
+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags";
+
 # Kerberos settings.  The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
 # the script "config" or manually.
 if (!$no_krb5)
@@ -1493,6 +1548,7 @@
 	s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
 	s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
 	s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
+	s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
 	s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
Index: openssl/Makefile.org
diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.4.2.2
--- openssl/Makefile.org:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1	Wed Dec 23 16:02:57 2015
+++ openssl/Makefile.org	Wed Dec 23 16:44:50 2015
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
 INSTALL_PREFIX=
 INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
 
+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option.
+PK11_LIB_LOCATION=
+
 # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
 OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
 
Index: openssl/README.pkcs11
diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.6.4.2
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015
+++ openssl/README.pkcs11	Fri Oct  4 14:45:25 2013
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+ISC modified
+============
+
+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility.
+
+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and
+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the
+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second
+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful
+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device
+protected key store and key loading).
+
+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor,
+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example
+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second.
+
+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in
+config/Configure.
+
+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine.
+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared
+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine
+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs).
+
+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l
+=========================================
+
+[Nov 19, 2009]
+
+Contents:
+
+Overview
+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
+FAQs
+Feedback
+
+Overview
+========
+
+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11
+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against
+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system
+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the
+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below.
+
+Patch can be applied like this:
+
+	# NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris
+	tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz
+	# now download the patch to the current directory
+	# ...
+	cd openssl-0.9.8l
+	# NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system)
+	patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19
+
+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the
+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share
+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA.
+
+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support
+following mechanisms:
+
+	RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4,
+	AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB,
+	AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224,
+	SHA256, SHA384, SHA512
+
+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP
+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may
+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an
+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety
+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested).
+
+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the
+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the
+config script:
+
+	$ ./config 
+	Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2
+	Configuring for solaris-x86-cc
+	You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.
+	See README.pkcs11 for more information.
+
+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run
+configure script like this:
+
+	./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so
+
+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run
+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the
+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary
+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits.
+
+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against
+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and
+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project
+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more
+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the
+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself
+and has functional PKCS#11 library.
+
+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are
+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information.
+
+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems,
+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more
+information).
+
+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
+=======================================
+
+2009-11-19
+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l
+
+- bugs and RFEs:
+
+	6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores
+	6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split
+	6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the
+		PKCS#11 engine
+
+2009-03-11
+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j 
+
+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a
+  tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied.
+
+- fixed bugs:
+
+	6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4
+	6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
+		meta slot is disabled
+
+2008-12-02
+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal)
+
+	6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine
+	6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true
+	6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean
+	6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take
+		it seriously
+	6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean
+	6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11
+		engine code
+	6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API
+	6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
+		meta slot is disabled
+
+2008-08-01
+- fixed bug
+
+	6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers
+		and digests
+
+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic
+
+2008-07-29
+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version
+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version:
+
+	6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users
+
+- fixed bugs in the engine code:
+
+	6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for
+		asymmetric key operations
+	6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called
+		atomically
+	6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys
+	6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners
+	6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in
+		suboptimal way
+	6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more
+		resilient to destroy failures
+	6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free()
+	6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys
+	6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine
+	6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size
+		of big numbers leading to failures
+	6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of
+		-1
+	6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references
+	6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not
+		checked
+	6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to
+		structure reuse
+	6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of
+		OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH}
+	defines but fails miserably
+	6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss
+	6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing
+		generate_params parameter
+	6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes
+	6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the
+		PKCS#11 engine
+	6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish()
+
+- new features and enhancements:
+
+	6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512
+	6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes
+	6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric
+		ciphers and digests
+
+2007-10-15
+- update for 0.9.8f version
+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
+
+2007-10-02
+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys"
+
+2007-09-26
+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes
+	  significant performance drop
+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine
+
+2007-05-25
+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers
+
+2007-05-19
+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code
+
+FAQs
+====
+
+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error:
+
+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init':
+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork'
+
+Answer:
+
+	- don't use "no-threads" when configuring
+	- if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by
+	  default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the
+	  architecture that Configure printed, for example:
+
+Configured for linux-elf.
+
+	- then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes),
+	  and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string.
+	  If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With
+	  "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after
+	  "-D_REENTRANT", like this:
+
+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:.....
+
+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for
+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch.
+
+Answer:
+
+	Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32
+	(as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there.
+
+
+Feedback
+========
+
+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was
+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris.
+
+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp.
+
Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h
diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.5.10.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.5
--- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.5.10.1	Sun Jan 15 15:45:34 2012
+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h	Fri Sep  4 10:43:21 2009
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
 
 #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
+# define OPENSSL_THREADS
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
 # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
 #endif
@@ -79,6 +82,8 @@
 # endif
 #endif
 
+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
+
 /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND
@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@
  * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
  * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
  */
-#undef RC4_CHUNK
+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long
 #endif
 #endif
 
@@ -148,7 +153,7 @@
 /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
  * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
 #ifndef DES_LONG
-#define DES_LONG unsigned long
+#define DES_LONG unsigned int
 #endif
 #endif
 
@@ -162,9 +167,9 @@
 /* The prime number generation stuff may not work when
  * EIGHT_BIT but I don't care since I've only used this mode
  * for debuging the bignum libraries */
-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
 #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
-#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
 #undef SIXTEEN_BIT
 #undef EIGHT_BIT
 #endif
@@ -178,7 +183,7 @@
 
 #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
 #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
-#undef BF_PTR
+#define BF_PTR2
 #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
 
 #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
@@ -208,7 +213,7 @@
 /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
  * Very mucy CPU dependant */
 #ifndef DES_UNROLL
-#undef DES_UNROLL
+#define DES_UNROLL
 #endif
 
 /* These default values were supplied by
Index: openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
diff -u openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.5.6.1.12.1 openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.5.2.1
--- openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.5.6.1.12.1	Wed Dec 23 16:03:19 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c	Wed Dec 23 16:45:10 2015
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
     if ((file = fopen(filename, mode)) == NULL) {
         SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
         ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
-        if (errno == ENOENT)
+        if ((errno == ENOENT) || ((*mode == 'r') && (errno == EACCES)))
             BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
         else
             BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile
diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.6.6.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.6
--- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.6.6.1	Sun Jan 15 15:45:35 2012
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile	Mon Jun 13 14:25:19 2011
@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@
 	eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \
 	tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
 	tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c \
-	eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c
+	eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c eng_padlock.c \
+	hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c
 LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
 	eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
 	tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
 	tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o \
-	eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o
+	eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o eng_padlock.o \
+	hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o
 
 SRC= $(LIBSRC)
 
@@ -288,6 +290,102 @@
 eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
 eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h
 eng_table.o: eng_table.c
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11.c
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/md4.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h ../../include/openssl/des.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/rc2.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../crypto/rc5/rc5.h ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/cast.h ../../include/openssl/idea.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../crypto/mdc2/mdc2.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../cryptlib.h
+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so_pub.c
 tb_cipher.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
 tb_cipher.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
 tb_cipher.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h	Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * CDDL HEADER START
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
+ * (the "License").  You may not use this file except in compliance
+ * with the License.
+ *
+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
+ * and limitations under the License.
+ *
+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
+ *
+ * CDDL HEADER END
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc.   All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ */
+
+#ifndef	_CRYPTOKI_H
+#define	_CRYPTOKI_H
+
+/* ident	"@(#)cryptoki.h	1.2	05/06/08 SMI" */
+
+#ifdef	__cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#ifndef	CK_PTR
+#define	CK_PTR *
+#endif
+
+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION
+#define	CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
+#endif
+
+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION
+#define	CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
+#endif
+
+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER
+#define	CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION
+#define	CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NULL_PTR
+#include <unistd.h>	/* For NULL */
+#define	NULL_PTR NULL
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint
+ */
+#ifndef	CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
+#define	CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
+#ifndef	TRUE
+#define	TRUE	1
+#endif /* TRUE */
+#ifndef	FALSE
+#define	FALSE	0
+#endif /* FALSE */
+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */
+
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+
+/* Solaris specific functions */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all
+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of
+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism
+ */
+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
+    CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession);
+
+/*
+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given
+ * mechanism from the rawkey data.
+ */
+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len,
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj);
+
+
+#ifdef	__cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif	/* _CRYPTOKI_H */
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.4.2.2
--- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1	Wed Dec 23 16:03:42 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c	Wed Dec 23 16:45:32 2015
@@ -113,6 +113,14 @@
 # if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)
     ENGINE_load_cryptodev();
 # endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
+    ENGINE_load_pk11ca();
+#  endif
+#  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
+    ENGINE_load_pk11so();
+#  endif
+# endif
 #endif
 }
 
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h
diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.4.2.2
--- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.4.6.1.6.1.6.1	Wed Dec 23 16:03:44 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h	Wed Dec 23 16:45:34 2015
@@ -403,6 +403,12 @@
 void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
 void ENGINE_load_padlock(void);
 void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void);
+# endif
 
