diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
index bfed93698..97cd580ea 100644
--- a/doc/configuration.txt
+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
@@ -2126,13 +2126,21 @@ ca-base <dir>
   directives. Absolute locations specified in "ca-file", "ca-verify-file" and
   "crl-file" prevail and ignore "ca-base".
 
-chroot <jail dir>
+chroot { <jail dir> | auto }
   Changes current directory to <jail dir> and performs a chroot() there before
   dropping privileges. This increases the security level in case an unknown
   vulnerability would be exploited, since it would make it very hard for the
-  attacker to exploit the system. This only works when the process is started
-  with superuser privileges. It is important to ensure that <jail_dir> is both
-  empty and non-writable to anyone.
+  attacker to exploit the system. It is important to ensure that <jail dir>
+  is both empty and non-writable to anyone. When the process is started with
+  superuser privileges, the chroot() is performed directly. On Linux, when
+  started unprivileged, haproxy attempts to perform it from inside a new
+  user namespace created with unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER); if that mechanism is
+  unavailable the chroot() will fail with the usual error.
+
+  As a special case, <jail dir> may be set to "auto", in which case haproxy
+  creates an anonymous temporary directory, unlinks it, and chroots into it.
+  The resulting jail has no name in the filesystem and is empty and read-only,
+  removing the need to prepare a dedicated jail directory.
 
 close-spread-time <time>
   Define a time window during which idle connections and active connections
diff --git a/src/haproxy.c b/src/haproxy.c
index ab55d2f12..3a4318753 100644
--- a/src/haproxy.c
+++ b/src/haproxy.c
@@ -3327,6 +3327,44 @@ static void setup_user_ns(uid_t euid, gid_t egid)
 }
 #endif
 
+static int do_chroot(const char *prog, const char *path)
+{
+	const char *chroot_dir = path;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(path, "auto") == 0) {
+		/* When "chroot auto" is used, we attempt to chroot to an
+		 * anonymous and read-only directory.
+		 */
+		char tmpdir[] = "/tmp/haproxy.XXXXXX";
+		chroot_dir = mkdtemp(tmpdir);
+		if (chroot_dir == NULL) {
+			ha_alert("[%s.main()] Cannot create(%s) for chroot auto.\n",
+			         prog, tmpdir);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		error = chdir(tmpdir);
+		/* We can call rmdir() here; we hold a reference to the
+		 * directory since it is our CWD (and if chdir() failed we still
+		 * want to remove the directory).
+		 */
+		DISGUISE(rmdir(tmpdir));
+		if (!error)
+			error = chroot(".");
+	} else {
+		error = chroot(path);
+	}
+	if (!error)
+		error = chdir("/");
+
+	if (error) {
+		ha_alert("[%s.main()] Cannot chroot(%s).\n", prog, chroot_dir);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	struct rlimit limit;
@@ -3659,14 +3697,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 
 	/* Must chroot and setgid/setuid in the children */
 	/* chroot if needed */
-	if (global.chroot != NULL) {
-		if (chroot(global.chroot) == -1 || chdir("/") == -1) {
-			ha_alert("[%s.main()] Cannot chroot(%s).\n", argv[0], global.chroot);
-			if (nb_oldpids)
-				tell_old_pids(SIGTTIN);
-			protocol_unbind_all();
-			exit(1);
-		}
+	if (global.chroot != NULL && do_chroot(argv[0], global.chroot) != 0) {
+		if (nb_oldpids)
+			tell_old_pids(SIGTTIN);
+		protocol_unbind_all();
+		exit(1);
 	}
 
 	ha_free(&global.chroot);