The COPYRIGHT.GPL file was slightly out-of-sync with the last GPLv2
license from Free Software Foundation, Inc.
The changes are primarily a new address, which required touching almost
all the project files.
Except of that, it is just minor adjustments to formatting, removal of
form-feed characters and referencing "GNU Lesser General Public License"
instead of "GNU Library General Public License".
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <20170329093648.10156-1-davids@openvpn.net>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20170329093648.10156-1-davids@openvpn.net
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
This enhances --verify-hash with an optional algorithm flag. If not
provided, it defaults to SHA1 to preserve backwards compatbilitity with
existing configurations. The only valid flags are SHA1 and SHA256.
In addition enhance the layout of the --verify-hash section in the man
page.
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Message-Id: <20170504204201.1257-1-davids@openvpn.net>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg14538.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
The tls-crypt commit message contained an elaborate discussion on the
function's security properties. This commit adds the gist of that
discussion, "rotate keys periodically" to the man page.
(The 'real' solution will follow later: add support for per-client
tls-crypt keys. That will make tls-crypt useful for VPN providers too.)
Note to non-crypto-geek reviewers: please verify that this text is clear
enough to explain you when you need to replace tls-crypt keys.
Note to crypto-geek reviewers: please check the numbers - see the
--tls-crypt commit message (c6e24fa3) for details.
[DS: Fixed a few typos on-the-fly during commit]
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <1494355368-20238-1-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg14610.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
As RHEL 5 has reached EOL, we no longer need to support OpenSSL v0.9.8.
This also makes it possible to remove a few workaronds which was
needed earlier, as well as some left overs from v0.9.6.
This also makes ./configure really stop running unless a new enough
OpenSSL library is found.
Compile tested on RHEL7.3 and RHEL6.7 (mock chroot build), both shipping
openssl-1.0.1e.
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Message-Id: <20170411173133.18060-1-davids@openvpn.net>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg14441.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Running rpmlint against Fedora RPM packages revealed these warnings:
W: manual-page-warning /usr/share/man/man8/openvpn.8.gz 2738:
a special character is not allowed in a name
W: manual-page-warning /usr/share/man/man8/openvpn.8.gz 2740:
a special character is not allowed in a name
This is just a typo mistake in the .B formatting, missing a trailing
space.
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Message-Id: <20170329094925.25644-1-davids@openvpn.net>
URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20170329094925.25644-1-davids@openvpn.net
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
OpenVPN uses a default plug-in directore, set using PLUGINDIR when
running ./configure. If this is set, it will use $LIBDIR/openvpn/plugin.
When using --plugin, OpenVPN will load plug-ins from this directory with
the only exception if the plug-in filename is based on an absolute path.
Any other relative paths are relative to the PLUGINDIR.
This patch adds a third variant, using plug-in paths starting with '.'
In this case, OpenVPN will use the relative directory of where OpenVPN
was started, or the directory OpenVPN have changed into due to --cd
being used before the actual --plugin option.
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <20170127142120.10492-1-davids@openvpn.net>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13970.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
We long recommended users to use --ns-cert-type to distinguish between
client and server certificates, but that extension is long deprecated and
now can even no longer be accurately checked in OpenSSL 1.1+. We support
a more modern alternative, --remote-cert-tls (which expands to
--remote-cert-ku + --remote-cert-eku), but are overly strict in checking
the keyUsage. This patch makes our implementation less picky, so that
correct-but-slightly-weird certicates will not immediately be rejected.
We currently allow users to specify a list of allowed keyUsage values, and
require that the remote certificate matches one of these values exactly.
This is for more strict than keyUsage usually requires; which is that a
certificate is okay to use if it can *at least* be used for our intended
purpose. This patch changes the behaviour to match that, by using the
library-provided mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage() function in mbed TLS
builds, and performing the 'at least bits xyz' check for OpenSSL builds
(OpenSSL unfortunately does not expose a similar function).
Furthermore, this patch adds better error messages when the checking fails;
it now explains that is expects to match either of the supplied values,
and only does so if the check actually failed.
This patch also changes --remote-cert-tls to still require a specific EKU,
but only *some* keyUsage value. Both our supported crypto libraries will
check the keyUsage value for correctness during the handshake, but only if
it is present. So this still enforces a correct keyUsage, but is a bit
less picky about certificates that do not exactly match expectations.
This patch should be applied together with the 'deprecate --ns-cert-type'
patch I sent earlier.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1489612820-15284-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg14265.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
The nsCertType x509 extension is very old, and barely used. We already
have had an alternative for a long time: --remote-cert-tls uses the far
more common keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage extensions instead.
OpenSSL 1.1 longer exposes an API to (separately) check the nsCertType x509
extension. Since we want be able to migrate to OpenSSL 1.1, we should
deprecate this option immediately.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1488653397-2309-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg14222.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
This looked like...
--server-poll-timeout n
--connect-timeout n when connecting to [...]
... and this patch changes this to...
--server-poll-timeout n, --connect-timeout n
When connecting to [...]
... preserving correct highlighting.
Signed-off-by: Christian Hesse <mail@eworm.de>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Message-Id: <20161228075420.348-1-list@eworm.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13747.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Also make sure --dhcp-pre-release results in not just dhcp_release()
in open_tun() but a subsequent dhcp_renew() as well. Else dhcp transaction
gets aborted as this call to release() happens after the adapter status
is changed to connected.