 /*
  * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.26.4.4
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c	Fri Oct  4 14:45:25 2013
@@ -0,0 +1,4116 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <cryptlib.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/des.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+typedef int pid_t;
+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
+#define NOPTHREADS
+#ifndef NULL_PTR
+#define NULL_PTR NULL
+#endif
+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
+#else
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Debug mutexes */
+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
+#define DEBUG_MUTEX
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
+#define __USE_UNIX98
+#endif
+#include <pthread.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
+
+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
+#define	PK11_DBG	"PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
+/* #undef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+/*
+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
+ * information.
+ */
+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
+#undef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither
+ * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes,
+ * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then
+ * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's
+ * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's.
+ */
+#define	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+#include "cryptoki.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
+#else
+#include "cryptoki.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#endif
+#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/*
+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine
+ * initialization.
+ */
+static int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef;
+static int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef;
+static int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+/*
+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
+ */
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
+ */
+static int *hw_cnids;
+static int *hw_dnids;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
+
+/*
+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
+ * logging into the token.
+ */
+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
+
+/*
+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
+ * PK11_SESSION object.
+ *
+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
+ *
+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
+ * They are also used for active list protection.
+ */
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
+ * list) for given algorithm type
+ */
+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
+ * without losing the secret key objects.
+ */
+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+/* ENGINE level stuff */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+
+/* RAND stuff */
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
+
+/* These functions are also used in other files */
+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+#endif
+
+/* Local helper functions */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+	CK_BBOOL persistent);
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
+
+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln);
+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+	const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+	const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
+#else
+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+	const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
+#endif
+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+	const int **nids, int nid);
+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+	const int **nids, int nid);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
+	int key_len);
+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
+	size_t count);
+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
+    int *local_cipher_nids);
+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
+    int *local_digest_nids);
+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
+    int id);
+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
+    int id);
+
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+/* Index for the supported ciphers */
+enum pk11_cipher_id {
+	PK11_DES_CBC,
+	PK11_DES3_CBC,
+	PK11_DES_ECB,
+	PK11_DES3_ECB,
+	PK11_RC4,
+	PK11_AES_128_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_192_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_256_CBC,
+	PK11_AES_128_ECB,
+	PK11_AES_192_ECB,
+	PK11_AES_256_ECB,
+	PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	PK11_AES_128_CTR,
+	PK11_AES_192_CTR,
+	PK11_AES_256_CTR,
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+	PK11_CIPHER_MAX
+};
+
+/* Index for the supported digests */
+enum pk11_digest_id {
+	PK11_MD5,
+	PK11_SHA1,
+	PK11_SHA224,
+	PK11_SHA256,
+	PK11_SHA384,
+	PK11_SHA512,
+	PK11_DIGEST_MAX
+};
+
+#define	TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv)	\
+	{								\
+	if (uselock)							\
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
+	if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1)			\
+		{							\
+		  retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl,	\
+		  priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent);	\
+		}							\
+	if (uselock)							\
+		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
+	}
+
+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+static int cipher_count		= 0;
+static int digest_count		= 0;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
+
+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
+	{
+	enum pk11_cipher_id	id;
+	int			nid;
+	int			iv_len;
+	int			min_key_len;
+	int			max_key_len;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE		key_type;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
+	} PK11_CIPHER;
+
+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
+	{
+	{ PK11_DES_CBC,		NID_des_cbc,		8,	 8,   8,
+		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_DES3_CBC,	NID_des_ede3_cbc,	8,	24,  24,
+		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_DES_ECB,		NID_des_ecb,		0,	 8,   8,
+		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_DES3_ECB,	NID_des_ede3_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
+		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_RC4,		NID_rc4,		0,	16, 256,
+		CKK_RC4,	CKM_RC4, },
+	{ PK11_AES_128_CBC,	NID_aes_128_cbc,	16,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_CBC,	NID_aes_192_cbc,	16,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_CBC,	NID_aes_256_cbc,	16,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
+	{ PK11_AES_128_ECB,	NID_aes_128_ecb,	0,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_ECB,	NID_aes_192_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_ECB,	NID_aes_256_ecb,	0,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
+	{ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,	NID_bf_cbc,		8,	16,  16,
+		CKK_BLOWFISH,	CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	/* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */
+	{ PK11_AES_128_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	16,  16,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+	{ PK11_AES_192_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	24,  24,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+	{ PK11_AES_256_CTR,	NID_undef,		16,	32,  32,
+		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+	};
+
+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
+	{
+	enum pk11_digest_id	id;
+	int			nid;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
+	} PK11_DIGEST;
+
+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
+	{
+	{PK11_MD5,	NID_md5,	CKM_MD5, },
+	{PK11_SHA1,	NID_sha1,	CKM_SHA_1, },
+	{PK11_SHA224,	NID_sha224,	CKM_SHA224, },
+	{PK11_SHA256,	NID_sha256,	CKM_SHA256, },
+	{PK11_SHA384,	NID_sha384,	CKM_SHA384, },
+	{PK11_SHA512,	NID_sha512,	CKM_SHA512, },
+	{0,		NID_undef,	0xFFFF, },
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION	*sp;
+	} PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
+
+
+/*
+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
+ *
+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
+ */
+
+/* DES CBC EVP */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_des_cbc,
+	8, 8, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/* 3DES CBC EVP */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_des_ede3_cbc,
+	8, 24, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_des_ecb,
+	8, 8, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_des_ede3_ecb,
+	8, 24, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_128_cbc,
+	16, 16, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_192_cbc,
+	16, 24, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_aes_256_cbc,
+	16, 32, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+/*
+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
+ */
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_128_ecb,
+	16, 16, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_192_ecb,
+	16, 24, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
+	{
+	NID_aes_256_ecb,
+	16, 32, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/*
+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are
+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures
+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword.
+ */
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 16, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 24, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
+	{
+	NID_undef,
+	16, 32, 16,
+	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
+	{
+	NID_bf_cbc,
+	8, 16, 8,
+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
+	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
+	{
+	NID_rc4,
+	1, 16, 0,
+	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
+	pk11_cipher_init,
+	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
+	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
+	{
+	NID_md5,
+	NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
+	MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	0,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	MD5_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
+	{
+	NID_sha1,
+	NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	0,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
+	{
+	NID_sha224,
+	NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	0,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	/* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
+	SHA256_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
+	{
+	NID_sha256,
+	NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	0,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA256_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
+	{
+	NID_sha384,
+	NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	0,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	/* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
+	SHA512_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
+	{
+	NID_sha512,
+	NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
+	SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+	0,
+	pk11_digest_init,
+	pk11_digest_update,
+	pk11_digest_final,
+	pk11_digest_copy,
+	pk11_digest_cleanup,
+	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
+	SHA512_CBLOCK,
+	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
+ */
+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH		ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+#define PK11_CMD_PIN			(ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT			(ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
+	{
+		{
+		PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
+		"SO_PATH",
+		"Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
+		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+		},
+		{
+		PK11_CMD_PIN,
+		"PIN",
+		"Specifies the pin code",
+		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+		},
+		{
+		PK11_CMD_SLOT,
+		"SLOT",
+		"Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
+		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
+		},
+		{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+	};
+
+
+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
+	{
+	pk11_rand_seed,
+	pk11_rand_bytes,
+	pk11_rand_cleanup,
+	pk11_rand_add,
+	pk11_rand_bytes,
+	pk11_rand_status
+	};
+
+
+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
+#endif
+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
+static const char *engine_pk11_name =
+	"PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)";
+
+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
+
+/*
+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
+ */
+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
+
+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
+static int pk11_pid = 0;
+
+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
+
+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	int type;
+	pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
+
+	if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
+	{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
+	if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
+	{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
+		return (0);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		session_cache[type].lock =
+		    OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+		if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
+			goto malloc_err;
+		(void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+
+malloc_err:
+	pk11_free_all_locks();
+	PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	return (0);
+#else
+	return (1);
+#endif
+	}
+
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	int type;
+
+	if (token_lock != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
+		OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
+		token_lock = NULL;
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+		find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
+		find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
+		find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
+			OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
+			session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
+ */
+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
+	RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		if (!pk11_library_init(e))
+			return (0);
+
+	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
+		return (0);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
+		    !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
+		    !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
+			return (0);
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
+			return (0);
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
+			return (0);
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+	if (pk11_have_random)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
+			return (0);
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+	if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
+		return (0);
+
+/*
+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+	pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
+	pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
+	if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE)
+		pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+	/* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
+	ERR_load_pk11_strings();
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
+#ifdef	ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+#error  "dynamic engine not supported"
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+	{
+	if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
+		return (0);
+
+	if (!bind_pk11(e))
+		return (0);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+
+#else
+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
+	{
+	ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+
+	if (!ret)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	if (!bind_pk11(ret))
+		{
+		ENGINE_free(ret);
+		return (NULL);
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+void
+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
+	{
+	ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
+	 * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
+	 */
+	/* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
+	if (!pk11_dso)
+		pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		return;
+		}
+
+	e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
+	if (!e_pk11)
+		{
+		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
+		pk11_dso = NULL;
+		return;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
+	 * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
+	 * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
+	 * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
+	 */
+	if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
+		{
+		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
+		pk11_dso = NULL;
+		ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
+		return;
+		}
+
+	ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
+
+	ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	}
+#endif	/* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
+
+/*
+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
+ */
+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+	{
+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+		return (PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+	return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+	}
+
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+	{
+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+	PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+	}
+
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
+	{
+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+
+	return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
+	}
+
+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#endif
+	}
+
+/*
+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
+ * accessible to all threads.
+ */
+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#endif
+	}
+
+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+	return (pk11_library_init(e));
+}
+
+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
+	{
+	NULL_PTR,		/* CreateMutex */
+	NULL_PTR,		/* DestroyMutex */
+	NULL_PTR,		/* LockMutex */
+	NULL_PTR,		/* UnlockMutex */
+	CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK,	/* flags */
+	NULL_PTR,		/* pReserved */
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
+	CK_INFO info;
+	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+	int any_slot_found;
+	int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+	struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
+	 * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
+	 * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
+	 * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
+	 * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
+	 * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
+	 * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
+	 * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
+	 * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
+	 * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
+	 * initialize the engine again.
+	 */
+	if (pk11_library_initialized)
+		{
+		if (pk11_pid == getpid())
+			{
+			return (1);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			/*
+			 * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
+			 * the application calls fork() without finishing the
+			 * engine first.
+			 */
+			pk11_free_all_locks();
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	/*
+	 * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all
+	 * NIDs there.
+	 */
+	if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0)
+		goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+	if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
+		goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	/* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
+	p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
+		PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
+	if (!p)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+	rv = p(&pFuncList);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+	/* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
+
+	(void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
+	(void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
+	(void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
+	(void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
+	(void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
+	(void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
+#endif
+	rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+	(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
+	(void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
+	(void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
+#endif
+	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
+	 * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
+	 * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
+	 * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
+	 * because no slot was present.
+	 */
+	if (any_slot_found == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
+			    PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
+	 * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
+	 */
+	/* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */
+	if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
+			!= CKR_OK) {
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
+		    "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		digest_count = 0;
+	}
+
+	pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
+	pk11_pid = getpid();
+	/*
+	 * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
+	 * will do the cleanup.
+	 */
+	if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
+		goto err;
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		session_cache[i].head = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
+	 * for asymmetric ciphers.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		active_list[i] = NULL;
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
+		{
+		if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
+		    pk11_fork_child) != 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
+		}
+#endif
+
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+	ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
+	if (pk11_pin) {
+		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+	}
+	pk11_pin = NULL;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
+ * library.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (pk11_pin) {
+		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+	}
+	pk11_pin = NULL;
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
+
+	if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* free all active lists */
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		pk11_free_active_list(i);
+
+	pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
+	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+	 * may have side-effects.
+	 */
+#if 0
+	pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+
+	if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	pk11_dso = NULL;
+	pFuncList = NULL;
+	pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
+	pk11_pid = 0;
+	/*
+	 * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
+	 * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
+	 * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
+	 * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
+	 * the engine before calling fork().
+	 */
+	pk11_free_all_locks();
+
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
+	{
+	int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+
+	switch (cmd)
+		{
+	case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
+		if (p == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		if (initialized)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
+	case PK11_CMD_PIN:
+		if (pk11_pin) {
+			memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
+			OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+		}
+		pk11_pin = NULL;
+
+		if (p == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
+		if (pk11_pin == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		return (1);
+	case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
+		SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif
+		return (1);
+	default:
+		break;
+		}
+
+	PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
+	{
+	return;
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
+	 * the calling functions do not care anyway
+	 */
+	pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+	{
+	pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		case OP_RSA:
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		case OP_DSA:
+			if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
+				sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
+				sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		case OP_DH:
+			if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
+				sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+#endif
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
+ */
+PK11_SESSION *
+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
+#endif
+	static pid_t pid = 0;
+	pid_t new_pid;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+#endif
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
+	 * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
+	 * here, with no PID information.
+	 */
+	if (pid == 0)
+		pid = getpid();
+
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	sp = freelist;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
+	 * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
+	 * structure from the freelist.
+	 */
+	if (sp == NULL)
+		{
+		if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		(void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
+
+		/*
+		 * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
+		 * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
+		 * mark them as unused.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		freelist = sp->next;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
+	 * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
+	 */
+	if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
+		{
+		pid = new_pid;
+
+		/*
+		 * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
+		 * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
+		 * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
+		 * head of the list).
+		 */
+		while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
+			{
+			freelist = sp1->next;
+			/*
+			 * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
+			 * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
+			 * sessions and destroy all objects.
+			 */
+			pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp1);
+			}
+
+		/* we have to free the active list as well. */
+		pk11_free_active_list(optype);
+
+		/* Initialize the process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
+		if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
+			    rv);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
+		 * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
+		 * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
+		 * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
+		 * information.
+		 */
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
+			goto err;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
+			    rv);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
+		 * re-initialization.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) 
+			{
+			/*
+			 * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
+			 * the caller cope with the situation.
+			 */
+			freelist = sp;
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (sp->pid == 0)
+		{
+		/* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
+	session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
+
+err:
+	if (sp != NULL)
+		sp->next = NULL;
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	return (sp);
+	}
+
+
+void
+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+#endif
+	PK11_SESSION *freelist;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
+	 * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
+	 * next time we will ask for a new session.
+	 */
+	if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
+		return;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+#endif
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return;
+		}
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	sp->next = freelist;
+	session_cache[optype].head = sp;
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	}
+
+
+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	int type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+	(void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+	(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
+	 * return 0 on exit.
+	 */
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
+ * return an error on return.
+ */
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
+	pid_t mypid = getpid();
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+#endif
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+#endif
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
+		{
+		if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
+			{
+			rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+			if (rv != CKR_OK)
+				{
+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+					PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+				ret = 0;
+				}
+			}
+		freelist = sp->next;
+		pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
+		OPENSSL_free(sp);
+		}
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+static int
+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+			myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
+			break;
+		case OP_RAND:
+			myslot = rand_SLOTID;
+			break;
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			myslot = SLOTID;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
+			    PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+	if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We are probably a child process so force the
+		 * reinitialize of the session
+		 */
+		pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
+		if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
+			return (0);
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+		}
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	sp->pid = getpid();
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		case OP_RSA:
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		case OP_DSA:
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		case OP_DH:
+			sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
+			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+			break;
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
+	 * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
+	 */
+	sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
+	sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+			sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+			}
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+			sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+			sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
+		 * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
+		 * must free those as well.
+		 */
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
+			}
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
+		uselock = FALSE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+	 */
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	if (session == NULL)
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
+#else
+	if (session == NULL)
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE);
+		sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
+			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE);
+		sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
+			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
+		uselock = FALSE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+	 */
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	if (session == NULL)
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
+#else
+	if (session == NULL)
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE);
+		sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
+			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
+ *
+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
+ *       if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
+		uselock = FALSE;
+		}
+
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	if (session == NULL)
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
+#else
+	if (session == NULL)
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+static int
+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+	CK_BBOOL persistent)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	/*
+	 * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
+	 * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
+	 * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
+	 */
+	if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
+		return (1);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
+		    rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+
+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
+
+static int
+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
+		if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
+			return (ciphers[i].id);
+	return (-1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
+	{
+	if (cipher_count > 0)
+		*nids = cipher_nids;
+	else
+		*nids = NULL;
+	return (cipher_count);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
+	{
+	if (digest_count > 0)
+		*nids = digest_nids;
+	else
+		*nids = NULL;
+	return (digest_count);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
+ */
+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
+	PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+	/*
+	 * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
+	 * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
+	 * pk11_init_symetric() is called.
+	 */
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+	if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
+	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
+	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+		{
+		pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
+		pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
+		/*
+		 * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
+		 * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
+		 * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
+		 * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
+		 * add code so that the counter length can be set via
+		 * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
+		 */
+		ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+		OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		(void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		}
+	else
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+		{
+		if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
+			{
+			pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
+			pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
+	if (ctx->encrypt)
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
+	else
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
+		    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM mech;
+	int index;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
+
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
+	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
+		return (0);
+
+	p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
+	/*
+	 * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
+	 * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
+	 * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
+	 * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
+	 * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
+	 * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
+	 * code serves as a sanity check.
+	 *
+	 * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
+	 * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
+	 * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
+	 * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
+	    ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
+	    ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
+	mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+	/* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
+	(void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
+	 * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
+	 * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
+	    sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
+		{
+		state->sp = sp;
+		if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
+			return (0);
+
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
+	 * needs to be created.
+	 */
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
+			ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
+		}
+
+	if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
+		 * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
+		 */
+		if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
+			{
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* now initialize the context with a new key */
+	if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
+	state->sp = sp;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
+ * that it needs not be recreated.
+ *
+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
+ */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
+static int
+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+	const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
+#else
+static int
+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+	const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
+#endif
+	{
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	unsigned long outl = inl;
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
+
+	if (!inl)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
+	if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	if (ctx->encrypt)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
+			    PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
+	 * the same size of input.
+	 * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
+	 * correctly aligned buffers.
+	 */
+	if (inl != outl)
+		return (0);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
+
+	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
+		 * rid of the context.
+		 */
+		if (ctx->encrypt)
+			rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
+			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
+		else
+			rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
+			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
+	const int **nids, int nid)
+	{
+	if (!cipher)
+		return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
+
+	switch (nid)
+		{
+		case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_des_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_128_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_192_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_256_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_128_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_192_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_aes_256_ecb:
+			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
+			break;
+		case NID_bf_cbc:
+			*cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
+			break;
+		case NID_rc4:
+			*cipher = &pk11_rc4;
+			break;
+		default:
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+			/*
+			 * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs
+			 * here are not constants.
+			 */
+			if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr)
+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
+			else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr)
+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
+			else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
+				*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
+			else
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+			*cipher = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+	return (*cipher != NULL);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
+	const int **nids, int nid)
+	{
+	if (!digest)
+		return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
+
+	switch (nid)
+		{
+		case NID_md5:
+			*digest = &pk11_md5;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha1:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha1;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha224:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha224;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha256:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha256;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha384:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha384;
+			break;
+		case NID_sha512:
+			*digest = &pk11_sha512;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*digest = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+	return (*digest != NULL);
+	}
+
+
+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
+	unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
+	 * can use the key handles. Here is why:
+	 * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
+	 * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
+	 * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
+	 * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
+	 * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
+	 * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
+	 * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
+	 * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
+	 * terminate the active operation.
+	 */
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+	if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
+		{
+		a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
+		memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len);
+		if ((key_type == CKK_DES) ||
+		    (key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
+		    (key_type == CKK_DES3))
+			DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]);
+		if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
+		    (key_type == CKK_DES3))
+			DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]);
+		if (key_type == CKK_DES3)
+			DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]);
+		a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf;
+		}
+	a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+		a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the key information used in this session.
+	 * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
+	 */
+	if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
+		{
+		sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX;
+		(void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len;
+		(void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len);
+		}
+	memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
+err:
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+static int
+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
+		if (digests[i].nid == nid)
+			return (digests[i].id);
+	return (-1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech;
+	int index;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
+	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
+		return (0);
+
+	pdp = &digests[index];
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
+	mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
+	mech.pParameter = NULL;
+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	state->sp = sp;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+
+	/* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
+	if (count == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
+		count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	unsigned long len;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
+	len = ctx->digest->md_size;
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+		state->sp = NULL;
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
+		return (0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
+	 * to the pool
+	 */
+	pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
+	state->sp = NULL;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int ret = 0;
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
+	CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
+	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
+
+	/* The copy-from state */
+	state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
+	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Initialize the copy-to state */
+	if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
+		goto err;
+	state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
+
+	/* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
+		&ul_state_len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (ul_state_len == 0)
+		{
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
+	if (pstate == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
+		&ul_state_len);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
+		ul_state_len, 0, 0);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
+		    PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+	if (pstate != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pstate);
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
+static int
+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+	{
+	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
+	unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
+		 * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
+		 * that might have been allocated in the token when
+		 * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
+		 * will return the session to the cache.
+		 */
+		if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
+ * prefix.
+ */
+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
+	int key_len)
+	{
+	if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
+	    memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
+		{
+		(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
+		}
+
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			{
+			/*
+			 * The secret key object is created in the
+			 * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
+			 */
+			if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
+				sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
+				goto err;
+			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			}
+		}
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	if (session == NULL)
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
+#else
+	if (session == NULL)
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_RSA_X_509
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
+ * CKM_DSA
+ *
+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
+ * public key slot.
+ *
+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_DES3_CBC
+ * CKM_DES_CBC
+ * CKM_AES_CBC
+ * CKM_DES3_ECB
+ * CKM_DES_ECB
+ * CKM_AES_ECB
+ * CKM_AES_CTR
+ * CKM_RC4
+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
+ *
+ * Digests optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_MD5
+ * CKM_SHA_1
+ * CKM_SHA224
+ * CKM_SHA256
+ * CKM_SHA384
+ * CKM_SHA512
+ *
+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
+	{
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+	unsigned int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
+	CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+	int slot_n_cipher = 0;
+	int slot_n_digest = 0;
+	CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
+	int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
+	int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+
+	int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
+	int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
+
+	/* let's initialize the output parameter */
+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+		*any_slot_found = 0;
+
+	/* Get slot list for memory allocation */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
+	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+		{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+
+	if (pSlotList == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* Get the slot list for processing */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		/* Check if slot has random support. */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+		if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
+			{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
+			rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
+			break;
+			}
+		}
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE;
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
