mattermost/server/public/model/authorize.go

300 lines
11 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2015-present Mattermost, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
// See LICENSE.txt for license information.
package model
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"regexp"
)
var (
codeChallengeRegex = regexp.MustCompile("^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$")
codeVerifierRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9\-._~]+$`)
)
const (
AuthCodeExpireTime = 60 * 10 // 10 minutes
AuthCodeResponseType = "code"
ImplicitResponseType = "token"
DefaultScope = "user"
PKCECodeChallengeMethodS256 = "S256"
PKCECodeChallengeMinLength = 43
PKCECodeChallengeMaxLength = 128
PKCECodeVerifierMinLength = 43
PKCECodeVerifierMaxLength = 128
)
type AuthData struct {
ClientId string `json:"client_id"`
UserId string `json:"user_id"`
Code string `json:"code"`
ExpiresIn int32 `json:"expires_in"`
CreateAt int64 `json:"create_at"`
RedirectUri string `json:"redirect_uri"`
State string `json:"state"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
CodeChallenge string `json:"code_challenge,omitempty"`
CodeChallengeMethod string `json:"code_challenge_method,omitempty"`
Resource string `json:"resource,omitempty"`
}
type AuthorizeRequest struct {
ResponseType string `json:"response_type"`
ClientId string `json:"client_id"`
RedirectURI string `json:"redirect_uri"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
State string `json:"state"`
CodeChallenge string `json:"code_challenge,omitempty"`
CodeChallengeMethod string `json:"code_challenge_method,omitempty"`
Resource string `json:"resource,omitempty"`
}
// IsValid validates the AuthData and returns an error if it isn't configured
// correctly.
func (ad *AuthData) IsValid() *AppError {
if !IsValidId(ad.ClientId) {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.client_id.app_error", nil, "", http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if !IsValidId(ad.UserId) {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.user_id.app_error", nil, "", http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if ad.Code == "" || len(ad.Code) > 128 {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.auth_code.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if ad.ExpiresIn == 0 {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.expires.app_error", nil, "", http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if ad.CreateAt <= 0 {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.create_at.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if len(ad.RedirectUri) > 256 || !IsValidHTTPURL(ad.RedirectUri) {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.redirect_uri.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if len(ad.State) > 1024 {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.state.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if len(ad.Scope) > 128 {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.scope.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// PKCE validation - if one PKCE field is present, both must be present and valid
if ad.CodeChallenge != "" || ad.CodeChallengeMethod != "" {
if err := ad.validatePKCE(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Resource validation per RFC 8707
if ad.Resource != "" {
if err := ValidateResourceParameter(ad.Resource, ad.ClientId, "AuthData.IsValid"); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// IsValid validates the AuthorizeRequest and returns an error if it isn't configured
// correctly.
func (ar *AuthorizeRequest) IsValid() *AppError {
if !IsValidId(ar.ClientId) {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.client_id.app_error", nil, "", http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if ar.ResponseType == "" {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.response_type.app_error", nil, "", http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if ar.RedirectURI == "" || len(ar.RedirectURI) > 256 || !IsValidHTTPURL(ar.RedirectURI) {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.redirect_uri.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ar.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if len(ar.State) > 1024 {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.state.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ar.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if len(ar.Scope) > 128 {
return NewAppError("AuthData.IsValid", "model.authorize.is_valid.scope.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ar.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// PKCE validation - if one PKCE field is present, both must be present and valid
if ar.CodeChallenge != "" || ar.CodeChallengeMethod != "" {
if err := ar.validatePKCE(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Resource validation per RFC 8707
if ar.Resource != "" {
if err := ValidateResourceParameter(ar.Resource, ar.ClientId, "AuthorizeRequest.IsValid"); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (ad *AuthData) PreSave() {
if ad.ExpiresIn == 0 {
ad.ExpiresIn = AuthCodeExpireTime
}
if ad.CreateAt == 0 {
ad.CreateAt = GetMillis()
}
if ad.Scope == "" {
ad.Scope = DefaultScope
}
}
func (ad *AuthData) IsExpired() bool {
return GetMillis() > ad.CreateAt+int64(ad.ExpiresIn*1000)
}
// validatePKCEParameters validates PKCE parameters (shared validation logic)
func validatePKCEParameters(codeChallenge, codeChallengeMethod, clientId, caller string) *AppError {
if codeChallenge == "" {
return NewAppError(caller, "model.authorize.is_valid.code_challenge.app_error", nil, "client_id="+clientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if codeChallengeMethod == "" {
