forgejo/routers/api/shared/middleware.go
Mathieu Fenniak 99984dac4d feat: remove admin-level permissions from repo-specific & public-only access tokens (#11468)
This PR is part of a series (#11311).

If the user authenticating to an API call is a Forgejo site administrator, or a Forgejo repo administrator, a wide variety of permission and ownership checks in the API are either bypassed, or are bypassable.  If a user has created an access token with restricted resources, I understand the intent of the user is to create a token which has a layer of risk reduction in the event that the token is lost/leaked to an attacker.  For this reason, it makes sense to me that restricted scope access tokens shouldn't inherit the owner's administrator access.

My intent is that repo-specific access tokens [will only be able to access specific authorization scopes](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/design/issues/50#issuecomment-11093951), probably: `repository:read`, `repository:write`, `issue:read`, `issue:write`, (`organization:read` / `user:read` maybe).  This means that *most* admin access is not intended to be affected by this because repo-specific access tokens won't have, for example, `admin:write` scope.  However, administrative access still grants elevated permissions in some areas that are relevant to these scopes, and need to be restricted:

- The `?sudo=otheruser` query parameter allows site administrators to impersonate other users in the API.
- Repository management rules are different for a site administrator, allowing them to create repos for another user, create repos in another organization, migrate a repository to an arbitrary owner, and transfer a repository to a prviate organization.
- Administrators have access to extra data through some APIs which would be in scope: the detailed configuration of branch protection rules, the some details of repository deploy keys (which repo, and which scope -- seems odd), (user:read -- user SSH keys, activity feeds of private users, user profiles of private users, user webhook configurations).
- Pull request reviews have additional perms for repo administrators, including the ability to dismiss PR reviews, delete PR reviews, and view draft PR reviews.
- Repo admins and site admins can comment on locked issues, and related to comments can edit or delete other user's comments and attachments.
- Repo admins can manage and view logged time on behalf of other users.

A handful of these permissions may make sense for repo-specific access tokens, but most of them clearly exceed the risk that would be expected from creating a limited scope access token.  I'd generally prefer to take a restrictive approach, and we can relax it if real-world use-cases come in -- users will have a workaround of creating an access token without repo-specific restrictions if they are blocked from needed access.

**Breaking:** The administration restrictions introduced in this PR affect both repo-specific access tokens, and existing public-only access tokens.

## Checklist

The [contributor guide](https://forgejo.org/docs/next/contributor/) contains information that will be helpful to first time contributors. There also are a few [conditions for merging Pull Requests in Forgejo repositories](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/governance/src/branch/main/PullRequestsAgreement.md). You are also welcome to join the [Forgejo development chatroom](https://matrix.to/#/#forgejo-development:matrix.org).

### Tests for Go changes

(can be removed for JavaScript changes)

- I added test coverage for Go changes...
  - [x] in their respective `*_test.go` for unit tests.
  - [x] in the `tests/integration` directory if it involves interactions with a live Forgejo server.
- I ran...
  - [x] `make pr-go` before pushing

### Documentation

- [ ] I created a pull request [to the documentation](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/docs) to explain to Forgejo users how to use this change.
- [x] I did not document these changes and I do not expect someone else to do it.

### Release notes

- [x] This change will be noticed by a Forgejo user or admin (feature, bug fix, performance, etc.). I suggest to include a release note for this change.
    - Although repo-specific access tokens are not yet exposed to end users, the breaking changes to public-only tokens will be visible to users and require release notes.
- [ ] This change is not visible to a Forgejo user or admin (refactor, dependency upgrade, etc.). I think there is no need to add a release note for this change.

Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/11468
Reviewed-by: Andreas Ahlenstorf <aahlenst@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
Co-committed-by: Mathieu Fenniak <mathieu@fenniak.net>
2026-03-04 16:17:41 +01:00