+		 * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+			&mech_info);
+
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+				(mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+			{
+			/*
+			 * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
+			 * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
+			 */
+			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+			    CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
+
+			if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
+			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
+				{
+				slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
+				if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER)
+					{
+					slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
+		 * verifying with CKM_DSA.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
+			&mech_info);
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
+		    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
+			{
+			slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
+			}
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
+		 * derivation.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+		    CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
+
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
+			{
+			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
+				CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
+			if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
+				{
+				slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
+				}
+			}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+		if (!found_candidate_slot &&
+		    (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
+			{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
+			pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
+			pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover;
+			pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
+			pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
+			found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
+			/*
+			 * Cache the flags for later use. We might
+			 * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
+			 * is used.
+			 */
+			pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
+			    PK11_DBG);
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			    best_slot_sofar);
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
+			    "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
+			}
+#else
+			} /* if */
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		} /* for */
+
+	if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
+		}
+
+	found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+	best_slot_sofar = 0;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+		current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
+		current_slot_n_digest = 0;
+		(void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
+		(void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+
+		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
+		    &current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
+
+		pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
+		    &current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot_n_cipher);
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			current_slot_n_digest);
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n",
+			PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+		/*
+		 * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
+		 * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
+		 * otherwise leave it where it is.
+		 */
+		if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
+		    (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
+			{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+			fprintf(stderr,
+				"%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n",
+				PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
+			cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
+			digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
+			(void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
+			    sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
+			(void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, 
+			    sizeof (local_digest_nids));
+			}
+		}
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	if (pSlotList != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+	OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
+	OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+		*any_slot_found = 1;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
+    int *local_cipher_nids, int id)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		return;
+		}
+
+	if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
+	    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
+		{
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids))
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
+			    ciphers[id].nid;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		else
+			{
+		fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+			}
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	else
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
+		}
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
+    int id)
+	{
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		return;
+		}
+
+	if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
+		{
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+		if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids))
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
+			    digests[id].nid;
+			}
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		else
+			{
+		fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
+			}
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	else
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
+		}
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_AES_CTR
+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */
+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln)
+	{
+	ASN1_OBJECT *o;
+	int nid;
+
+	if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"",
+	    1, sn, ln)) == NULL)
+		{
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* will return NID_undef on error */
+	nid = OBJ_add_object(o);
+	ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
+
+	return (nid);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we
+ * have to help ourselves here.
+ */
+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void)
+	{
+	/* are we already set? */
+	if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef)
+		return (1);
+
+	/*
+	 * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just
+	 * follow the format of those that exist.
+	 */
+	if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) ==
+	    NID_undef)
+		goto err;
+	ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr;
+	if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) ==
+	    NID_undef)
+		goto err;
+	ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr;
+	if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) ==
+	    NID_undef)
+		goto err;
+	ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr;
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED);
+	return (0);
+	}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */
+
+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
+		{
+		pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
+		    ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher,
+		    local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id);
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
+    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
+		{
+		pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type,
+		    current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id);
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
+/*
+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
+ *
+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
+ * asymmetric operations.
+ *
+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
+ *
+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
+ * information.
+ *
+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
+ * the code won't be used.
+ */
+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
+#else
+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
+ */
+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	void *handle;
+	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+	int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+	int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
+	int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
+	    PK11_DBG);
+#endif
+	if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
+	    PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+	if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
+	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
+		    PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
+	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+		{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif
+		hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
+		hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
+		if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
+			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		/* this means empty tables */
+		hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
+		hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+	if (pSlotList == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Get the slot list for processing */
+	if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also
+	 * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
+	 * search.
+	 */
+	hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
+	hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
+	tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
+	tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
+	if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
+	 * is zero now.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
+		tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
+	for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
+		tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
+	    PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+		/*
+		 * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
+		 * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
+		 */
+		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
+		    &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
+		pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
+		    &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+	 * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
+	 * dlclose(3C).
+	 */
+#if 0
+	pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+	OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+	(void) dlclose(handle);
+	hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
+	hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	if (pSlotList != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+	if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
+	if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
+ * non-existent).
+ */
+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
+	{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
+	 * table.
+	 */
+	if (nid_table == NULL)
+		return (1);
+
+	/*
+	 * the table is never full, there is always at least one
+	 * NID_undef.
+	 */
+	while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
+		{
+		if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
+			{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			return (1);
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.4.10.1
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c	Tue Jun 14 21:52:40 2011
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
+{
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0),			"PK11_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0),		"PK11_DESTROY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0),			"PK11_CTRL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0),		"PK11_RSA_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0),		"PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0),		"PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0),		"PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0),		"PK11_RAND_ADD"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0),		"PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_GET_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0),		"PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0),		"PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0),		"PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0),		"PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DSA_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DH_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_DH_FINISH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0),		"PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0),		"PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0),	"PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0),	"PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0),		"PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0),	"PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0),		"PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0),		"PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0),		"PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0),			"ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0),		"PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0),		"PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0),	"PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0),		"PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0),		"PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0),	"PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0),	"PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0),	"PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0),	"PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0),	"PK11_RETURN_SESSION"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0),		"PK11_GET_PIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0),	"PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0),	"PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0),		"PK11_CACHE_PIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0),	"PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0),		"PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0),		"PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"},
+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0),		"PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"},
+{ 0, NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
+{
+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED,		"PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE,			"unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED,			"PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER,		"null parameter passed"},
+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,	"command not implemented"},
+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE,			"C_Initialize failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE,			"C_Finalize failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GETINFO,			"C_GetInfo faile"},
+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST,			"C_GetSlotList failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT,	"no modulus or no exponent"},
+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID,	"attr sensitive or invalid"},
+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,		"C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS,			"no modulus"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT,			"no exponent"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT,		"C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,			"C_FindObjects failed"},
+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,		"C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,			"C_CreateObject failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,			"C_DestroyObject failed"},
+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION,			"C_OpenSession failed"},
+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION,			"C_CloseSession failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT,			"C_EncryptInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT,			"C_Encrypt failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT,			"C_SignInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SIGN,				"C_Sign failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT,			"C_DecryptInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT,			"C_Decrypt failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,			"C_VerifyRecover failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFY,			"C_Verify failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT,		"C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER,			"C_VerifyRecover failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY,			"C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM,			"C_SeedRandom failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM,		"C_GenerateRandom failed"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH,	"invalid message length"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE,	"unknown algorithm type"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID,	"unknown asn1 onject id"},
+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE,		"unknown padding type"},
+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED,		"padding check failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG,		"digest too big"},
+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE,		"malloc failure"},
+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,	"ctl command not implemented"},
+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN,	"data is bigger than mod"},
+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS,	"data is too larger for mod"},
+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT,		"a dsa component is missing"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH,	"invalid signature length"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R,	"missing r in dsa verify"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S,	"missing s in dsa verify"},
+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY,		"inconsistent key type"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE,			"C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE,			"C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT,			"C_DigestInit failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE,			"C_DigestUpdate failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL,			"C_DigestFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL,			"C_EncryptFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL,			"C_DecryptFinal failed"},
+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT,		"Slot does not support PRNG"},
+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO,			"C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY,			"C_DeriveKey failed"},
+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,		"C_GetOperationState failed"},
+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE,		"C_SetOperationState failed"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE,		"invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM,		"IV or key length incorrect"},
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE,	"invalid operation type"},
+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED,		"failed to add NID" },
+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED,			"atfork() failed" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED,		"C_Login() failed on token" },
+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND,	"more than one object found" },
+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI,		"pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" },
+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN,		"could not read PIN from terminal" },
+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND,	"PIN not read from external command" },
+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND,	"could not popen() dialog command" },
+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED,			"pipe() failed" },
+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC,		"bad passphrasedialog specification" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED,		"token not initialized" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET,		"token PIN required but not set" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED,	"token PIN required but not provided" },
+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL,		"missing mandatory 'object' keyword" },
+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH,	"token attrs provided do not match" },
+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND,		"private key not found in keystore" },
+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND,		"specified object not found" },
+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID,	"PIN set but caching policy invalid" },
+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED,		"sysconf() failed" },
+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED,			"mmap() failed" },
+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING,	"PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" },
+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED,			"mlock() failed" },
+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED,			"fork() failed" },
+{ 0,	NULL}
+};
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
+
+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
+static int pk11_error_init = 1;
+
+static void
+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
+	{
+	if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
+		pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+
+	if (pk11_error_init)
+		{
+		pk11_error_init = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+		ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
+		ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
+#endif
+		}
+}
+
+static void
+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
+	{
+	if (pk11_error_init == 0)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+		ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
+		ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
+#endif
+		pk11_error_init = 1;
+		}
+}
+
+void
+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
+{
+	if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
+		pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
+	ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
+}
+
+void
+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
+{
+	char tmp_buf[20];
+
+	PK11err(function, reason);
+	(void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
+	ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
+}
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.9.10.2
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:05 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h	Fri Oct  4 14:45:25 2013
@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef	HW_PK11_ERR_H
+#define	HW_PK11_ERR_H
+
+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
+#define	PK11err(f, r)	ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+
+#define	PK11_F_INIT				100
+#define	PK11_F_FINISH				101
+#define	PK11_F_DESTROY				102
+#define	PK11_F_CTRL				103
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_INIT				104
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_FINISH			105
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY			106
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY			107
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY			108
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC			109
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC			110
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC			111
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC			112
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_SIGN				113
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY			114
+#define	PK11_F_RAND_ADD				115
+#define	PK11_F_RAND_BYTES			116
+#define	PK11_F_GET_SESSION			117
+#define	PK11_F_FREE_SESSION			118
+#define	PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY			119
+#define	PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY			120
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW			121
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW			122
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW			123
+#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW			124
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_SIGN				125
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY			126
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_INIT				127
+#define	PK11_F_DSA_FINISH			128
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY			129
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY			130
+#define	PK11_F_DH_INIT				131
+#define	PK11_F_DH_FINISH			132
+#define	PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH			133
+#define	PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY			134
+#define	PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS		135
+#define	PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION			136
+#define	PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT			137
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT			138
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER			139
+#define	PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY			140
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT			141
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE			142
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL			143
+#define	PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT			144
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL			145
+#define	PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT			146
+#define	PK11_F_LOAD				147
+#define	PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY			148
+#define	PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY			149
+#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY			150
+#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP			151
+#define	PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD			152
+#define	PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE			153
+#define	PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS		154
+#define	PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC			155
+#define	PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS			156
+#define	PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS			157
+#define	PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION			158
+#define	PK11_F_GET_PIN				159
+#define	PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT			160
+#define	PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS		161
+#define	PK11_F_CACHE_PIN			162
+#define	PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY		163
+#define	PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN			164
+#define	PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN			165
+#define	PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS			166
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+#define	PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 			100
+#define	PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 			101
+#define	PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 			102
+#define	PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 		103
+#define	PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 		104
+#define	PK11_R_INITIALIZE 			105
+#define	PK11_R_FINALIZE 			106
+#define	PK11_R_GETINFO 				107
+#define	PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 			108
+#define	PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 	109
+#define	PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 	110
+#define	PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 		111
+#define	PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 			112
+#define	PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 			113
+#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 			114
+#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 			115
+#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 		116
+#define	PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 			118
+#define	PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 			119
+#define	PK11_R_OPENSESSION 			120
+#define	PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 			121
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 			122
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPT 				123
+#define	PK11_R_SIGNINIT 			124
+#define	PK11_R_SIGN 				125
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 			126
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPT 				127
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 			128
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFY 				129
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 		130
+#define	PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 			131
+#define	PK11_R_GEN_KEY 				132
+#define	PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 			133
+#define	PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 			134
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 		135
+#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 		136
+#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 		137
+#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 		138
+#define	PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 		139
+#define	PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 			140
+#define	PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 			141
+#define	PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 	142
+#define	PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 	143
+#define	PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 	144
+#define	PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT		145
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH		146
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R		147
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S		148
+#define	PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY			149
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE			150
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE			151
+#define	PK11_R_DIGESTINIT			152
+#define	PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE			153
+#define	PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL			154
+#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL			155
+#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL			156
+#define	PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT			157
+#define	PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO			158
+#define	PK11_R_DERIVEKEY			159
+#define	PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE		160
+#define	PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE		161
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE			162
+#define	PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM		163
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE		164
+#define	PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED			165
+#define	PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED			166
+
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED		167
+#define	PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND	168
+#define	PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI		169
+#define	PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN		170
+#define	PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND		171
+#define	PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED			172
+#define	PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND	173
+#define	PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC		174
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED		175
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET		176
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED		177
+#define	PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL		178
+#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH		179
+#define	PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND		180
+#define	PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND			181
+#define	PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID	182
+#define	PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED			183
+#define	PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED			183
+#define	PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING	184
+#define	PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED			185
+#define	PK11_R_FORK_FAILED			186
+
+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
+#define	PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX			32
+
+#ifdef NOPTHREADS
+/*
+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the
+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global
+ * per-process lock for the whole engine.
+ *
+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as
+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but
+ * it's safe.
+ */
+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE	CRYPTO_LOCK_EC
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
+ *
+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
+	{
+	struct PK11_st_SESSION	*next;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;	/* PK11 session handle */
+	pid_t			pid;		/* Current process ID */
+	CK_BBOOL		pub_persistent;	/* is pub key in keystore? */
+	CK_BBOOL		priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */
+	union
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
+			RSA			*rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
+			RSA			*rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */
+			BIGNUM			*rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
+			} u_RSA;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
+			DSA			*dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
+			DSA			*dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
+			} u_DSA;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dh_key; /* key handle */
+			DH			*dh; /* dh key addr */
+			BIGNUM			*dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
+			} u_DH;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+		struct
+			{
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	cipher_key; /* key handle */
+			unsigned char		key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
+			int			key_len; /* priv key len */
+			int			encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
+			} u_cipher;
+		} opdata_u;
+	} PK11_SESSION;
+
+#define	opdata_rsa_pub_key	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
+#define	opdata_rsa_priv_key	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
+#define	opdata_rsa_pub		opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
+#define	opdata_rsa_priv		opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
+#define	opdata_rsa_n_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
+#define	opdata_rsa_e_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
+#define	opdata_rsa_pn_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num
+#define	opdata_rsa_pe_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num
+#define	opdata_rsa_d_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
+#define	opdata_dsa_pub_key	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
+#define	opdata_dsa_priv_key	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
+#define	opdata_dsa_pub		opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
+#define	opdata_dsa_pub_num	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
+#define	opdata_dsa_priv		opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
+#define	opdata_dsa_priv_num	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
+#define	opdata_dh_key		opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
+#define	opdata_dh		opdata_u.u_DH.dh
+#define	opdata_dh_priv_num	opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
+#define	opdata_cipher_key	opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
+#define	opdata_key		opdata_u.u_cipher.key
+#define	opdata_key_len		opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
+#define	opdata_encrypt		opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
+
+/*
+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
+ *   1) asymmetric operations
+ *   2) random operations
+ *   3) symmetric and digest operations
+ *
+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
+ * only a single group of operations.
+ *
+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
+ *
+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
+ */
+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
+	{
+	OP_RAND,
+	OP_RSA,
+	OP_DSA,
+	OP_DH,
+	OP_CIPHER,
+	OP_DIGEST,
+	OP_MAX
+	} PK11_OPTYPE;
+
+/*
+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
+ * and locks associated with the lists.
+ */
+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *head;
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	pthread_mutex_t *lock;
+#endif
+	} PK11_CACHE;
+
+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
+typedef struct PK11_active_st
+	{
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
+	unsigned int refcnt;
+	struct PK11_active_st *prev;
+	struct PK11_active_st *next;
+	} PK11_active;
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
+#endif
+extern PK11_active *active_list[];
+/*
+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
+ */
+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+#define	LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
+#define	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
+#else
+#define	LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
+#define	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
+#endif
+
+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
+
+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.32.4.7
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c	Fri Oct  4 14:45:25 2013
@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <cryptlib.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#define NOPTHREADS
+typedef int pid_t;
+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
+#ifndef NULL_PTR
+#define NULL_PTR NULL
+#endif
+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
+#else
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+#include <pthread.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+#include "cryptoki.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
+#else
+#include "cryptoki.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#endif
+#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
+#endif
+
+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
+#define getpassphrase(x)	getpass(x)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* RSA stuff */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+	unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+	const RSA *rsa);
+#else
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
+	unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+	const RSA *rsa);
+#endif
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+#endif
+
+/* DSA stuff */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
+	DSA *dsa);
+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
+	DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
+#endif
+
+/* DH stuff */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
+#endif
+
+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
+	CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
+
+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+	CK_BBOOL is_private);
+
+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
+#else
+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
+ */
+#define	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label)	\
+	{								\
+	if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0)			\
+		{							\
+		var = TRUE;						\
+		if (unlock)						\
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);			\
+		goto label;						\
+		}							\
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry;
+
+	for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
+		if (entry->h == h)
+			return (entry);
+
+	return (NULL);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
+ * failure.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+int
+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
+	if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+		return (-1);
+		}
+
+	/* search for entry in the active list */
+	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
+		entry->refcnt++;
+	else
+		{
+		/* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
+		entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
+		if (entry == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		entry->h = h;
+		entry->refcnt = 1;
+		entry->prev = NULL;
+		entry->next = NULL;
+		/* connect the newly created entry to the list */
+		if (active_list[type] == NULL)
+			active_list[type] = entry;
+		else /* make the entry first in the list */
+			{
+			entry->next = active_list[type];
+			active_list[type]->prev = entry;
+			active_list[type] = entry;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (entry->refcnt);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+void
+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *prev_entry;
+
+	/* remove the entry from the list and free it */
+	if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
+		{
+		prev_entry->next = entry->next;
+		if (entry->next != NULL)
+			entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		active_list[type] = entry->next;
+		/* we were the first but not the only one */
+		if (entry->next != NULL)
+			entry->next->prev = NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* sanitization */
+	entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	entry->prev = NULL;
+	entry->next = NULL;
+	OPENSSL_free(entry);
+	}
+
+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
+void
+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry;
+
+	/* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
+	switch (type)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+			break;
+		default:
+			return;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+	while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
+		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
+ *
+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+int
+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
+	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+		return (-1);
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
+	entry->refcnt--;
+	if (entry->refcnt == 0)
+		{
+		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 RSA method",
+	pk11_RSA_public_encrypt,		/* rsa_pub_encrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_public_decrypt,		/* rsa_pub_decrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_private_encrypt,		/* rsa_priv_encrypt */
+	pk11_RSA_private_decrypt,		/* rsa_priv_decrypt */
+	NULL,					/* rsa_mod_exp */
+	NULL,					/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_RSA_init,				/* init */
+	pk11_RSA_finish,			/* finish */
+	RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER,			/* flags */
+	NULL,					/* app_data */
+	pk11_RSA_sign,				/* rsa_sign */
+	pk11_RSA_verify				/* rsa_verify */
+	};
+
+RSA_METHOD *
+PK11_RSA(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_rsa);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 DSA method",
+	pk11_dsa_do_sign, 	/* dsa_do_sign */
+	NULL, 			/* dsa_sign_setup */
+	pk11_dsa_do_verify, 	/* dsa_do_verify */
+	NULL,			/* dsa_mod_exp */
+	NULL, 			/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_DSA_init, 		/* init */
+	pk11_DSA_finish, 	/* finish */
+	0, 			/* flags */
+	NULL 			/* app_data */
+	};
+
+DSA_METHOD *
+PK11_DSA(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_dsa);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/*
+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
+ * enough.
+ */
+#define	DH_BUF_RESERVE	8
+
+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
+	{
+	"PKCS#11 DH method",
+	pk11_DH_generate_key,	/* generate_key */
+	pk11_DH_compute_key,	/* compute_key */
+	NULL,			/* bn_mod_exp */
+	pk11_DH_init,		/* init */
+	pk11_DH_finish,		/* finish */
+	0,			/* flags */
+	NULL,			/* app_data */
+	NULL			/* generate_params */
+	};
+
+DH_METHOD *
+PK11_DH(void)
+	{
+	return (&pk11_dh);
+	}
+#endif
+
+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
+#define	SSL_SIG_LENGTH		36
+
+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
+#define	DSA_DATA_LEN		20
+#define	DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN	40
+
+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/*
+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	default:
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
+err:
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
+ * should be catched in the padding functions
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+		break;
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+	default:
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (i <= 0) goto err;
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
+err:
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	BIGNUM f;
+	int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	BN_init(&f);
+
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+
+	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+		{
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
+	 */
+	if (flen > num)
+		{
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* make data into a big number */
+	if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+
+	/*
+	 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
+	 * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
+	 */
+	for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
+		if (buf[j] != 0)
+			break;
+
+	p = buf + j;
+	j = r - j;  /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
+		break;
+	default:
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (r < 0)
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+err:
+	BN_clear_free(&f);
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+	{
+	BIGNUM f;
+	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+	BN_init(&f);
+	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		{
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
+	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
+	 */
+	if (flen > num)
+		{
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+		{
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
+			PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* PK11 functions are called here */
+	r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
+
+	/*
+	 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
+	 * Needs to skip these 0's here
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
+		if (buf[i] != 0)
+			break;
+
+	p = buf + i;
+	i = r - i;  /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+	switch (padding)
+		{
+	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
+		break;
+	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+		r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
+		break;
+	default:
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (r < 0)
+		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+err:
+	BN_clear_free(&f);
+	if (buf != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+		OPENSSL_free(buf);
+		}
+	return (r);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
+			    sp->session);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_encrypted;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
+		}
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
+			    rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		retval = ul_sig_len;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
+				PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_decrypted;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
+	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
+	int retval = -1;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	(void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
+			    sp->session);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
+			p_mech, h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
+				PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
+			    PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
+			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		retval = bytes_decrypted;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
+	 * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
+	 */
+	rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
+	 * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
+	 * structures.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+	if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	X509_SIG sig;
+	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+	int i, j = 0;
+	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+	X509_ALGOR algor;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long ulsiglen;
