This PR is part of a series (#11311).
If the user authenticating to an API call is a Forgejo site administrator, or a Forgejo repo administrator, a wide variety of permission and ownership checks in the API are either bypassed, or are bypassable. If a user has created an access token with restricted resources, I understand the intent of the user is to create a token which has a layer of risk reduction in the event that the token is lost/leaked to an attacker. For this reason, it makes sense to me that restricted scope access tokens shouldn't inherit the owner's administrator access.
My intent is that repo-specific access tokens [will only be able to access specific authorization scopes](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/design/issues/50#issuecomment-11093951), probably: `repository:read`, `repository:write`, `issue:read`, `issue:write`, (`organization:read` / `user:read` maybe). This means that *most* admin access is not intended to be affected by this because repo-specific access tokens won't have, for example, `admin:write` scope. However, administrative access still grants elevated permissions in some areas that are relevant to these scopes, and need to be restricted:
- The `?sudo=otheruser` query parameter allows site administrators to impersonate other users in the API.
- Repository management rules are different for a site administrator, allowing them to create repos for another user, create repos in another organization, migrate a repository to an arbitrary owner, and transfer a repository to a prviate organization.
- Administrators have access to extra data through some APIs which would be in scope: the detailed configuration of branch protection rules, the some details of repository deploy keys (which repo, and which scope -- seems odd), (user:read -- user SSH keys, activity feeds of private users, user profiles of private users, user webhook configurations).
- Pull request reviews have additional perms for repo administrators, including the ability to dismiss PR reviews, delete PR reviews, and view draft PR reviews.
- Repo admins and site admins can comment on locked issues, and related to comments can edit or delete other user's comments and attachments.
- Repo admins can manage and view logged time on behalf of other users.
A handful of these permissions may make sense for repo-specific access tokens, but most of them clearly exceed the risk that would be expected from creating a limited scope access token. I'd generally prefer to take a restrictive approach, and we can relax it if real-world use-cases come in -- users will have a workaround of creating an access token without repo-specific restrictions if they are blocked from needed access.
**Breaking:** The administration restrictions introduced in this PR affect both repo-specific access tokens, and existing public-only access tokens.
## Checklist
The [contributor guide](https://forgejo.org/docs/next/contributor/) contains information that will be helpful to first time contributors. There also are a few [conditions for merging Pull Requests in Forgejo repositories](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/governance/src/branch/main/PullRequestsAgreement.md). You are also welcome to join the [Forgejo development chatroom](https://matrix.to/#/#forgejo-development:matrix.org).
### Tests for Go changes
(can be removed for JavaScript changes)
- I added test coverage for Go changes...
- [x] in their respective `*_test.go` for unit tests.
- [x] in the `tests/integration` directory if it involves interactions with a live Forgejo server.
- I ran...
- [x] `make pr-go` before pushing
### Documentation
- [ ] I created a pull request [to the documentation](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/docs) to explain to Forgejo users how to use this change.
- [x] I did not document these changes and I do not expect someone else to do it.
### Release notes
- [x] This change will be noticed by a Forgejo user or admin (feature, bug fix, performance, etc.). I suggest to include a release note for this change.
- Although repo-specific access tokens are not yet exposed to end users, the breaking changes to public-only tokens will be visible to users and require release notes.
- [ ] This change is not visible to a Forgejo user or admin (refactor, dependency upgrade, etc.). I think there is no need to add a release note for this change.
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/11468
Reviewed-by: Andreas Ahlenstorf <aahlenst@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Adds new a function, `AcceptsGithubResponse`, to the API router context struct to check if the requests accepts a Github response. Although Forgejo API will never be compatible with the Github API, historically Forgejo's API has been designed to follow that of Github closely and we know that a lot of tooling that uses the Github API can be used against the Forgejo API with little to no problem.
As a meet in the middle solution, this function can be used to respond with a more appropriate response that follows the Github API. This allows Forgejo to avoid breaking compatibility with existing users of the API and allows the API to be oh so slightly more compatible with that of Github for API clients that expect a Github response.
Because the `upload_url` field was added purely to match the Github API (forgejo/forgejo#580), it is fair to actually make it compatible with how the Github API intended it to be and that is by adding `{?name,label}` which is used by Github's Oktokit.
Only add `{?name,label}` when Forgejo knows the request accepts a Github response. This avoids breaking the API compatibility with non-Github API clients.
ResolvesCodeberg/Community#2132
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/9285
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Reviewed-by: oliverpool <oliverpool@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Gusted <postmaster@gusted.xyz>
Co-committed-by: Gusted <postmaster@gusted.xyz>
- Use mock helper functions, instead of home-brew solutions.
- Disable cron jobs that are not important to be run during integration tests and might even interfere.
- Avoid sleeping unnecessary, if there's some requirement then sleep or retry until that requirement is met.
- Avoid trying to deliver webhooks that will always result in a failure.
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/7917
Reviewed-by: Michael Kriese <michael.kriese@gmx.de>
Co-authored-by: Gusted <postmaster@gusted.xyz>
Co-committed-by: Gusted <postmaster@gusted.xyz>
Since `modules/context` has to depend on `models` and many other
packages, it should be moved from `modules/context` to
`services/context` according to design principles. There is no logic
code change on this PR, only move packages.
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/context` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context`
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/contexttest` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/contexttest` because of depending on
context
- Move `code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/upload` to
`code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context/upload` because of depending on
context
(cherry picked from commit 29f149bd9f517225a3c9f1ca3fb0a7b5325af696)
Conflicts:
routers/api/packages/alpine/alpine.go
routers/api/v1/repo/issue_reaction.go
routers/install/install.go
routers/web/admin/config.go
routers/web/passkey.go
routers/web/repo/search.go
routers/web/repo/setting/default_branch.go
routers/web/user/home.go
routers/web/user/profile.go
tests/integration/editor_test.go
tests/integration/integration_test.go
tests/integration/mirror_push_test.go
trivial context conflicts
also modified all other occurrences in Forgejo specific files
2024-03-06 12:10:43 +08:00
Renamed from modules/context/api_test.go (Browse further)