195 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2024 The Forgejo Authors. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package shared
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
auth_model "forgejo.org/models/auth"
"forgejo.org/modules/log"
"forgejo.org/modules/setting"
"forgejo.org/routers/common"
"forgejo.org/services/auth"
"forgejo.org/services/authz"
"forgejo.org/services/context"
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
)
func Middlewares() (stack []any) {
stack = append(stack, securityHeaders())
if setting.CORSConfig.Enabled {
stack = append(stack, cors.Handler(cors.Options{
AllowedOrigins: setting.CORSConfig.AllowDomain,
AllowedMethods: setting.CORSConfig.Methods,
AllowCredentials: setting.CORSConfig.AllowCredentials,
AllowedHeaders: append([]string{"Authorization", "X-Gitea-OTP", "X-Forgejo-OTP"}, setting.CORSConfig.Headers...),
MaxAge: int(setting.CORSConfig.MaxAge.Seconds()),
}))
}
return append(stack,
context.APIContexter(),
checkDeprecatedAuthMethods,
// Get user from session if logged in.
apiAuthentication(buildAuthGroup()),
apiAuthorization,
verifyAuthWithOptions(&common.VerifyOptions{
SignInRequired: setting.Service.RequireSignInView,
}),
)
}
func buildAuthGroup() *auth.Group {
group := auth.NewGroup(
&auth.OAuth2{},
&auth.HTTPSign{},
&auth.Basic{}, // FIXME: this should be removed once we don't allow basic auth in API
)
if setting.Service.EnableReverseProxyAuthAPI {
group.Add(&auth.ReverseProxy{})
}
return group
}
func apiAuthentication(authMethod auth.Method) func(*context.APIContext) {
return func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
ar, err := common.AuthShared(ctx.Base, nil, authMethod)
if err != nil {
ctx.Error(http.StatusUnauthorized, "APIAuth", err)
return
}
ctx.Doer = ar.Doer
ctx.IsSigned = ar.Doer != nil
ctx.IsBasicAuth = ar.IsBasicAuth
}
}
func apiAuthorization(ctx *context.APIContext) {
scope, scopeExists := ctx.Data["ApiTokenScope"].(auth_model.AccessTokenScope)
if scopeExists {
publicOnly, err := scope.PublicOnly()
if err != nil {
ctx.Error(http.StatusForbidden, "tokenRequiresScope", "parsing public resource scope failed: "+err.Error())
return
}
ctx.PublicOnly = publicOnly
}
reducer, reducerExists := ctx.Data["ApiTokenReducer"].(authz.AuthorizationReducer)
if reducerExists {
ctx.Reducer = reducer
} else {
// No "ApiTokenReducer" will be populated if the auth method wasn't an PAT. In this case, we populate
// `ctx.Reducer` so no nil checks are needed, and we respect the scope `PublicOnly()` so that it it's safe to
// just rely on `ctx.Reducer` to account for public-only access:
if ctx.PublicOnly {
ctx.Reducer = &authz.PublicReposAuthorizationReducer{}
} else {
ctx.Reducer = &authz.AllAccessAuthorizationReducer{}
}
}
}
// verifyAuthWithOptions checks authentication according to options
func verifyAuthWithOptions(options *common.VerifyOptions) func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
return func(ctx *context.APIContext) {
// Check prohibit login users.
if ctx.IsSigned {
if !ctx.Doer.IsActive && setting.Service.RegisterEmailConfirm {
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("auth.active_your_account")
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{
"message": "This account is not activated.",
})
return
}
if !ctx.Doer.IsActive || ctx.Doer.ProhibitLogin {
log.Info("Failed authentication attempt for %s from %s", ctx.Doer.Name, ctx.RemoteAddr())
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("auth.prohibit_login")
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{
"message": "This account is prohibited from signing in, please contact your site administrator.",
})
return
}
if ctx.Doer.MustChangePassword {
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{
"message": "You must change your password. Change it at: " + setting.AppURL + "/user/change_password",
})
return
}
if ctx.Doer.MustHaveTwoFactor() {
hasTwoFactor, err := auth_model.HasTwoFactorByUID(ctx, ctx.Doer.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("auth.prohibit_login")
log.Error("Error getting 2fa: %s", err)
ctx.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{
"message": fmt.Sprintf("Error getting 2fa: %s", err),
})
return
}
if !hasTwoFactor {
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("auth.prohibit_login")
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{
"message": ctx.Locale.TrString("error.must_enable_2fa", fmt.Sprintf("%suser/settings/security", setting.AppURL)),
})
return
}
}
}
// Redirect to dashboard if user tries to visit any non-login page.
if options.SignOutRequired && ctx.IsSigned && ctx.Req.URL.RequestURI() != "/" {
ctx.Redirect(setting.AppSubURL + "/")
return
}
if options.SignInRequired {
if !ctx.IsSigned {
// Restrict API calls with error message.
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{
"message": "Only signed in user is allowed to call APIs.",
})
return
} else if !ctx.Doer.IsActive && setting.Service.RegisterEmailConfirm {
ctx.Data["Title"] = ctx.Tr("auth.active_your_account")
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{
"message": "This account is not activated.",
})
return
}
}
if options.AdminRequired {
if !ctx.IsUserSiteAdmin() {
ctx.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{
"message": "You have no permission to request for this.",
})
return
}
}
}
}
// check for and warn against deprecated authentication options
func checkDeprecatedAuthMethods(ctx *context.APIContext) {
if ctx.FormString("token") != "" || ctx.FormString("access_token") != "" {
ctx.Resp.Header().Set("Warning", "token and access_token API authentication is deprecated and will be removed in Forgejo v13.0.0. Please use AuthorizationHeaderToken instead. Existing queries will continue to work but without authorization.")
}
}
func securityHeaders() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
// CORB: https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/corb-for-developers
// http://stackoverflow.com/a/3146618/244009
resp.Header().Set("x-content-type-options", "nosniff")
next.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
})
}
}