+
+	/* Encode the digest */
+	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+		s = (unsigned char *)m;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sig.algor = &algor;
+		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+
+		sig.digest = &digest;
+		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+		sig.digest->length = m_len;
+
+		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+		}
+
+	j = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		if (s == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p = s;
+		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
+			    sp->session);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		ulsiglen = j;
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
+			(CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
+		*siglen = ulsiglen;
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ret = 1;
+		}
+
+err:
+	if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
+		{
+		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		OPENSSL_free(s);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
+	unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+	const RSA *rsa)
+#else
+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
+	unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
+	const RSA *rsa)
+#endif
+	{
+	X509_SIG sig;
+	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+	int i, j = 0;
+	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+	X509_ALGOR algor;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* Encode the digest	*/
+	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+		s = (unsigned char *)m;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sig.algor = &algor;
+		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+		sig.digest = &digest;
+		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+		sig.digest->length = m_len;
+		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+		}
+
+	j = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		if (s == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p = s;
+		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	(void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
+			    sp->session);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
+			    rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i,
+			(CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ret = 1;
+		}
+
+err:
+	if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
+		{
+		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		OPENSSL_free(s);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
+
+#define	MAXATTR	1024
+
+/*
+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
+ * PKCS#11 token.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	FILE *privkey;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
+
+	/* we look for private keys only */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
+		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
+		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
+	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
+	 * never ask for private components.
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
+		};
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
+	 */
+	if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
+		{
+		search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
+		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
+		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+		    CK_TRUE) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/* see find_lock array definition
+		   for more info on object locking */
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+		/*
+		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
+		 * if we can't find it.
+		 */
+		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+		    &ks_key) == 0)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
+			hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
+				        "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
+					NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+		/*
+		 * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
+		 * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
+		 * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
+		 * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
+		 * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
+		 * do not check the return value because even in case
+		 * of failure the sp structure will have both key
+		 * pointer and object handle cleaned and
+		 * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
+		 * OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
+
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
+		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
+		sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
+
+		/*
+		 * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
+		 * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
+		 * consistency reasons.
+		 */
+		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
+		 * everything else is 0 or NULL.
+		 */
+		rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
+		RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
+
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
+					 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
+		 * must take care of handle management ourselves.
+		 */
+		KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
+
+		/*
+		 * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
+		 * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+		/*
+		 * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
+		 * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
+		 * in the keystore.
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
+			&sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
+			&sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
+
+		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+		{
+		pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		(void) fclose(privkey);
+		if (pkey != NULL)
+			{
+			rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+			if (rsa != NULL)
+				{
+				/*
+				 * This will always destroy the RSA
+				 * object since we have a new RSA
+				 * structure here.
+				 */
+				(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+				sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
+
+				h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+				    pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
+				if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+					goto err;
+				}
+			else
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (pkey);
+err:
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	if (rsa != NULL)
+		RSA_free(rsa);
+	if (pkey != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		pkey = NULL;
+		}
+	rollback = rollback;
+	return (pkey);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
+ * PKCS#11 token.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	FILE *pubkey;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
+	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
+
+	/* we look for public keys only */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
+		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
+		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
+	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
+		};
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
+	 */
+	if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
+		{
+		search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
+		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
+		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+		    CK_FALSE) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/* see find_lock array definition
+		   for more info on object locking */
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+		/*
+		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
+		 * if we can't find it.
+		 */
+		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+		    &ks_key) == 0)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
+		 * structure. No cache hit is possible.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
+
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
+		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
+		sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
+
+		/*
+		 * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
+		 */
+		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
+		 * everything else is 0 or NULL.
+		 */
+		rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
+
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
+					 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+
+		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * Create a session object from it so that when calling
+		 * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
+		 * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
+		 * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
+		 * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
+		 * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
+		 * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
+		 * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
+		 * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
+		 * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
+		 */
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+		    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
+		    &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
+		    &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
+		if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+		{
+		pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		(void) fclose(pubkey);
+		if (pkey != NULL)
+			{
+			rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+			if (rsa != NULL)
+				{
+				/*
+				 * This will always destroy the RSA
+				 * object since we have a new RSA
+				 * structure here.
+				 */
+				(void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+				sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
+
+				h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+				    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
+				if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+					goto err;
+				}
+			else
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (pkey);
+err:
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	if (rsa != NULL)
+		RSA_free(rsa);
+	if (pkey != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		pkey = NULL;
+		}
+	return (pkey);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
+    RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
+    CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	int i;
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+	if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
+
+	a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
+	a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
+	if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
+		if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+	if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
+		if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
+			*rsa_n_num = NULL;
+			rollback = TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = rsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
+    BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	int i;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+
+	/* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
+		h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+		goto set;
+	}
+	
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	/* Put the private key components into the template */
+	if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+	/*
+	 * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
+	 * component is NULL.  That means this is key by reference RSA
+	 * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
+	 * searching for the private key handle.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->d == NULL)
+		{
+		ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+		/*
+		 * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
+		 * session keys.
+		 */
+		a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
+		 * only so we tried to find the private key in the
+		 * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
+		 * problem. Note that for other key types we just
+		 * create a new session key using the private
+		 * components from the RSA structure.
+		 */
+		if (rsa->d == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+				PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+set:
+	if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
+		 * extract private components from the keystore. In
+		 * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
+		 * application to properly cope with that. It is
+		 * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
+		 * reference are used we expect it to be used
+		 * exclusively using the high level API and then there
+		 * is no problem. If the application expects the
+		 * private components to be read from the keystore
+		 * then that is not a supported way of usage.
+		 */
+		if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			*rsa_d_num = NULL;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
+	 * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
+	 * 'n'/'e' components as well.
+	 */
+	*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
+	*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = rsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0 &&
+		    (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	/*
+	 * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
+	 * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
+	 */
+	for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
+	 * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 *
+	 * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
+	 * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
+	 * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
+	 * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
+	 * both data signing and verifying.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
+	    (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
+	 * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
+	 * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
+	 * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
+	 * public component since with the keys by reference
+	 * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
+	 * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
+	 * compare the handle as well.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
+	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
+	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
+	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* The DSA function implementation */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+
+static DSA_SIG *
+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+	int i;
+	DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
+
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+
+	/*
+	 * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
+	 * each is 20 bytes long
+	 */
+	unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+	unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+	unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
+
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+	if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+	if (dlen > i)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
+		goto ret;
+
+	(void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+
+		(void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret,
+			(CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+		}
+
+
+	if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	dsa_sig->r = r;
+	dsa_sig->s = s;
+
+ret:
+	if (dsa_sig == NULL)
+		{
+		if (r != NULL)
+			BN_free(r);
+		if (s != NULL)
+			BN_free(s);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
+	return (dsa_sig);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
+	DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int retval = 0;
+	CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
+
+	unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+	unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
+	unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
+
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
+
+	if (dlen > i)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
+			PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+		goto ret;
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
+		goto ret;
+
+	(void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
+
+	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
+	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
+			pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
+			    &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
+			h_pub_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
+			    rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
+		 * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
+		 * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
+		 */
+		(void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
+		BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
+		BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
+		    BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
+			(unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
+			goto ret;
+			}
+		}
+
+	retval = 1;
+ret:
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
+	return (retval);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
+    DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+	int i;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* p */
+		{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},	/* q */
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* g */
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}		/* pub_key - y */
+		};
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
+    DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	int i;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+
+	/* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* p */
+		{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},	/* q */
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* g */
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}		/* priv_key - x */
+		};
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	/* Put the private key components into the template */
+	if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	/*
+	 * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
+	 * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
+	 */
+	for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
+	 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
+	 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* The DH function implementation */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Generate DH key-pair.
+ *
+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
+ */
+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG i;
+	CK_RV rv, rv1;
+	int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
+
+	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+	if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
+		 * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
+		 * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
+		 */
+		pub_key_template[1].pValue =
+			OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
+			DH_BUF_RESERVE);
+		if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
+		}
+	else
+		goto err;
+
+	pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
+	if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
+		{
+		pub_key_template[2].pValue =
+			OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
+			DH_BUF_RESERVE);
+		if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
+		}
+	else
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
+	 *	 a session handle. The objects created in this function are
+	 *	 destroyed before return and thus not cached.
+	 */
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
+	    &mechanism,
+	    pub_key_template,
+	    ul_pub_key_attr_count,
+	    priv_key_template,
+	    ul_priv_key_attr_count,
+	    &h_pub_key,
+	    &h_priv_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
+	 * should be sufficient for reuse.
+	 */
+	if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
+		{
+		reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
+		reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
+		reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
+		pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
+	rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
+		((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Reuse the memory allocated */
+	pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
+	pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
+		pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
+			if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+					PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+		dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
+			pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
+		if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Reuse the memory allocated */
+	priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
+	priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+			if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+					PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+		dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
+			priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
+		if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+err:
+
+	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+
+	for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
+		{
+		if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
+			pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
+	DH *dh)
+	{
+	unsigned int i;
+	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	CK_ULONG seclen;
+	CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
+		{CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)},
+		};
+
+	CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	CK_RV rv;
+	int ret = -1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+
+	if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
+	priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+	seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+	mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
+	if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
+
+	(void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
+
+	h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
+	if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
+			pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
+			    &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
+
+	if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
+	    &mechanism,
+	    h_key,
+	    priv_key_template,
+	    ul_priv_key_attr_count,
+	    &h_derived_key);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
+	    priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	priv_key_result[0].pValue =
+		OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
+	if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
+		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
+	 * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
+	 */
+	if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
+		 * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
+		 * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
+		 * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
+		 * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
+		 * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
+		 * pre-master secret.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
+			{
+			if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
+				break;
+			}
+
+		(void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
+			priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
+		ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
+		}
+
+err:
+
+	if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
+			}
+		}
+	if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
+		priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
+		}
+
+	if (mechanism.pParameter)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
+		mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
+	DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+	int i;
+
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
+		{CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	key_template[0].pValue = &class;
+	key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
+
+	key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
+	key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
+
+	key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
+	key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
+
+	key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
+	key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+	if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
+		    rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
+			    rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
+		if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = dh;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
+
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
+		{
+		if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
+			key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ *
+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
+ *       to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
+ */
+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
+	 * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
+	 * in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Local function to simplify key template population
+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
+ */
+static int
+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
+	CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG len = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
+	 * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
+	 */
+	if (bn != NULL)
+		len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+
+	if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	*ul_value_len = len;
+	*p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
+	if (*p_value == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static void
+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
+	{
+	if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
+		*bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
+ * Assume object store locked.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 OK
+ *	0 no object or more than 1 object found
+ */
+static int
+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG objcnt;
+
+	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
+		    rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
+
+	if (objcnt > 1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+		    PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	else if (objcnt == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* from uri stuff */
+
+extern char *pk11_pin;
+
+static int pk11_get_pin(void);
+
+static int
+pk11_get_pin(void)
+{
+	char *pin;
+
+	/* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
+	if (pin == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		return (0);
+		}
+	pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
+	if (pk11_pin == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		return (0);
+		}
+	memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
+ * multiple threads.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+static int
+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+    CK_BBOOL is_private)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+#if 0
+	/* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
+	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+		    PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+		return (0);
+		}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
+	 * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
+	 * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
+	 * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
+	 * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
+	 * flag is set.
+	 */
+	if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
+	     (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
+	    (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
+	 * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
+	 * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
+	 * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
+	 * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
+	 * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
+	 * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
+	 * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
+	 * lock right before C_Login().
+	 */
+	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
+	    (is_private == CK_TRUE))
+		{
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
+			{
+			if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
+				return (0);
+				}
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
+		 * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
+		 * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
+		 * the engine.
+		 *
+		 * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
+		 * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
+		 */
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
+			{
+			if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
+			    CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
+			    strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
+				{
+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+				goto err_locked;
+				}
+
+			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
+
+			}
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		}
+	else
+		{
+			/*
+			 * If token does not require login we take it as the
+			 * login was done.
+			 */
+			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+
+err_locked:
+	if (pk11_pin) {
+		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+	}
+	pk11_pin = NULL;
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
+ * this.
+ *
+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
+		return (0);
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
+	    (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
+		    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		return (0);
+		}
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+#ifdef	OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
+	{
+	static char buf[128];
+	HANDLE h;
+	DWORD cc, mode;
+	int cnt;
+
+	h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
+	fputs(prompt, stderr);
+	fflush(stderr);
+	fflush(stdout);
+	FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
+	GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
+	SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
+
+	for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
+		{
+		ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
+		if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
+			break;
+		fputc('*', stdout);
+		fflush(stderr);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		}
+
+	SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
+	buf[cnt] = '\0';
+	fputs("\n", stderr);
+	return buf;
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.2.4.2
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h	Wed Jun 15 21:12:32 2011
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */
+
+#define token_lock			pk11ca_token_lock
+#define find_lock			pk11ca_find_lock
+#define active_list			pk11ca_active_list
+#define pubkey_token_flags		pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags
+#define pubkey_SLOTID			pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID
+#define ERR_pk11_error			ERR_pk11ca_error
+#define PK11err_add_data		PK11CAerr_add_data
+#define pk11_get_session		pk11ca_get_session
+#define pk11_return_session		pk11ca_return_session
+#define pk11_active_add			pk11ca_active_add
+#define pk11_active_delete		pk11ca_active_delete
+#define pk11_active_remove		pk11ca_active_remove
+#define pk11_free_active_list		pk11ca_free_active_list
+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects	pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects
+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub	pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub
+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv	pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv
+#define pk11_load_privkey		pk11ca_load_privkey
+#define pk11_load_pubkey		pk11ca_load_pubkey
+#define PK11_RSA			PK11CA_RSA
+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects	pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects
+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub	pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub
+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv	pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv
+#define PK11_DSA			PK11CA_DSA
+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects	pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects
+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object		pk11ca_destroy_dh_object
+#define PK11_DH				PK11CA_DH
+#define pk11_token_relogin		pk11ca_token_relogin
+#define pFuncList			pk11ca_pFuncList
+#define pk11_pin			pk11ca_pin
+#define ENGINE_load_pk11		ENGINE_load_pk11ca
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.3.4.3
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c	Fri Oct  4 14:45:25 2013
@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#error RSA is disabled
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <cryptlib.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+typedef int pid_t;
+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
+#define NOPTHREADS
+#ifndef NULL_PTR
+#define NULL_PTR NULL
+#endif
+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
+#else
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Debug mutexes */
+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
+#define DEBUG_MUTEX
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
+#define __USE_UNIX98
+#endif
+#include <pthread.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
+
+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
+#define	PK11_DBG	"PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
+/*#undef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+#include "cryptoki.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
+#else
+#include "cryptoki.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#endif
+#include "hw_pk11so.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
+
+/*
+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
+ * RSA keys by reference feature.
+ */
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
+#endif
+
+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
+
+/*
+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
+ * logging into the token.
+ */
+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
+
+/*
+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
+ * PK11_SESSION object.
+ *
+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
+ *
+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
+ * They are also used for active list protection.
+ */
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
+ * list) for given algorithm type
+ */
+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
+ * without losing the secret key objects.
+ */
+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+/* ENGINE level stuff */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+
+/* RAND stuff */
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int pk11_rand_status(void);
+
+/* These functions are also used in other files */
+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+
+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
+
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
+
+/* Local helper functions */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+	CK_BBOOL persistent);
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
+
+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
+
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
+
+#define	TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv)	\
+	{								\
+	if (uselock)							\
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
+	if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1)			\
+		{							\
+		  retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl,	\
+		  priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent);	\
+		}							\
+	if (uselock)							\
+		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
+	}
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa	= CK_FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
+ */
+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH		ENGINE_CMD_BASE
+#define PK11_CMD_PIN			(ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT			(ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
+	{
+		{
+		PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
+		"SO_PATH",
+		"Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
+		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+		},
+		{
+		PK11_CMD_PIN,
+		"PIN",
+		"Specifies the pin code",
+		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+		},
+		{
+		PK11_CMD_SLOT,
+		"SLOT",
+		"Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
+		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
+		},
+		{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
+	};
+
+
+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
+	{
+	pk11_rand_seed,
+	pk11_rand_bytes,
+	pk11_rand_cleanup,
+	pk11_rand_add,
+	pk11_rand_bytes,
+	pk11_rand_status
+	};
+
+
+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
+#endif
+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)";
+
+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
+
+/*
+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
+ */
+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
+
+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
+char *pk11_pin = NULL;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
+static int pk11_pid = 0;
+
+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
+
+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	int type;
+	pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
+
+	if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
+	{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
+	if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
+	{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
+		return (0);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
+
+	find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
+		goto malloc_err;
+	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
+
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		session_cache[type].lock =
+		    OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
+		if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
+			goto malloc_err;
+		(void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+
+malloc_err:
+	pk11_free_all_locks();
+	PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	return (0);
+#else
+	return (1);
+#endif
+	}
+
+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	int type;
+
+	if (token_lock != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
+		OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
+		token_lock = NULL;
+		}
+
+	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
+		{
+		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
+		find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
+		}
+
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
+			OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
+			session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+/*
+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
+ */
+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		if (!pk11_library_init(e))
+			return (0);
+
+	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name))
+		return (0);
+
+	if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
+		    !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
+		    !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
+			return (0);
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+
+	if (pk11_have_random)
+		{
+		if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
+			return (0);
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		}
+	if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
+	    !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
+		return (0);
+
+	/* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
+	ERR_load_pk11_strings();
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
+#ifdef	ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+#error	"dynamic engine not supported"
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+	{
+	if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
+		return (0);
+
+	if (!bind_pk11(e))
+		return (0);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+
+#else
+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
+	{
+	ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+
+	if (!ret)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	if (!bind_pk11(ret))
+		{
+		ENGINE_free(ret);
+		return (NULL);
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+void
+ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
+	{
+	ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
+	 * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
+	 */
+	/* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
+	if (!pk11_dso)
+		pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		return;
+		}
+
+	e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
+	if (!e_pk11)
+		{
+		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
+		pk11_dso = NULL;
+		return;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
+	 * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
+	 * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
+	 * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
+	 */
+	if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
+		{
+		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
+		pk11_dso = NULL;
+		ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
+		return;
+		}
+
+	ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
+
+	ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	}
+#endif	/* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
+
+/*
+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
+ * the function symbol names to bind to.
+ */
+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+
+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+	{
+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+		return (PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+	return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+	}
+
+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
+	{
+	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
+
+	PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
+	}
+
+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
+	{
+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+
+	return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
+	}
+
+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+/* release all engine specific mutexes */
+static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#endif
+	}
+
+/*
+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
+ * accessible to all threads.
+ */
+static void pk11_fork_child(void)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	int i;
+
+	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
+		}
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#endif
+	}
+
+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+	return (pk11_library_init(e));
+}
+
+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
+	{
+	NULL_PTR,		/* CreateMutex */
+	NULL_PTR,		/* DestroyMutex */
+	NULL_PTR,		/* LockMutex */
+	NULL_PTR,		/* UnlockMutex */
+	CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK,	/* flags */
+	NULL_PTR,		/* pReserved */
+	};
+
+/*
+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
+	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
+	CK_INFO info;
+	int any_slot_found;
+	int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+	struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
+	 * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
+	 * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
+	 * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
+	 * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
+	 * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
+	 * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
+	 * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
+	 * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
+	 * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
+	 * initialize the engine again.
+	 */
+	if (pk11_library_initialized)
+		{
+		if (pk11_pid == getpid())
+			{
+			return (1);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+			/*
+			 * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
+			 * the application calls fork() without finishing the
+			 * engine first.
+			 */
+			pk11_free_all_locks();
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
+	p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
+		PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
+	if (!p)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
+	rv = p(&pFuncList);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+	/* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
+
+	(void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
+	(void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
+	(void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
+	(void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
+	(void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
+	(void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
+#endif
+	rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+	(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
+	(void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
+	(void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
+#endif
+	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
+	 * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
+	 * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
+	 * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
+	 * because no slot was present.
+	 */
+	if (any_slot_found == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
+			    PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
+	pk11_pid = getpid();
+	/*
+	 * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
+	 * will do the cleanup.
+	 */
+	if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
+		goto err;
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		session_cache[i].head = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
+	 * for asymmetric ciphers.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		active_list[i] = NULL;
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
+		{
+		if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
+		    pk11_fork_child) != 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
+		}
+#endif
+
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
+	ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
+	if (pk11_pin) {
+		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+	}
+	pk11_pin = NULL;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
+ * library.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
+	{
+	int i;
+
+	if (pk11_pin) {
+		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+	}
+	pk11_pin = NULL;
+
+	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
+
+	if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* free all active lists */
+	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
+		pk11_free_active_list(i);
+
+	pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
+	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
+	 * may have side-effects.
+	 */
+#if 0
+	pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
+#endif
+
+	if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	pk11_dso = NULL;
+	pFuncList = NULL;
+	pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
+	pk11_pid = 0;
+	/*
+	 * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
+	 * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
+	 * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
+	 * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
+	 * the engine before calling fork().
+	 */
+	pk11_free_all_locks();
+
+	return (1);
+
+err:
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
+	{
+	int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
+
+	switch (cmd)
+		{
+	case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
+		if (p == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		if (initialized)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
