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HAProxy - Load balancer
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It has been reported by Wedl Michael, a student at the University of Applied
Sciences St. Poelten, a potential vulnerability into haproxy as described below.
An attacker could have obtained a TLS session ticket after having established
a connection to an haproxy QUIC listener, using its real IP address. The
attacker has not even to send a application level request (HTTP3). Then
the attacker could open a 0-RTT session with a spoofed IP address
trusted by the QUIC listen to bypass IP allow/block list and send HTTP3 requests.
To mitigate this vulnerability, one decided to use a token which can be provided
to the client each time it successfully managed to connect to haproxy. These
tokens may be reused for future connections to validate the address/path of the
remote peer as this is done with the Retry token which is used for the current
connection, not the next one. Such tokens are transported by NEW_TOKEN frames
which was not used at this time by haproxy.
So, each time a client connect to an haproxy QUIC listener with 0-RTT
enabled, it is provided with such a token which can be reused for the
next 0-RTT session. If no such a token is presented by the client,
haproxy checks if the session is a 0-RTT one, so with early-data presented
by the client. Contrary to the Retry token, the decision to refuse the
connection is made only when the TLS stack has been provided with
enough early-data from the Initial ClientHello TLS message and when
these data have been accepted. Hopefully, this event arrives fast enough
to allow haproxy to kill the connection if some early-data have been accepted
without token presented by the client.
quic_build_post_handshake_frames() has been modified to build a NEW_TOKEN
frame with this newly implemented token to be transported inside.
quic_tls_derive_retry_token_secret() was renamed to quic_do_tls_derive_token_secre()
and modified to be reused and derive the secret for the new token implementation.
quic_token_validate() has been implemented to validate both the Retry and
the new token implemented by this patch. When this is a non-retry token
which could not be validated, the datagram received is marked as requiring
a Retry packet to be sent, and no connection is created.
When the Initial packet does not embed any non-retry token and if 0-RTT is enabled
the connection is marked with this new flag: QUIC_FL_CONN_NO_TOKEN_RCVD. As soon
as the TLS stack detects that some early-data have been provided and accepted by
the client, the connection is marked to be killed (QUIC_FL_CONN_TO_KILL) from
ha_quic_add_handshake_data(). This is done calling qc_ssl_eary_data_accepted()
new function. The secret TLS handshake is interrupted as soon as possible returnin
0 from ha_quic_add_handshake_data(). The connection is also marked as
requiring a Retry packet to be sent (QUIC_FL_CONN_SEND_RETRY) from
ha_quic_add_handshake_data(). The the handshake I/O handler (quic_conn_io_cb())
knows how to behave: kill the connection after having sent a Retry packet.
About TLS stack compatibility, this patch is supported by aws-lc. It is
disabled for wolfssl which does not support 0-RTT at this time thanks
to HAVE_SSL_0RTT_QUIC.
This patch depends on these commits:
MINOR: quic: Add trace for QUIC_EV_CONN_IO_CB event.
MINOR: quic: Implement qc_ssl_eary_data_accepted().
MINOR: quic: Modify NEW_TOKEN frame structure (qf_new_token struct)
BUG/MINOR: quic: Missing incrementation in NEW_TOKEN frame builder
MINOR: quic: Token for future connections implementation.
MINOR: quic: Implement quic_tls_derive_token_secret().
MINOR: tools: Implement ipaddrcpy().
Must be backported as far as 2.6.
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HAProxy
HAProxy is a free, very fast and reliable reverse-proxy offering high availability, load balancing, and proxying for TCP and HTTP-based applications.
Installation
The INSTALL file describes how to build HAProxy. A list of packages is also available on the wiki.
Getting help
The discourse and the mailing-list are available for questions or configuration assistance. You can also use the slack or IRC channel. Please don't use the issue tracker for these.
The issue tracker is only for bug reports or feature requests.
Documentation
The HAProxy documentation has been split into a number of different files for ease of use. It is available in text format as well as HTML. The wiki is also meant to replace the old architecture guide.
Please refer to the following files depending on what you're looking for:
- INSTALL for instructions on how to build and install HAProxy
- BRANCHES to understand the project's life cycle and what version to use
- LICENSE for the project's license
- CONTRIBUTING for the process to follow to submit contributions
The more detailed documentation is located into the doc/ directory:
- doc/intro.txt for a quick introduction on HAProxy
- doc/configuration.txt for the configuration's reference manual
- doc/lua.txt for the Lua's reference manual
- doc/SPOE.txt for how to use the SPOE engine
- doc/network-namespaces.txt for how to use network namespaces under Linux
- doc/management.txt for the management guide
- doc/regression-testing.txt for how to use the regression testing suite
- doc/peers.txt for the peers protocol reference
- doc/coding-style.txt for how to adopt HAProxy's coding style
- doc/internals for developer-specific documentation (not all up to date)
License
HAProxy is licensed under GPL 2 or any later version, the headers under LGPL 2.1. See the LICENSE file for a more detailed explanation.