return NewAppError(caller, "model.authorize.is_valid.code_challenge_method.app_error", nil, "client_id="+clientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// Only support S256 method for security
if codeChallengeMethod != PKCECodeChallengeMethodS256 {
return NewAppError(caller, "model.authorize.is_valid.code_challenge_method.unsupported.app_error", nil, "client_id="+clientId+", method="+codeChallengeMethod, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// Validate code challenge format (base64url encoded)
if len(codeChallenge) < PKCECodeChallengeMinLength || len(codeChallenge) > PKCECodeChallengeMaxLength {
return NewAppError(caller, "model.authorize.is_valid.code_challenge.length.app_error", nil, "client_id="+clientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// Validate base64url format (no padding, URL-safe characters)
if !codeChallengeRegex.MatchString(codeChallenge) {
return NewAppError(caller, "model.authorize.is_valid.code_challenge.format.app_error", nil, "client_id="+clientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
return nil
}
// validatePKCE validates PKCE parameters for AuthData
func (ad *AuthData) validatePKCE() *AppError {
return validatePKCEParameters(ad.CodeChallenge, ad.CodeChallengeMethod, ad.ClientId, "AuthData.validatePKCE")
}
// validatePKCE validates PKCE parameters for AuthorizeRequest
func (ar *AuthorizeRequest) validatePKCE() *AppError {
return validatePKCEParameters(ar.CodeChallenge, ar.CodeChallengeMethod, ar.ClientId, "AuthorizeRequest.validatePKCE")
}
// VerifyPKCE verifies a PKCE code_verifier against the stored code_challenge
func (ad *AuthData) VerifyPKCE(codeVerifier string) bool {
// Both empty = no PKCE was used (backward compatibility)
if ad.CodeChallenge == "" && ad.CodeChallengeMethod == "" {
return true
}
// Only one empty = invalid data state
if ad.CodeChallenge == "" || ad.CodeChallengeMethod == "" {
return false
}
// Validate code verifier length
if len(codeVerifier) < PKCECodeVerifierMinLength || len(codeVerifier) > PKCECodeVerifierMaxLength {
return false
}
// Validate code verifier format (unreserved characters from RFC 3986)
if !codeVerifierRegex.MatchString(codeVerifier) {
return false
}
// Only S256 method is supported
if ad.CodeChallengeMethod != PKCECodeChallengeMethodS256 {
return false
}
// Calculate S256 challenge: BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier)))
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(codeVerifier))
calculatedChallenge := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:])
return calculatedChallenge == ad.CodeChallenge
}
// ValidatePKCEForClientType validates PKCE parameters based on OAuth client type and security requirements
func (ad *AuthData) ValidatePKCEForClientType(isPublicClient bool, codeVerifier string) *AppError {
if isPublicClient {
// RFC 7636: Public clients MUST use PKCE
if ad.CodeChallenge == "" {
return NewAppError("AuthData.ValidatePKCEForClientType", "model.authorize.validate_pkce.public_client_required.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
if codeVerifier == "" {
return NewAppError("AuthData.ValidatePKCEForClientType", "model.authorize.validate_pkce.verifier_required.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// Verify the code verifier matches the stored code challenge
if !ad.VerifyPKCE(codeVerifier) {
return NewAppError("AuthData.ValidatePKCEForClientType", "model.authorize.validate_pkce.verification_failed.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
} else {
// Confidential clients: PKCE is optional but enforced if initiated
if ad.CodeChallenge != "" {
// Client started flow with PKCE - code_verifier is required
if codeVerifier == "" {
return NewAppError("AuthData.ValidatePKCEForClientType", "model.authorize.validate_pkce.verifier_required.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// Verify the code verifier matches the stored code challenge
if !ad.VerifyPKCE(codeVerifier) {
return NewAppError("AuthData.ValidatePKCEForClientType", "model.authorize.validate_pkce.verification_failed.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
} else if codeVerifier != "" {
// Client provided code_verifier but didn't use PKCE in authorization - reject
return NewAppError("AuthData.ValidatePKCEForClientType", "model.authorize.validate_pkce.not_used_in_auth.app_error", nil, "client_id="+ad.ClientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
}
return nil
}
// ValidateResourceParameter validates a resource parameter per RFC 8707
func ValidateResourceParameter(resource, clientId, caller string) *AppError {
// Empty resource parameter is allowed (no resource specified)
if resource == "" {
return nil
}
// Resource must not exceed 512 characters to fit in database column
if len(resource) > 512 {
return NewAppError(caller, "model.authorize.is_valid.resource.length.app_error", nil, "client_id="+clientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
parsedURL, err := url.Parse(resource)
if err != nil {
return NewAppError(caller, "model.authorize.is_valid.resource.invalid_uri.app_error", nil, "client_id="+clientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// Must be absolute URI (has scheme)
if !parsedURL.IsAbs() {
return NewAppError(caller, "model.authorize.is_valid.resource.not_absolute.app_error", nil, "client_id="+clientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
// Must not include a fragment component per RFC 8707
if parsedURL.Fragment != "" {
return NewAppError(caller, "model.authorize.is_valid.resource.has_fragment.app_error", nil, "client_id="+clientId, http.StatusBadRequest)
}
return nil
}