+	case PK11_CMD_PIN:
+		if (pk11_pin) {
+			memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
+			OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+		}
+		pk11_pin = NULL;
+
+		if (p == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
+		if (pk11_pin == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (0);
+			}
+		return (1);
+	case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
+		SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif
+		return (1);
+	default:
+		break;
+		}
+
+	PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
+	{
+	return;
+	}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
+	 * the calling functions do not care anyway
+	 */
+	pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+
+	return;
+	}
+
+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+	{
+	pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
+	}
+
+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
+		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
+static int pk11_rand_status(void)
+	{
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
+				}
+			if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+				{
+				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+				sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+				}
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
+ */
+PK11_SESSION *
+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
+#endif
+	static pid_t pid = 0;
+	pid_t new_pid;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+#endif
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
+	 * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
+	 * here, with no PID information.
+	 */
+	if (pid == 0)
+		pid = getpid();
+
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	sp = freelist;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
+	 * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
+	 * structure from the freelist.
+	 */
+	if (sp == NULL)
+		{
+		if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		(void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
+
+		/*
+		 * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
+		 * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
+		 * mark them as unused.
+		 */
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		freelist = sp->next;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
+	 * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
+	 */
+	if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
+		{
+		pid = new_pid;
+
+		/*
+		 * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
+		 * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
+		 * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
+		 * head of the list).
+		 */
+		while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
+			{
+			freelist = sp1->next;
+			/*
+			 * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
+			 * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
+			 * sessions and destroy all objects.
+			 */
+			pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp1);
+			}
+
+		/* we have to free the active list as well. */
+		pk11_free_active_list(optype);
+
+		/* Initialize the process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
+		if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
+			    rv);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
+		 * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
+		 * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
+		 * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
+		 * information.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
+			    rv);
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
+		 * re-initialization.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) 
+			{
+			/*
+			 * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
+			 * the caller cope with the situation.
+			 */
+			freelist = sp;
+			sp = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (sp->pid == 0)
+		{
+		/* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
+		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(sp);
+			sp = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
+	session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
+
+err:
+	if (sp != NULL)
+		sp->next = NULL;
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	return (sp);
+	}
+
+
+void
+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+#endif
+	PK11_SESSION *freelist;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
+	 * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
+	 * next time we will ask for a new session.
+	 */
+	if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
+		return;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+#endif
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return;
+		}
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	sp->next = freelist;
+	session_cache[optype].head = sp;
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	}
+
+
+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
+static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	int type;
+
+	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
+	 * return 0 on exit.
+	 */
+	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
+		{
+		if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
+ * return an error on return.
+ */
+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
+	pid_t mypid = getpid();
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
+#endif
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+		case OP_DSA:
+		case OP_DH:
+		case OP_RAND:
+		case OP_DIGEST:
+		case OP_CIPHER:
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
+#endif
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
+	while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
+		{
+		if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
+			{
+			rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
+			if (rv != CKR_OK)
+				{
+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
+					PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
+				ret = 0;
+				}
+			}
+		freelist = sp->next;
+		pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
+		OPENSSL_free(sp);
+		}
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+
+static int
+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
+
+	switch (optype)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+			myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
+			break;
+		case OP_RAND:
+			myslot = rand_SLOTID;
+			break;
+		default:
+			PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
+			    PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+	sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+	if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We are probably a child process so force the
+		 * reinitialize of the session
+		 */
+		pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
+		if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
+			return (0);
+		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
+			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
+		}
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	sp->pid = getpid();
+
+	if (optype == OP_RSA)
+		{
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
+	 * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
+	 */
+	sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
+	sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
+			sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
+			}
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
+			sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
+	{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
+		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
+			sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
+		 * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
+		 * must free those as well.
+		 */
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
+			}
+		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
+			{
+			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
+			sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
+ * objects in the free list.
+ */
+int
+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
+	{
+	int ret = 1;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
+	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
+
+	if (session != NULL)
+		local_free_session = session;
+	else
+		{
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
+		uselock = FALSE;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
+	 */
+	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
+		{
+		local_free_session = sp->next;
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
+		 * destroy operations fails.
+		 */
+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
+			{
+			ret = 0;
+			continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	if (session == NULL)
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
+#else
+	if (session == NULL)
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+static int
+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
+	CK_BBOOL persistent)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	/*
+	 * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
+	 * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
+	 * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
+	 */
+	if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
+		return (1);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
+		    rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+
+/*
+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
+ *
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
+ *
+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
+ * public key slot.
+ *
+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
+ */
+static int
+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
+	{
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
+	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
+	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
+	unsigned int i;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
+	CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
+	CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
+
+	/* let's initialize the output parameter */
+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+		*any_slot_found = 0;
+
+	/* Get slot list for memory allocation */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
+	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
+		{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
+
+	if (pSlotList == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/* Get the slot list for processing */
+	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		/* Check if slot has random support. */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+		if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
+			{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
+			rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
+			break;
+			}
+		}
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
+	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
+		{
+		CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
+		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			continue;
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
+		 */
+		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+			&mech_info);
+
+		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN)))
+			{
+			slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
+			}
+
+		if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa)
+			{
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+			best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
+			pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
+			found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
+			/*
+			 * Cache the flags for later use. We might
+			 * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
+			 * is used.
+			 */
+			pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
+			    PK11_DBG);
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
+			    best_slot_sofar);
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
+			    "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG);
+			}
+#else
+			} /* if */
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+		} /* for */
+
+	if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
+		{
+		pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
+		}
+
+	/*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/
+
+#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
+#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
+
+	if (pSlotList != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
+
+	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
+		*any_slot_found = 1;
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.2.4.2
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h	Wed Jun 15 21:12:32 2011
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */
+
+#define token_lock			pk11so_token_lock
+#define find_lock			pk11so_find_lock
+#define active_list			pk11so_active_list
+#define pubkey_token_flags		pk11so_pubkey_token_flags
+#define pubkey_SLOTID			pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID
+#define ERR_pk11_error			ERR_pk11so_error
+#define PK11err_add_data		PK11SOerr_add_data
+#define pk11_get_session		pk11so_get_session
+#define pk11_return_session		pk11so_return_session
+#define pk11_active_add			pk11so_active_add
+#define pk11_active_delete		pk11so_active_delete
+#define pk11_active_remove		pk11so_active_remove
+#define pk11_free_active_list		pk11so_free_active_list
+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects	pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects
+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub	pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub
+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv	pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv
+#define pk11_load_privkey		pk11so_load_privkey
+#define pk11_load_pubkey		pk11so_load_pubkey
+#define PK11_RSA			PK11SO_RSA
+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects	pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects
+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub	pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub
+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv	pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv
+#define PK11_DSA			PK11SO_DSA
+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects	pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects
+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object		pk11so_destroy_dh_object
+#define PK11_DH				PK11SO_DH
+#define pk11_token_relogin		pk11so_token_relogin
+#define pFuncList			pk11so_pFuncList
+#define pk11_pin			pk11so_pin
+#define ENGINE_load_pk11		ENGINE_load_pk11so
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.2.4.6
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c	Fri Oct  4 14:45:25 2013
@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ */
+
+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
+/*
+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
+ *
+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
+ * Afchine Madjlessi.
+ */
+/*
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#error RSA is disabled
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <cryptlib.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#define NOPTHREADS
+typedef int pid_t;
+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
+#ifndef NULL_PTR
+#define NULL_PTR NULL
+#endif
+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+	returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
+#else
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+#include <pthread.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+#include "cryptoki.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
+#else
+#include "cryptoki.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#endif
+#include "hw_pk11so.h"
+#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
+
+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
+#endif
+
+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
+#define getpassphrase(x)	getpass(x)
+#endif
+
+/* RSA stuff */
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
+	BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
+
+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
+
+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
+	CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
+
+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+	CK_BBOOL is_private);
+
+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
+#else
+static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
+ * variable and jump to the specified label.
+ */
+#define	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label)	\
+	{								\
+	if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0)			\
+		{							\
+		var = TRUE;						\
+		if (unlock)						\
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);			\
+		goto label;						\
+		}							\
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
+ * entry otherwise return NULL.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry;
+
+	for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
+		if (entry->h == h)
+			return (entry);
+
+	return (NULL);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
+ * failure.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+int
+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
+	if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+		return (-1);
+		}
+
+	/* search for entry in the active list */
+	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
+		entry->refcnt++;
+	else
+		{
+		/* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
+		entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
+		if (entry == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			return (-1);
+			}
+		entry->h = h;
+		entry->refcnt = 1;
+		entry->prev = NULL;
+		entry->next = NULL;
+		/* connect the newly created entry to the list */
+		if (active_list[type] == NULL)
+			active_list[type] = entry;
+		else /* make the entry first in the list */
+			{
+			entry->next = active_list[type];
+			active_list[type]->prev = entry;
+			active_list[type] = entry;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (entry->refcnt);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+void
+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *prev_entry;
+
+	/* remove the entry from the list and free it */
+	if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
+		{
+		prev_entry->next = entry->next;
+		if (entry->next != NULL)
+			entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		active_list[type] = entry->next;
+		/* we were the first but not the only one */
+		if (entry->next != NULL)
+			entry->next->prev = NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* sanitization */
+	entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	entry->prev = NULL;
+	entry->next = NULL;
+	OPENSSL_free(entry);
+	}
+
+/* Free all entries from the active list. */
+void
+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry;
+
+	/* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
+	switch (type)
+		{
+		case OP_RSA:
+			break;
+		default:
+			return;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+	while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
+		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
+ *
+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
+ *
+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
+ * held.
+ */
+int
+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
+	{
+	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
+
+	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
+		return (-1);
+		}
+
+	OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
+	entry->refcnt--;
+	if (entry->refcnt == 0)
+		{
+		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
+		return (1);
+		}
+
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa;
+
+RSA_METHOD *
+PK11_RSA(void)
+	{
+	const RSA_METHOD *rsa;
+
+	if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL)
+		{
+		rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+		memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa));
+		pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method";
+		pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign;
+		}
+	return (&pk11_rsa);
+	}
+
+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
+#define	SSL_SIG_LENGTH		36
+
+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
+
+/*
+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
+ */
+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	X509_SIG sig;
+	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
+	int i, j = 0;
+	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
+	X509_ALGOR algor;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
+	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned long ulsiglen;
+
+	/* Encode the digest */
+	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+		s = (unsigned char *)m;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sig.algor = &algor;
+		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
+				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
+
+		sig.digest = &digest;
+		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
+		sig.digest->length = m_len;
+
+		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+		}
+
+	j = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
+		{
+		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		if (s == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		p = s;
+		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+		}
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+
+	(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+
+	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
+	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+			pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
+			    &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
+			    sp->session);
+
+	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		ulsiglen = j;
+		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
+			(CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
+		*siglen = ulsiglen;
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		ret = 1;
+		}
+
+err:
+	if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
+		{
+		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
+		OPENSSL_free(s);
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (ret);
+	}
+
+static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
+
+#define	MAXATTR	1024
+
+/*
+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
+ * PKCS#11 token.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	FILE *privkey;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
+
+	/* we look for private keys only */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
+		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
+		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
+	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
+	 * never ask for private components.
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
+		};
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
+	 */
+	if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
+		{
+		search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
+		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
+		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+		    CK_TRUE) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/* see find_lock array definition
+		   for more info on object locking */
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+		/*
+		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
+		 * if we can't find it.
+		 */
+		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+		    &ks_key) == 0)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
+			hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
+				        "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
+					NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+		/*
+		 * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
+		 * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
+		 * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
+		 * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
+		 * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
+		 * do not check the return value because even in case
+		 * of failure the sp structure will have both key
+		 * pointer and object handle cleaned and
+		 * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
+		 * OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
+
+		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
+		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
+		sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
+
+		/*
+		 * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
+		 * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
+		 * consistency reasons.
+		 */
+		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
+		 * everything else is 0 or NULL.
+		 */
+		rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
+		RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
+
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
+					 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
+		 * must take care of handle management ourselves.
+		 */
+		KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
+
+		/*
+		 * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
+		 * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+		/*
+		 * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
+		 * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
+		 * in the keystore.
+		 */
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
+			&sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
+			&sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
+
+		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+		{
+		pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		(void) fclose(privkey);
+		if (pkey != NULL)
+			{
+			rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+			if (rsa != NULL)
+				{
+				/*
+				 * This will always destroy the RSA
+				 * object since we have a new RSA
+				 * structure here.
+				 */
+				(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
+				sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
+
+				h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
+				    pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
+				if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+					goto err;
+				}
+			else
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (pkey);
+err:
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	if (rsa != NULL)
+		RSA_free(rsa);
+	if (pkey != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		pkey = NULL;
+		}
+	rollback = rollback;
+	return (pkey);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
+ * PKCS#11 token.
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
+	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+	{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	FILE *pubkey;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	PK11_SESSION *sp;
+	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
+	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
+
+	/* we look for public keys only */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
+		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
+		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	/*
+	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
+	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
+	 */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
+		};
+
+	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
+	 */
+	if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
+		{
+		search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
+		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
+
+		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
+		    CK_FALSE) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/* see find_lock array definition
+		   for more info on object locking */
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+		/*
+		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
+		 * if we can't find it.
+		 */
+		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
+		    &ks_key) == 0)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
+		 * structure. No cache hit is possible.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
+
+		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
+		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
+		sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
+
+		/*
+		 * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
+		 */
+		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
+		 * everything else is 0 or NULL.
+		 */
+		rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
+
+		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
+		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
+					 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
+		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
+
+		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * Create a session object from it so that when calling
+		 * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
+		 * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
+		 * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
+		 * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
+		 * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
+		 * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
+		 * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
+		 * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
+		 * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
+		 */
+		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+		    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
+		    &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
+		    &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
+		if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+			goto err;
+		}
+	else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
+		{
+		pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		(void) fclose(pubkey);
+		if (pkey != NULL)
+			{
+			rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+			if (rsa != NULL)
+				{
+				/*
+				 * This will always destroy the RSA
+				 * object since we have a new RSA
+				 * structure here.
+				 */
+				(void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
+				sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
+
+				h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
+				    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
+				    &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
+				if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+					goto err;
+				}
+			else
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	return (pkey);
+err:
+	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
+	if (rsa != NULL)
+		RSA_free(rsa);
+	if (pkey != NULL)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		pkey = NULL;
+		}
+	return (pkey);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
+    RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
+    CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
+		};
+
+	int i;
+
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+	a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
+	if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
+
+	a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
+	a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
+		(size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
+	if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
+		if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+	if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
+		if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
+			*rsa_n_num = NULL;
+			rollback = TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = rsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
+ */
+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
+    BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	int i;
+	CK_ULONG found;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
+	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
+	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
+
+	/* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
+		{
+		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
+		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
+		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
+		{CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
+		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		{CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
+		};
+
+	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
+		h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
+		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+		goto set;
+	}
+	
+	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
+	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
+
+	/* Put the private key components into the template */
+	if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
+	    init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
+		&a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto malloc_err;
+		}
+
+	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
+	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+	/*
+	 * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
+	 * component is NULL.  That means this is key by reference RSA
+	 * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
+	 * searching for the private key handle.
+	 */
+	if (rsa->d == NULL)
+		{
+		ul_key_attr_count = 8;
+		/*
+		 * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
+		 * session keys.
+		 */
+		a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
+		ul_key_attr_count);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (found == 0)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
+		 * only so we tried to find the private key in the
+		 * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
+		 * problem. Note that for other key types we just
+		 * create a new session key using the private
+		 * components from the RSA structure.
+		 */
+		if (rsa->d == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+			    PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
+			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
+				PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+set:
+	if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
+		 * extract private components from the keystore. In
+		 * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
+		 * application to properly cope with that. It is
+		 * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
+		 * reference are used we expect it to be used
+		 * exclusively using the high level API and then there
+		 * is no problem. If the application expects the
+		 * private components to be read from the keystore
+		 * then that is not a supported way of usage.
+		 */
+		if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
+			{
+			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			rollback = TRUE;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			*rsa_d_num = NULL;
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
+	 * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
+	 * 'n'/'e' components as well.
+	 */
+	*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
+	*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
+
+	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
+	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
+	if (key_ptr != NULL)
+		*key_ptr = rsa;
+
+err:
+	if (rollback)
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
+		 * since we are doing rollback.
+		 */
+		if (found == 0 &&
+		    (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
+			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
+		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+		}
+
+	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
+
+malloc_err:
+	/*
+	 * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
+	 * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
+	 */
+	for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
+		{
+		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
+			{
+			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
+				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
+			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
+			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+
+	return (h_key);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
+	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
+	 * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
+	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
+	 *
+	 * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
+	 * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
+	 * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
+	 * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
+	 * both data signing and verifying.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
+	    (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
+ */
+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
+	{
+	/*
+	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
+	 * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
+	 * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
+	 * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
+	 * public component since with the keys by reference
+	 * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
+	 * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
+	 * compare the handle as well.
+	 */
+	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
+	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
+	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
+	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
+	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
+		{
+		/*
+		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
+		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
+		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
+		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
+		 */
+		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Local function to simplify key template population
+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
+ */
+static int
+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
+	CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
+	{
+	CK_ULONG len = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
+	 * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
+	 */
+	if (bn != NULL)
+		len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+
+	if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	*ul_value_len = len;
+	*p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
+	if (*p_value == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+static void
+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
+	{
+	if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
+		*bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
+ * Assume object store locked.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 OK
+ *	0 no object or more than 1 object found
+ */
+static int
+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG objcnt;
+
+	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
+		    rv);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
+
+	if (objcnt > 1)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
+		    PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	else if (objcnt == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
+		return (0);
+		}
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/* from uri stuff */
+
+extern char *pk11_pin;
+
+static int pk11_get_pin(void);
+
+static int
+pk11_get_pin(void)
+{
+	char *pin;
+
+	/* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
+	if (pin == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		return (0);
+		}
+	pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
+	if (pk11_pin == NULL)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		return (0);
+		}
+	memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
+ * multiple threads.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+static int
+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
+    CK_BBOOL is_private)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+#if 0
+	/* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
+	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+		    PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+		return (0);
+		}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
+	 * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
+	 * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
+	 * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
+	 * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
+	 * flag is set.
+	 */
+	if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
+	     (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
+	    (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
+		{
+		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
+		return (0);
+		}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
+	 * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
+	 * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
+	 * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
+	 * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
+	 * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
+	 * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
+	 * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
+	 * lock right before C_Login().
+	 */
+	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
+	    (is_private == CK_TRUE))
+		{
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
+			{
+			if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
+				{
+				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
+				return (0);
+				}
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
+		 * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
+		 * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
+		 * the engine.
+		 *
+		 * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
+		 * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
+		 */
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
+			{
+			if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
+			    CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
+			    strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
+				{
+				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
+				    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+				goto err_locked;
+				}
+
+			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
+
+			}
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		}
+	else
+		{
+			/*
+			 * If token does not require login we take it as the
+			 * login was done.
+			 */
+			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
+		}
+
+	return (1);
+
+err_locked:
+	if (pk11_pin) {
+		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
+		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
+	}
+	pk11_pin = NULL;
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	return (0);
+	}
+
+/*
+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
+ * this.
+ *
+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *	1 on success
+ *	0 on failure
+ */
+int
+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+	{
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
+		return (0);
+
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
+	    (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
+		{
+		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
+		    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+		return (0);
+		}
+#ifndef NOPTHREADS
+	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
+#else
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
+#endif
+
+	return (1);
+	}
+
+#ifdef	OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
+	{
+	static char buf[128];
+	HANDLE h;
+	DWORD cc, mode;
+	int cnt;
+
+	h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
+	fputs(prompt, stderr);
+	fflush(stderr);
+	fflush(stdout);
+	FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
+	GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
+	SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
+
+	for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
+		{
+		ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
+		if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
+			break;
+		fputc('*', stdout);
+		fflush(stderr);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		}
+
+	SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
+	buf[cnt] = '\0';
+	fputs("\n", stderr);
+	return buf;
+	}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h	Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */
+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
+
+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
+
+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 
+ * referencing the derived work.
+
+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 
+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
+ * warranty of any kind.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_
+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by
+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined.  These
+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them
+ * are also given.  Be advised that these definitions can depend
+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also
+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or
+ * dynamically).
+ *
+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention
+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set.  The Cryptoki
+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte
+ * aligned.
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following
+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
+ *
+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+ *
+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including
+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
+ *
+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using
+ * the following preprocessor directive before including
+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
+ *
+ * #pragma pack(1)
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this.  You might
+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything.
+ *
+ *
+ * Now for the macros:
+ *
+ *
+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an
+ * object.  It can be used like this:
+ *
+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_PTR *
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_PTR far *
+ *
+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_PTR *
+ *
+ *
+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a
+ * return type and a function name.  It should be used in the
+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in
+ * a Cryptoki library:
+ *
+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
+ *   CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
+ * )
+ * {
+ *   ...
+ * }
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a
+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
+ * might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __export _far _pascal name
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType name
+ *
+ *
+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a
+ * return type and a function name.  It should be used in the
+ * following fashion:
+ *
+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
+ *   CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
+ * );
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a
+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
+ * might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __export _far _pascal name
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType name
+ *
+ *
+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro
+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or
+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a
+ * function name.  It should be used in the following fashion:
+ *
+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function
+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV.
+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args);
+ *
+ * or
+ *
+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a
+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning
+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type
+ * // funcPtrType.
+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args);
+ * funcPtrType funcPtr;
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access
+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might
+ * be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __export _far _pascal (* name)
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType (* name)
+ *
+ *
+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of
+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback.
+ * It should be used in the following fashion:
+ *
+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args);
+ *
+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback
+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV.  It can also
+ * be used like this:
+ *
+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args);
+ * myCallbackType myCallback;
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32
+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType (* name)
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType _far _pascal (* name)
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType (* name)
+ *
+ *
+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer.
+ *
+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well),
+ * this should best be defined by
+ *
+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR
+ * #define NULL_PTR 0
+ * #endif
+ */
+
+
+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the
+ * file pkcs11t.h. */
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+
+#define __PASTE(x,y)      x##y
+
+
+/* ==============================================================
+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points.
+ * ==============================================================
+ */
+
+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST  1
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
+  extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name)
+
+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
+ * function prototypes. */
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+
+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+
+
+/* ==============================================================
+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points.  That is, for
+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is
+ * a pointer to that kind of function.
+ * ==============================================================
+ */
+
+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST  1
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
+  typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name))
+
+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
+ * function prototypes. */
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+
+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+
+
+/* ==============================================================
+ * Define structed vector of entry points.  A CK_FUNCTION_LIST
+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version
+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in
+ * the library.  This type was declared, but not defined, in
+ * pkcs11t.h.
+ * ==============================================================
+ */
+
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
+  __PASTE(CK_,name) name;
+  
+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST {
+
+  CK_VERSION    version;  /* Cryptoki version */
+
+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */
+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
+ * function prototypes. */
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+
+};
+
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+
+
+#undef __PASTE
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h	Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */
+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
+
+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
+
+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 
+ * referencing the derived work.
+
+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 
+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
+ * warranty of any kind.
+ */
+
+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */
+/* Cryptoki function prototypes.  Because this information is */
+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */
+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */
+/* should not be altered. */
+
+/* General-purpose */
+
+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_VOID_PTR   pInitArgs  /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets
+                            * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR
+                            * and dereferenced */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the
+ * Cryptoki library. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_VOID_PTR   pReserved  /* reserved.  Should be NULL_PTR */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_INFO_PTR   pInfo  /* location that receives information */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList  /* receives pointer to
+                                            * function list */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Slot and token management */
+
+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_BBOOL       tokenPresent,  /* only slots with tokens? */
+  CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList,     /* receives array of slot IDs */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR   pulCount       /* receives number of slots */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in
+ * the system. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID       slotID,  /* the ID of the slot */
+  CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo    /* receives the slot information */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token
+ * in the system. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID        slotID,  /* ID of the token's slot */
+  CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo    /* receives the token information */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types
+ * supported by a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID            slotID,          /* ID of token's slot */
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList,  /* gets mech. array */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR          pulCount         /* gets # of mechs. */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular
+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID            slotID,  /* ID of the token's slot */
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE     type,    /* type of mechanism */
+  CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo    /* receives mechanism info */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID      slotID,    /* ID of the token's slot */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,      /* the SO's initial PIN */
+  CK_ULONG        ulPinLen,  /* length in bytes of the PIN */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel     /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pPin,      /* the normal user's PIN */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPinLen   /* length in bytes of the PIN */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pOldPin,   /* the old PIN */
+  CK_ULONG          ulOldLen,  /* length of the old PIN */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pNewPin,   /* the new PIN */
+  CK_ULONG          ulNewLen   /* length of the new PIN */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Session management */
+
+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a
+ * token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID            slotID,        /* the slot's ID */
+  CK_FLAGS              flags,         /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */
+  CK_VOID_PTR           pApplication,  /* passed to callback */
+  CK_NOTIFY             Notify,        /* callback function */
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession      /* gets session handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a
+ * token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID     slotID  /* the token's slot */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE   hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo      /* receives session info */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation
+ * in a session. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,             /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pOperationState,      /* gets state */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulOperationStateLen  /* gets state length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
+ * operation in a session. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pOperationState,      /* holds state */
+  CK_ULONG         ulOperationStateLen,  /* holds state length */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey,       /* en/decryption key */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey    /* sign/verify key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_USER_TYPE      userType,  /* the user type */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pPin,      /* the user's PIN */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPinLen   /* the length of the PIN */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Object management */
+
+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,   /* the object's template */
+  CK_ULONG          ulCount,     /* attributes in template */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject  /* gets new object's handle. */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the
+ * copy. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE     hObject,     /* the object's handle */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,   /* template for new object */
+  CK_ULONG             ulCount,     /* attributes in template */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject  /* receives handle of copy */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject    /* the object's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject,   /* the object's handle */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSize    /* receives size of object */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object
+ * attributes. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject,    /* the object's handle */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,  /* specifies attrs; gets vals */
+  CK_ULONG          ulCount     /* attributes in template */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object
+ * attributes */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject,    /* the object's handle */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,  /* specifies attrs and values */
+  CK_ULONG          ulCount     /* attributes in template */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session
+ * objects that match a template. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,  /* attribute values to match */
+  CK_ULONG          ulCount     /* attrs in search template */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session
+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object
+ * handles. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,          /* session's handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject,          /* gets obj. handles */
+ CK_ULONG             ulMaxObjectCount,  /* max handles to get */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR         pulObjectCount     /* actual # returned */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session
+ * objects. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Encryption and decryption */
+
+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the encryption mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* handle of encryption key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,               /* the plaintext data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,           /* bytes of plaintext */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedData,      /* gets ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedDataLen  /* gets c-text size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,           /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,              /* the plaintext data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen,          /* plaintext data len */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,     /* gets ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,                /* session handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLastEncryptedPart,      /* last c-text */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulLastEncryptedPartLen  /* gets last size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the decryption mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* handle of decryption key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,           /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedData,     /* ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,              /* gets plaintext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDataLen          /* gets p-text size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* encrypted data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedPartLen,  /* input length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* gets plaintext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulPartLen           /* p-text size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,       /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLastPart,      /* gets plaintext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulLastPartLen  /* p-text size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Message digesting */
+
+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism  /* the digesting mechanism */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,     /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,        /* data to be digested */
+  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,    /* bytes of data to digest */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pDigest,      /* gets the message digest */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDigestLen  /* gets digest length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,     /* data to be digested */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen  /* bytes of data to be digested */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting
+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of
+ * the data already digested. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey       /* secret key to digest */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,     /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pDigest,      /* gets the message digest */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDigestLen  /* gets byte count of digest */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Signing and MACing */
+
+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption)
+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to
+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the
+ *signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the signature mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* handle of signature key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single
+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the
+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,           /* the data to sign */
+  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,       /* count of bytes to sign */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* gets the signature */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSignatureLen  /* gets signature length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, 
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,     /* the data to sign */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen  /* count of bytes to sign */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, 
+ * returning the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* gets the signature */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSignatureLen  /* gets signature length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where
+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey        /* handle of the signature key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the
+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,           /* the data to sign */
+  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,       /* count of bytes to sign */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* gets the signature */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSignatureLen  /* gets signature length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */
+
+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the
+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot
+ *  cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the verification mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* verification key */ 
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, 
+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext
+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,       /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,          /* signed data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,      /* length of signed data */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,     /* signature */
+  CK_ULONG          ulSignatureLen  /* signature length*/
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification
+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, 
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,     /* signed data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen  /* length of signed data */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification
+ * operation, checking the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,       /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,     /* signature to verify */
+  CK_ULONG          ulSignatureLen  /* signature length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification
+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the verification mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* verification key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part
+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* signature to verify */
+  CK_ULONG          ulSignatureLen,  /* signature length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,           /* gets signed data */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDataLen       /* gets signed data len */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
+
+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting
+ * and encryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* the plaintext data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen,           /* plaintext length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* gets ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedPartLen  /* gets c-text length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
+ * digesting operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedPartLen,  /* ciphertext length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* gets plaintext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulPartLen           /* gets plaintext len */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
+ * encryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* the plaintext data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen,           /* plaintext length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* gets ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedPartLen  /* gets c-text length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
+ * verify operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedPartLen,  /* ciphertext length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* gets plaintext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulPartLen           /* gets p-text length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Key management */
+
+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key
+ * object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,  /* key generation mech. */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,   /* template for new key */
+  CK_ULONG             ulCount,     /* # of attrs in template */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey        /* gets handle of new key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, 
+ * creating new key objects. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,                    /* session
+                                                     * handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,                  /* key-gen
+                                                     * mech. */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pPublicKeyTemplate,          /* template
+                                                     * for pub.
+                                                     * key */
+  CK_ULONG             ulPublicKeyAttributeCount,   /* # pub.
+                                                     * attrs. */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pPrivateKeyTemplate,         /* template
+                                                     * for priv.
+                                                     * key */
+  CK_ULONG             ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount,  /* # priv.
+                                                     * attrs. */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,                 /* gets pub.
+                                                     * key
+                                                     * handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey                 /* gets
+                                                     * priv. key
+                                                     * handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,      /* the wrapping mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hWrappingKey,    /* wrapping key */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey,            /* key to be wrapped */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pWrappedKey,     /* gets wrapped key */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new
+ * key object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,          /* session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,        /* unwrapping mech. */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE     hUnwrappingKey,    /* unwrapping key */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR          pWrappedKey,       /* the wrapped key */
+  CK_ULONG             ulWrappedKeyLen,   /* wrapped key len */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,         /* new key template */
+  CK_ULONG             ulAttributeCount,  /* template length */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey              /* gets new handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key
+ * object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,          /* session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,        /* key deriv. mech. */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE     hBaseKey,          /* base key */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,         /* new key template */
+  CK_ULONG             ulAttributeCount,  /* template length */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey              /* gets new handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Random number generation */
+
+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's
+ * random number generator. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed,     /* the seed material */
+  CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen  /* length of seed material */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       RandomData,  /* receives the random data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulRandomLen  /* # of bytes to generate */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Parallel function management */
+
+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an
+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an
+ * application. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function
+ * running in parallel. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */
+
+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion,
+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_FLAGS flags,        /* blocking/nonblocking flag */
+  CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot,  /* location that receives the slot ID */
+  CK_VOID_PTR pRserved   /* reserved.  Should be NULL_PTR */
+);
+#endif
Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h
diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 23 16:49:06 2015
+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h	Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008
@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@
+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */
+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
+
+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
+
+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
+ * referencing the derived work.
+
+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
+ * warranty of any kind.
+ */
+
+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that
+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that
+ * must be set before including this file. */
+
+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_
+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1
+
+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2
+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20
+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3
+
+#define CK_TRUE 1
+#define CK_FALSE 0
+
+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE CK_FALSE
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE CK_TRUE
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */
+typedef unsigned char     CK_BYTE;
+
+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */
+typedef CK_BYTE           CK_CHAR;
+
+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */
+typedef CK_BYTE           CK_UTF8CHAR;
+
+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */
+typedef CK_BYTE           CK_BBOOL;
+
+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */
+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;
+
+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */
+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */
+typedef long int          CK_LONG;
+
+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_FLAGS;
+
+
+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */
+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL)
+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE    0
+
+
+typedef CK_BYTE     CK_PTR   CK_BYTE_PTR;
+typedef CK_CHAR     CK_PTR   CK_CHAR_PTR;
+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR   CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR;
+typedef CK_ULONG    CK_PTR   CK_ULONG_PTR;
+typedef void        CK_PTR   CK_VOID_PTR;
+
+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */
+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR;
+
+
+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */
+/* handle or object handle */
+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0
+
+
+typedef struct CK_VERSION {
+  CK_BYTE       major;  /* integer portion of version number */
+  CK_BYTE       minor;  /* 1/100ths portion of version number */
+} CK_VERSION;
+
+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_INFO {
+  /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from
+   * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
+  CK_VERSION    cryptokiVersion;     /* Cryptoki interface ver */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   manufacturerID[32];  /* blank padded */
+  CK_FLAGS      flags;               /* must be zero */
+
+  /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   libraryDescription[32];  /* blank padded */
+  CK_VERSION    libraryVersion;          /* version of library */
+} CK_INFO;
+
+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR    CK_INFO_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that
+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */
+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG
+ * for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION;
+#define CKN_SURRENDER       0
+
+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED     1
+
+
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_SLOT_ID;
+
+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */
+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO {
+  /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from
+   * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   slotDescription[64];  /* blank padded */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   manufacturerID[32];   /* blank padded */
+  CK_FLAGS      flags;
+
+  /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */
+  CK_VERSION    hardwareVersion;  /* version of hardware */
+  CK_VERSION    firmwareVersion;  /* version of firmware */
+} CK_SLOT_INFO;
+
+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
+ *      Bit Flag              Mask        Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT     0x00000001  /* a token is there */
+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE  0x00000002  /* removable devices*/
+#define CKF_HW_SLOT           0x00000004  /* hardware slot */
+
+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */
+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO {
+  /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from
+   * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   label[32];           /* blank padded */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   manufacturerID[32];  /* blank padded */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   model[16];           /* blank padded */
+  CK_CHAR       serialNumber[16];    /* blank padded */
+  CK_FLAGS      flags;               /* see below */
+
+  /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount,
+   * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been
+   * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMaxSessionCount;     /* max open sessions */
+  CK_ULONG      ulSessionCount;        /* sess. now open */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMaxRwSessionCount;   /* max R/W sessions */
+  CK_ULONG      ulRwSessionCount;      /* R/W sess. now open */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMaxPinLen;           /* in bytes */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMinPinLen;           /* in bytes */
+  CK_ULONG      ulTotalPublicMemory;   /* in bytes */
+  CK_ULONG      ulFreePublicMemory;    /* in bytes */
+  CK_ULONG      ulTotalPrivateMemory;  /* in bytes */
+  CK_ULONG      ulFreePrivateMemory;   /* in bytes */
+
+  /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for
+   * v2.0 */
+  CK_VERSION    hardwareVersion;       /* version of hardware */
+  CK_VERSION    firmwareVersion;       /* version of firmware */
+  CK_CHAR       utcTime[16];           /* time */
+} CK_TOKEN_INFO;
+
+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows:
+ *      Bit Flag                    Mask        Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_RNG                     0x00000001  /* has random #
+                                                 * generator */
+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED         0x00000002  /* token is
+                                                 * write-
+                                                 * protected */
+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED          0x00000004  /* user must
+                                                 * login */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED    0x00000008  /* normal user's
+                                                 * PIN is set */
+
+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0.  If it is set,
+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic
+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys
+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */
+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED  0x00000020
+
+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0.  If it is set, that means
+ * that the token has some sort of clock.  The time on that
+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */
+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN          0x00000040
+
+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0.  If it is
+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login
+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */
+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100
+
+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0.  If it is true,
+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform
+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and
+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt
+ * and sign) */
+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS  0x00000200
+
+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an
+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11.
+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause
+ * the token to be reinitialized. */
+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED       0x00000400
+
+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is
+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for
+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and
+   onwards. */
+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION  0x00000800
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once
+ * since the last successful authentication. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW       0x00010000
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY       0x00020000
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not
+ * possible. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED          0x00040000
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token
+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
+ * expired by the card. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED   0x00080000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since
+ * the last successful authentication. */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW         0x00100000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY         0x00200000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO
+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible.
+ */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED            0x00400000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token
+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
+ * expired by the card. */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED     0x00800000
+
+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that
+ * identifies a session */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_SESSION_HANDLE;
+
+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */
+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_USER_TYPE;
+/* Security Officer */
+#define CKU_SO    0
+/* Normal user */
+#define CKU_USER  1
+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */
+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC   2
+
+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */
+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_STATE;
+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION  0
+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS  1
+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION  2
+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS  3
+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS    4
+
+
+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */
+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO {
+  CK_SLOT_ID    slotID;
+  CK_STATE      state;
+  CK_FLAGS      flags;          /* see below */
+
+  /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+   * v2.0 */
+  CK_ULONG      ulDeviceError;  /* device-dependent error code */
+} CK_SESSION_INFO;
+
+/* The flags are defined in the following table:
+ *      Bit Flag                Mask        Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_RW_SESSION          0x00000002  /* session is r/w */
+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION      0x00000004  /* no parallel */
+
+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an
+ * object  */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_OBJECT_HANDLE;
+
+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or
+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes.  It is defined
+ * as follows: */
+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_OBJECT_CLASS;
+
+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */
+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */
+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */
+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKO_DATA              0x00000000
+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE       0x00000001
+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY        0x00000002
+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY       0x00000003
+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY        0x00000004
+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE        0x00000005
+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006
+#define CKO_MECHANISM         0x00000007
+
+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
+#define CKO_OTP_KEY           0x00000008
+
+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED    0x80000000
+
+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a
+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object
+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE;
+
+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */
+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER  0x00000001
+#define CKH_CLOCK           0x00000002
+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE  0x00000003
+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED  0x80000000
+
+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */
+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_KEY_TYPE;
+
+/* the following key types are defined: */
+#define CKK_RSA             0x00000000
+#define CKK_DSA             0x00000001
+#define CKK_DH              0x00000002
+
+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */
+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */
+#define CKK_ECDSA           0x00000003
+#define CKK_EC              0x00000003
+#define CKK_X9_42_DH        0x00000004
+#define CKK_KEA             0x00000005
+
+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET  0x00000010
+#define CKK_RC2             0x00000011
+#define CKK_RC4             0x00000012
+#define CKK_DES             0x00000013
+#define CKK_DES2            0x00000014
+#define CKK_DES3            0x00000015
+
+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKK_CAST            0x00000016
+#define CKK_CAST3           0x00000017
+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */
+#define CKK_CAST5           0x00000018
+#define CKK_CAST128         0x00000018
+#define CKK_RC5             0x00000019
+#define CKK_IDEA            0x0000001A
+#define CKK_SKIPJACK        0x0000001B
+#define CKK_BATON           0x0000001C
+#define CKK_JUNIPER         0x0000001D
+#define CKK_CDMF            0x0000001E
+#define CKK_AES             0x0000001F
+
+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKK_BLOWFISH        0x00000020
+#define CKK_TWOFISH         0x00000021
+
+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
+#define CKK_SECURID         0x00000022
+#define CKK_HOTP            0x00000023
+#define CKK_ACTI            0x00000024
+
+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKK_CAMELLIA                   0x00000025
+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKK_ARIA                       0x00000026
+
+
+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED  0x80000000
+
+
+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate
+ * type */
+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG
+ * for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
+
+/* The following certificate types are defined: */
+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */
+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKC_X_509           0x00000000
+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001
+#define CKC_WTLS            0x00000002
+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED  0x80000000
+
+
+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute
+ * type */
+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
+
+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which
+   consists of an array of values. */
+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE    0x40000000
+
+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
+   and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */
+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL      0
+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL  1
+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2
+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY       3
+
+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
+   and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */
+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED       0
+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL      1
+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY     2
+
+/* The following attribute types are defined: */
+#define CKA_CLASS              0x00000000
+#define CKA_TOKEN              0x00000001
+#define CKA_PRIVATE            0x00000002
+#define CKA_LABEL              0x00000003
+#define CKA_APPLICATION        0x00000010
+#define CKA_VALUE              0x00000011
+
+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */
+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID          0x00000012
+
+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE   0x00000080
+#define CKA_ISSUER             0x00000081
+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER      0x00000082
+
+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new
+ * for v2.10 */
+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER          0x00000083
+#define CKA_OWNER              0x00000084
+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES         0x00000085
+
+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */
+#define CKA_TRUSTED            0x00000086
+
+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ...
+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY        0x00000087
+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN   0x00000088
+#define CKA_URL                         0x00000089
+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY  0x0000008A
+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY   0x0000008B
+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE                 0x00000090
+
+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE           0x00000100
+#define CKA_SUBJECT            0x00000101
+#define CKA_ID                 0x00000102
+#define CKA_SENSITIVE          0x00000103
+#define CKA_ENCRYPT            0x00000104
+#define CKA_DECRYPT            0x00000105
+#define CKA_WRAP               0x00000106
+#define CKA_UNWRAP             0x00000107
+#define CKA_SIGN               0x00000108
+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER       0x00000109
+#define CKA_VERIFY             0x0000010A
+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER     0x0000010B
+#define CKA_DERIVE             0x0000010C
+#define CKA_START_DATE         0x00000110
+#define CKA_END_DATE           0x00000111
+#define CKA_MODULUS            0x00000120
+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS       0x00000121
+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT    0x00000122
+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT   0x00000123
+#define CKA_PRIME_1            0x00000124
+#define CKA_PRIME_2            0x00000125
+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1         0x00000126
+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2         0x00000127
+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT        0x00000128
+#define CKA_PRIME              0x00000130
+#define CKA_SUBPRIME           0x00000131
+#define CKA_BASE               0x00000132
+
+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS         0x00000133
+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS      0x00000134
+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS     CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS
+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */
+
+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS         0x00000160
+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN          0x00000161
+
+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS,
+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE        0x00000162
+#define CKA_LOCAL              0x00000163
+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE  0x00000164
+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE   0x00000165
+
+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */
+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM  0x00000166
+
+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE         0x00000170
+
+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11,
+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */
+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS       0x00000180
+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS          0x00000180
+
+#define CKA_EC_POINT           0x00000181
+
+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS,
+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */
+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH     0x00000200
+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS     0x00000201
+
+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ...
+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE  0x00000202
+
+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED    0x00000210
+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE        (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211)
+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE      (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212)
+
+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */
+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT                0x00000220
+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH                0x00000221
+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL         0x00000222
+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE    0x00000223
+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224
+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT      0x00000225
+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT   0x00000226
+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT       0x00000227
+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER               0x0000022E
+#define CKA_OTP_TIME                  0x0000022F
+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER       0x0000022A
+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER    0x0000022B
+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO          0x0000022C
+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE     0x0000022D
+
+
+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET
+ * are new for v2.10 */
+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE    0x00000300
+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT      0x00000301
+#define CKA_HAS_RESET          0x00000302
+
+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKA_PIXEL_X                     0x00000400
+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y                     0x00000401
+#define CKA_RESOLUTION                  0x00000402
+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS                   0x00000403
+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS                0x00000404
+#define CKA_COLOR                       0x00000405
+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL              0x00000406
+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS                   0x00000480
+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS            0x00000481
+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES                  0x00000482
+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE              0x00000500
+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES     0x00000501
+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES      0x00000502
+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES    0x00000503
+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS          (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600)
+
+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED     0x80000000
+
+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length
+ * and value of an attribute */
+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE {
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type;
+  CK_VOID_PTR       pValue;
+
+  /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+  CK_ULONG          ulValueLen;  /* in bytes */
+} CK_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */
+typedef struct CK_DATE{
+  CK_CHAR       year[4];   /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */
+  CK_CHAR       month[2];  /* the month ("01" - "12") */
+  CK_CHAR       day[2];    /* the day   ("01" - "31") */
+} CK_DATE;
+
+
+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism
+ * type */
+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
+
+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN      0x00000000
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS                   0x00000001
+#define CKM_RSA_9796                   0x00000002
+#define CKM_RSA_X_509                  0x00000003
+
+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS
+ * are new for v2.0.  They are mechanisms which hash and sign */
+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS               0x00000004
+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS               0x00000005
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS              0x00000006
+
+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS         0x00000007
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS         0x00000008
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP              0x00000009
+
+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31,
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN     0x0000000A
+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31                  0x0000000B
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31             0x0000000C
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS               0x0000000D
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS          0x0000000E
+
+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN           0x00000010
+#define CKM_DSA                        0x00000011
+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1                   0x00000012
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN       0x00000020
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE             0x00000021
+
+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE,
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for
+ * v2.11 */
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN      0x00000030
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE            0x00000031
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE     0x00000032
+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE           0x00000033
+
+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS            0x00000040
+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS            0x00000041
+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS            0x00000042
+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000043
+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000044
+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000045
+
+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS            0x00000046
+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000047
+
+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN                0x00000100
+#define CKM_RC2_ECB                    0x00000101
+#define CKM_RC2_CBC                    0x00000102
+#define CKM_RC2_MAC                    0x00000103
+
+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL            0x00000104
+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD                0x00000105
+
+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN                0x00000110
+#define CKM_RC4                        0x00000111
+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN                0x00000120
+#define CKM_DES_ECB                    0x00000121
+#define CKM_DES_CBC                    0x00000122
+#define CKM_DES_MAC                    0x00000123
+
+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL            0x00000124
+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD                0x00000125
+
+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN               0x00000130
+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN               0x00000131
+#define CKM_DES3_ECB                   0x00000132
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC                   0x00000133
+#define CKM_DES3_MAC                   0x00000134
+
+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN,
+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC,
+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000135
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD               0x00000136
+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN               0x00000140
+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB                   0x00000141
+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC                   0x00000142
+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC                   0x00000143
+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000144
+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD               0x00000145
+
+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_DES_OFB64                  0x00000150
+#define CKM_DES_OFB8                   0x00000151
+#define CKM_DES_CFB64                  0x00000152
+#define CKM_DES_CFB8                   0x00000153
+
+#define CKM_MD2                        0x00000200
+
+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC                   0x00000201
+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL           0x00000202
+
+#define CKM_MD5                        0x00000210
+
+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC                   0x00000211
+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL           0x00000212
+
+#define CKM_SHA_1                      0x00000220
+
+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC                 0x00000221
+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL         0x00000222
+
+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC,
+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC,
+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128                  0x00000230
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC             0x00000231
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL     0x00000232
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160                  0x00000240
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC             0x00000241
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL     0x00000242
+
+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_SHA256                     0x00000250
+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC                0x00000251
+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000252
+
+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_SHA224                     0x00000255
+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC                0x00000256
+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000257
+
+#define CKM_SHA384                     0x00000260
+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC                0x00000261
+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000262
+#define CKM_SHA512                     0x00000270
+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC                0x00000271
+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000272
+
+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN            0x00000280
+#define CKM_SECURID                    0x00000282
+
+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN    0x00000290
+#define CKM_HOTP            0x00000291
+
+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
+#define CKM_ACTI            0x000002A0
+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN    0x000002A1
+
+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */
+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */
+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN               0x00000300
+#define CKM_CAST_ECB                   0x00000301
+#define CKM_CAST_CBC                   0x00000302
+#define CKM_CAST_MAC                   0x00000303
+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000304
+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD               0x00000305
+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN              0x00000310
+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB                  0x00000311
+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC                  0x00000312
+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC                  0x00000313
+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL          0x00000314
+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD              0x00000315
+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN              0x00000320
+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN            0x00000320
+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB                  0x00000321
+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB                0x00000321
+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC                  0x00000322
+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC                0x00000322
+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC                  0x00000323
+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC                0x00000323
+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL          0x00000324
+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL        0x00000324
+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD              0x00000325
+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD            0x00000325
+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN                0x00000330
+#define CKM_RC5_ECB                    0x00000331
+#define CKM_RC5_CBC                    0x00000332
+#define CKM_RC5_MAC                    0x00000333
+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL            0x00000334
+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD                0x00000335
+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN               0x00000340
+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB                   0x00000341
+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC                   0x00000342
+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC                   0x00000343
+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000344
+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD               0x00000345
+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN     0x00000350
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY   0x00000360
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA  0x00000362
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE  0x00000363
+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA          0x00000364
+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY       0x00000365
+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN    0x00000370
+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE     0x00000371
+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE    0x00000372
+
+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN,
+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and
+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH  0x00000373
+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN     0x00000374
+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE      0x00000375
+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE     0x00000376
+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH   0x00000377
+
+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_TLS_PRF                    0x00000378
+
+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC               0x00000380
+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC              0x00000381
+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION         0x00000390
+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION         0x00000391
+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION        0x00000392
+
+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000393
+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000394
+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000395
+
+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000396
+
+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC            0x000003A0
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC            0x000003A1
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC           0x000003A2
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC          0x000003A3
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC          0x000003A4
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC        0x000003A4
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC         0x000003A5
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC       0x000003A5
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128           0x000003A6
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40            0x000003A7
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC      0x000003A8
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC      0x000003A9
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC       0x000003AA
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC        0x000003AB
+
+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */
+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2                0x000003B0
+
+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC    0x000003C0
+
+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN         0x000003D0
+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE          0x000003D1
+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC   0x000003D2
+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF                        0x000003D3
+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE  0x000003D4
+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE  0x000003D5
+
+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS             0x00000400
+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP          0x00000401
+
+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_CMS_SIG                    0x00000500
+
+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE                 0x00000510
+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP                   0x00000511
+#define CKM_KIP_MAC                    0x00000512
+
+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN           0x00000550
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB               0x00000551
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC               0x00000552
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC               0x00000553
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL       0x00000554
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD           0x00000555
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA  0x00000556
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA  0x00000557
+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR               0x00000558
+
+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN               0x00000560
+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB                   0x00000561
+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC                   0x00000562
+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC                   0x00000563
+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000564
+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD               0x00000565
+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA      0x00000566
+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA      0x00000567
+
+/* Fortezza mechanisms */
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN           0x00001000
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64             0x00001001
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64             0x00001002
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64             0x00001003
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64             0x00001004
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32             0x00001005
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16             0x00001006
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8              0x00001007
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP              0x00001008
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP      0x00001009
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX            0x0000100a
+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN           0x00001010
+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE             0x00001011
+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP         0x00001020
+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN              0x00001030
+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128               0x00001031
+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96                0x00001032
+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128               0x00001033
+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER              0x00001034
+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE              0x00001035
+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP                 0x00001036
+
+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11,
+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */
+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN         0x00001040
+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN            0x00001040
+
+#define CKM_ECDSA                      0x00001041
+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1                 0x00001042
+
+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE
+ * are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE               0x00001050
+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE      0x00001051
+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE               0x00001052
+
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN            0x00001060
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128             0x00001061
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128             0x00001062
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER            0x00001063
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE            0x00001064
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP               0x00001065
+#define CKM_FASTHASH                   0x00001070
+
+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC,
+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN,
+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are
+ * new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN                0x00001080
+#define CKM_AES_ECB                    0x00001081
+#define CKM_AES_CBC                    0x00001082
+#define CKM_AES_MAC                    0x00001083
+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL            0x00001084
+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD                0x00001085
+
+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKM_AES_CTR                    0x00001086
+
+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN           0x00001090
+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC               0x00001091
+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN            0x00001092
+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC                0x00001093
+
+
+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001100
+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001101
+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA      0x00001102
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA      0x00001103
+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001104
+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001105
+
+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN          0x00002000
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN      0x00002001
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN     0x00002002
+
+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED             0x80000000
+
+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular
+ * mechanism  */
+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM {
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
+  CK_VOID_PTR       pParameter;
+
+  /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+   * v2.0 */
+  CK_ULONG          ulParameterLen;  /* in bytes */
+} CK_MECHANISM;
+
+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular
+ * mechanism */
+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO {
+    CK_ULONG    ulMinKeySize;
+    CK_ULONG    ulMaxKeySize;
+    CK_FLAGS    flags;
+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
+
+/* The flags are defined as follows:
+ *      Bit Flag               Mask        Meaning */
+#define CKF_HW                 0x00000001  /* performed by HW */
+
+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN,
+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP,
+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0.  They specify whether or not
+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */
+#define CKF_ENCRYPT            0x00000100
+#define CKF_DECRYPT            0x00000200
+#define CKF_DIGEST             0x00000400
+#define CKF_SIGN               0x00000800
+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER       0x00001000
+#define CKF_VERIFY             0x00002000
+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER     0x00004000
+#define CKF_GENERATE           0x00008000
+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR  0x00010000
+#define CKF_WRAP               0x00020000
+#define CKF_UNWRAP             0x00040000
+#define CKF_DERIVE             0x00080000
+
+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE,
+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They
+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism
+ * information. */
+#define CKF_EC_F_P             0x00100000
+#define CKF_EC_F_2M            0x00200000
+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS    0x00400000
+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE      0x00800000
+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS      0x01000000
+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS        0x02000000
+
+#define CKF_EXTENSION          0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */
+
+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a
+ * Cryptoki function */
+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_RV;
+
+#define CKR_OK                                0x00000000
+#define CKR_CANCEL                            0x00000001
+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY                       0x00000002
+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID                   0x00000003
+
+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */
+
+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR                     0x00000005
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED                   0x00000006
+
+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS,
+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */
+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD                     0x00000007
+#define CKR_NO_EVENT                          0x00000008
+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS            0x00000009
+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK                         0x0000000A
+
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY               0x00000010
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE               0x00000011
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID            0x00000012
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID           0x00000013
+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID                      0x00000020
+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE                    0x00000021
+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR                      0x00000030
+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY                     0x00000031
+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED                    0x00000032
+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID            0x00000040
+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE          0x00000041
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED                 0x00000050
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL             0x00000051
+
+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED            0x00000054
+
+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID                0x00000060
+
+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */
+
+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE                    0x00000062
+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT             0x00000063
+
+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED,
+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED,
+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for
+ * v2.0 */
+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED                    0x00000064
+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED                       0x00000065
+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED                        0x00000066
+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE                  0x00000067
+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED        0x00000068
+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE                 0x00000069
+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE                 0x0000006A
+
+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID                 0x00000070
+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID           0x00000071
+
+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID
+ * were removed for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID             0x00000082
+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE                  0x00000090
+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED         0x00000091
+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT                     0x000000A0
+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID                       0x000000A1
+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE                     0x000000A2
+
+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED                       0x000000A3
+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED                        0x000000A4
+
+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED                    0x000000B0
+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT                     0x000000B1
+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID            0x000000B3
+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED    0x000000B4
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY                 0x000000B5
+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS                    0x000000B6
+
+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and
+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS          0x000000B7
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS      0x000000B8
+
+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID                 0x000000C0
+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE               0x000000C1
+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE               0x000000D0
+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT             0x000000D1
+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT                 0x000000E0
+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED              0x000000E1
+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED             0x000000E2
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID     0x000000F0
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE         0x000000F1
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT  0x000000F2
+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN            0x00000100
+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN                0x00000101
+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED          0x00000102
+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID                 0x00000103
+
+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
+ * are new to v2.01 */
+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN    0x00000104
+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES               0x00000105
+
+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID               0x00000110
+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE             0x00000112
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID       0x00000113
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE           0x00000114
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT    0x00000115
+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED         0x00000120
+
+/* These are new to v2.0 */
+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG                     0x00000121
+
+/* These are new to v2.11 */
+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID             0x00000130
+
+/* These are new to v2.0 */
+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL                  0x00000150
+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID               0x00000160
+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE             0x00000170
+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE                  0x00000180
+
+/* These are new to v2.01 */
+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED          0x00000190
+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED      0x00000191
+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD                         0x000001A0
+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED                  0x000001A1
+
+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE                      0x000001B0
+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP                          0x000001B1
+
+/* This is new to v2.20 */
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED                 0x00000200
+
+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED                    0x80000000
+
+
+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,     /* the session's handle */
+  CK_NOTIFICATION   event,
+  CK_VOID_PTR       pApplication  /* passed to C_OpenSession */
+);
+
+
+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec
+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the
+ * Cryptoki functions */
+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
+
+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR;
+
+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a
+ * mutex object */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)(
+  CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex  /* location to receive ptr to mutex */
+);
+
+
+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a
+ * mutex object */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)(
+  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex  /* pointer to mutex */
+);
+
+
+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)(
+  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex  /* pointer to mutex */
+);
+
+
+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a
+ * mutex */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)(
+  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex  /* pointer to mutex */
+);
+
+
+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to
+ * C_Initialize */
+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS {
+  CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
+  CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
+  CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
+  CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
+  CK_FLAGS flags;
+  CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
+
+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
+ *      Bit Flag                           Mask       Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001
+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK                  0x00000002
+
+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR;
+
+
+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */
+
+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */
+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK     1
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE  is used to indicate the Message
+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when
+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption
+ * scheme. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following MGFs are defined */
+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512
+ * are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1         0x00000001
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256       0x00000002
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384       0x00000003
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512       0x00000004
+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224       0x00000005
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE  is used to indicate the source
+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block
+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */
+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED    0x00000001
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */
+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS {
+        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
+        CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
+        CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source;
+        CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData;
+        CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen;
+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */
+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS {
+        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE    hashAlg;
+        CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
+        CK_ULONG             sLen;
+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE;
+
+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */
+#define CKD_NULL                 0x00000001
+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF             0x00000002
+
+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms,
+ * where each party contributes one key pair.
+ */
+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */
+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE;
+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined
+   (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */
+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1        0x00000003
+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004
+
+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party
+ * contributes one key pair */
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation
+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */
+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_BBOOL      isSender;
+  CK_ULONG      ulRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pRandomA;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pRandomB;
+  CK_ULONG      ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPublicData;
+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and
+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms.  An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just
+ * holds the effective keysize */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_RC2_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC
+ * mechanism */
+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS {
+  /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+   * v2.0 */
+  CK_ULONG      ulEffectiveBits;  /* effective bits (1-1024) */
+
+  CK_BYTE       iv[8];            /* IV for CBC mode */
+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulEffectiveBits;  /* effective bits (1-1024) */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMacLength;      /* Length of MAC in bytes */
+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and
+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */
+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulWordsize;  /* wordsize in bits */
+  CK_ULONG      ulRounds;    /* number of rounds */
+} CK_RC5_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC
+ * mechanism */
+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulWordsize;  /* wordsize in bits */
+  CK_ULONG      ulRounds;    /* number of rounds */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pIv;         /* pointer to IV */
+  CK_ULONG      ulIvLen;     /* length of IV in bytes */
+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulWordsize;   /* wordsize in bits */
+  CK_ULONG      ulRounds;     /* number of rounds */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMacLength;  /* Length of MAC in bytes */
+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block
+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms.  Its value is the length of
+ * the MAC */
+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
+  CK_BYTE      iv[8];
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
+  CK_ULONG     length;
+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
+  CK_BYTE      iv[16];
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
+  CK_ULONG     length;
+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulPasswordLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPassword;
+  CK_ULONG      ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG      ulPAndGLen;
+  CK_ULONG      ulQLen;
+  CK_ULONG      ulRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pRandomA;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPrimeP;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pBaseG;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pSubprimeQ;
+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulOldWrappedXLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldWrappedX;
+  CK_ULONG      ulOldPasswordLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldPassword;
+  CK_ULONG      ulOldPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG      ulOldRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldRandomA;
+  CK_ULONG      ulNewPasswordLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pNewPassword;
+  CK_ULONG      ulNewPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pNewPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG      ulNewRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pNewRandomA;
+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pInitVector;
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR  pPassword;
+  CK_ULONG         ulPasswordLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pSalt;
+  CK_ULONG         ulSaltLen;
+  CK_ULONG         ulIteration;
+} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */
+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS {
+  CK_BYTE       bBC;     /* block contents byte */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pX;      /* extra data */
+  CK_ULONG      ulXLen;  /* length of extra data in bytes */
+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA {
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pClientRandom;
+  CK_ULONG     ulClientRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pServerRandom;
+  CK_ULONG     ulServerRandomLen;
+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+  CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT {
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pIVClient;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pIVServer;
+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT;
+
+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG                ulMacSizeInBits;
+  CK_ULONG                ulKeySizeInBits;
+  CK_ULONG                ulIVSizeInBits;
+  CK_BBOOL                bIsExport;
+  CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA     RandomInfo;
+  CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS {
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pSeed;
+  CK_ULONG     ulSeedLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pLabel;
+  CK_ULONG     ulLabelLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pOutput;
+  CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA {
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
+  CK_ULONG    ulClientRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
+  CK_ULONG    ulServerRandomLen;
+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE   DigestMechanism;
+  CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR         pVersion;
+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS {
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed;
+  CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLabel;
+  CK_ULONG          ulLabelLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pOutput;
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulOutputLen;
+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT {
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pIV;
+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE       DigestMechanism;
+  CK_ULONG                ulMacSizeInBits;
+  CK_ULONG                ulKeySizeInBits;
+  CK_ULONG                ulIVSizeInBits;
+  CK_ULONG                ulSequenceNumber;
+  CK_BBOOL                bIsExport;
+  CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA     RandomInfo;
+  CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS {
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE      certificateHandle;
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR      pSigningMechanism;
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR      pDigestMechanism;
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR       pContentType;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR           pRequestedAttributes;
+  CK_ULONG              ulRequestedAttributesLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR           pRequiredAttributes;
+  CK_ULONG              ulRequiredAttributesLen;
+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA {
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
+  CK_ULONG    ulLen;
+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;
+
+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \
+  CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR;
+
+
+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the
+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism.  It specifies which bit
+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the
+ * derived key */
+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to
+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate
+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001
+
+
+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the
+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5
+ * PBKDF2. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED        0x00000001
+
+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the
+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */
+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS {
+        CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE           saltSource;
+        CK_VOID_PTR                                pSaltSourceData;
+        CK_ULONG                                   ulSaltSourceDataLen;
+        CK_ULONG                                   iterations;
+        CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf;
+        CK_VOID_PTR                                pPrfData;
+        CK_ULONG                                   ulPrfDataLen;
+        CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR                            pPassword;
+        CK_ULONG_PTR                               ulPasswordLen;
+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE;
+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */
+
+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM {
+    CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type;
+    CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
+    CK_ULONG ulValueLen;
+} CK_OTP_PARAM;
+
+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS {
+    CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
+    CK_ULONG ulCount;
+} CK_OTP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO {
+    CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
+    CK_ULONG ulCount;
+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO;
+
+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR;
+
+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
+#define CK_OTP_VALUE          0
+#define CK_OTP_PIN            1
+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE      2
+#define CK_OTP_TIME           3
+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER        4
+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS          5
+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH  6
+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT  7
+
+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP          0x00000001
+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME      0x00000002
+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER   0x00000004
+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008
+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN       0x00000010
+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020
+
+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS {
+    CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey;
+    CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed;
+    CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen;
+} CK_KIP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
+    CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
+    CK_BYTE cb[16];
+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS {
+    CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
+    CK_BYTE cb[16];
+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
+    CK_BYTE      iv[16];
+    CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
+    CK_ULONG     length;
+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
+    CK_BYTE      iv[16];
+    CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
+    CK_ULONG     length;
+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+#endif
Index: openssl/util/libeay.num
diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.7.6.1.4.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.7.2.3
--- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.7.6.1.4.1.2.1.4.1	Wed Mar  4 13:46:38 2015
+++ openssl/util/libeay.num	Wed Mar  4 13:57:56 2015
@@ -3731,4 +3731,6 @@
 pqueue_size                             4114	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OPENSSL_uni2asc                         4115	EXIST:NETWARE:FUNCTION:
 OPENSSL_asc2uni                         4116	EXIST:NETWARE:FUNCTION:
+ENGINE_load_pk11ca                      4117	EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE
+ENGINE_load_pk11so                      4117	EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE
 ASN1_TYPE_cmp                           4428	EXIST::FUNCTION:
Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.8.6.1.10.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.8.2.1
--- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.8.6.1.10.1	Wed Mar  4 13:46:38 2015
+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl	Wed Mar  4 13:57:57 2015
@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@
 	no-ecdh					- No ECDH
 	no-engine				- No engine
 	no-hw					- No hw
+	no-hw-pkcs11ca				- No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor
+	no-hw-pkcs11so				- No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor
 	nasm 					- Use NASM for x86 asm
 	nw-nasm					- Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare
 	nw-mwasm				- Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare
@@ -242,6 +244,8 @@
 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ECDH" if $no_ecdh;
 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE"   if $no_engine;
 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW"   if $no_hw;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"   if $no_hw_pkcs11ca;
+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"   if $no_hw_pkcs11so;
 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS"    if $fips;
 $cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
 $cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
@@ -316,6 +320,9 @@
 		$dir=$val;
 		}
 
+	if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION")
+		{ $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";}
+
 	if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES")
 		{ $cflags .= " $val";}
 
@@ -1295,6 +1302,8 @@
 		"no-ecdh" => \$no_ecdh,
 		"no-engine" => \$no_engine,
 		"no-hw" => \$no_hw,
+		"no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca,
+		"no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so,
 		"just-ssl" =>
 			[\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast,
 			  \$no_md2, \$no_sha, \$no_mdc2, \$no_dsa, \$no_dh,
Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl
diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.6.6.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.6
--- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.6.6.1	Sun Jan 15 15:45:40 2012
+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl	Mon Jun 13 14:25:25 2011
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
 			 # External "algorithms"
 			 "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM",
 			 # Engines
-			 "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP",
+			 "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO",
 			 # RFC3779 support 
 			 "RFC3779",
 			 # TLS extension support
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
 my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2;
 my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5;
 my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; my $no_camellia;
+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so;
 my $no_seed;
 my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated;
 my $no_rfc3779; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; my $no_jpake;
@@ -214,6 +215,8 @@
 	elsif (/^no-cms$/)	{ $no_cms=1; }
 	elsif (/^no-capieng$/)	{ $no_capieng=1; }
 	elsif (/^no-jpake$/)	{ $no_jpake=1; }
+	elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; }
+	elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; }
 	}
 
 
@@ -1155,6 +1158,8 @@
 			if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; }
 			if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; }
 			if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; }
+			if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; }
+			if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; }
 			if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; }
 			if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; }
 			if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; }
Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.6.6.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.6.2.2
--- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.6.6.1.2.1.4.1	Thu Jul  3 12:12:38 2014
+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl	Thu Jul  3 12:32:04 2014
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
     my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT';
     $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib);	# remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib
     $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox';
-    $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
+    $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
     $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
     }
 elsif ($FLAVOR =~ /CE/)