Fixes Trac #807 (but can't say the same for Trac #665 without knowing
how to reproduce it)
v2: Mark --dhcp-release as obsolete in manpage and option parser, and
remove the unused dhcp_release variable.
Enforce dhcp-renew with dhcp-pre-release while parsing the option
instead of in open_tun().
Trac: #807
Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1483475883-17450-1-git-send-email-selva.nair@gmail.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13814.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
As suggested by krzee in trac #790, refer to the --tls-crypt option
form the --tls-auth section of the man page, to encourage users to
check out the --tls-crypt feature.
Trac: #790
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Message-Id: <1482703334-18949-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13713.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Ever since we support TLS 1.2 (OpenVPN 2.3.3+), the RSA_SIGN might not
only request MD5-SHA1 'TLS signatures', but also other variants.
Document this by updating the implementation hints, and explicitly
stating that we expect a PKCS#1 1.5 signature.
Trac: #764
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Message-Id: <1482705505-20302-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13714.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
The git master/2.4 code lacked some useful information about
the changes to --reneg-bytes, SWEET32 and weak ciphers (less
than 128-bits cipher blocks)
v2 - Fixed a couple of grammar/typo issues
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Message-Id: <1482509264-24550-1-git-send-email-davids@openvpn.net>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13682.html
Not needed either, because mbed TLS automatically selects the curve based
on the certificate.
Trac: #789
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Message-Id: <1481658672-5110-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13523.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
This fixes the bug of supporting --no-iv (since we're only accepting
bugfixes in the current release phase ;) ).
The --no-iv function decreases security if used (CBC *requires*
unpredictable IVs, other modes don't allow --no-iv at all), and even
marginally decreases other user's security by adding unwanted
complexity to our code.
Let's get rid of this.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Message-Id: <1481138447-6292-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13430.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Also correct the default ifconfig-pool end in docs and comments
Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1480707729-19578-1-git-send-email-selva.nair@gmail.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13387.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
As reported and discussed on Trac #775, restarting dns service has
unwanted side effects when there are dependent services. And it
appears unnecessary to restart this service to get DNS registered
on Windows.
Resolve by removing two actions from --register-dns:
'net stop dnscache' and 'net start dnscache' run through the service
or directly.
Trac: #775
Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1480542696-7123-1-git-send-email-selva.nair@gmail.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13331.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
- Any existing addresses are deleted before adding
- On close_tun all addresses are deleted (only if any were added)
Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1479958527-29491-1-git-send-email-selva.nair@gmail.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13222.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Allows non-NCP peers (<= 2.3, or 2.4+ with --ncp-disable) to specify a
--cipher that is different from the one in our config, as long as the new
cipher value is allowed (i.e. in --ncp-ciphers at our side).
This works both client-to-server and server-to-client. I.e. a 2.4 client
with "cipher BF-CBC" and "ncp-ciphers AES-256-GCM:AES-256-CBC" can connect
to both a 2.3 server with "cipher BF-CBC" as well as a server with
"cipher AES-256-CBC" in its config. The other way around, a 2.3 client
with either "cipher BF-CBC" or "cipher AES-256-CBC" can connect to a 2.4
server with e.g. "cipher BF-CBC" and "ncp-ciphers AES-256-GCM:AES-256-CBC"
in its config.
This patch was inspired by Gert's "Poor man's NCP for 2.3 clients" patch,
but takes a different approach to avoid the need for server-side scripts
or client-side 'setenv UV_*' tricks.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1479936104-4045-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13218.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
This isn't an option to be used directly in any configuration files,
but to be used via --client-connect scripts or --plugin making use of
OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT or OPENVPN_PLUGIN_CLIENT_CONNECT_V2.
[v2 - Added lacking .B styling of options
- Clarified the token life time ]
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1474118415-14666-1-git-send-email-davids@openvpn.net>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg12506.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
v2: On closing tun delete the ipv6 dns addresses (if any were set).
Also use "validate=no" only in Windows 7 and higher where it is
supported. Its used to skip the time consuming automatic address
validation which is on by default on those platforms.
Tested on Windows Server 2008 (i686), Win 7 (x64) and Win 10 (x64)
TODO: set dns servers using the interactive service
Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1479784332-21680-1-git-send-email-selva.nair@gmail.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13193.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
This defines a new DHCP suboption "DNS6", but does not actually
implement anything but "document the option and understand it".
If received, it will be put into an "foreign_option_<n>" environment
variable where an --up script or plugin could receive and act upon it.
On non-Windows platforms, all "dhcp-option" sub-options end up there,
so v4 and v6 DNS options will be reflected like this:
foreign_option_1=dhcp-option DNS6 2001:608::2
foreign_option_2=dhcp-option DNS 195.30.0.2
v2: do not set o->dhcp_options if DNS6 is the single dhcp-option seen
(spotted by Selva Nair)
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <1479746562-751-1-git-send-email-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13174.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
In OpenVPN 2.3 --tls-remote got deprecated in favour of --verify-x509-name.
The new option solves the same task as --tls-remote but in a more flexible
and improved way. This new option was introduced in commit 9f0fc74566
(release/2.3: f6e12862ce). Removing --tls-remote will only require
a minor configuration file change.
The removal of this option has been documented in the man pages since the
release of OpenVPN v2.3, where also the deprecation of --compat-names and
--no-name-remapping was included. However, those two will first be removed
in OpenVPN v2.5.
The reason not to remove --compat-names and --no-name-remapping now is that
such a change will require TLS verification scripts and plug-ins to be
updated to support the new X.509 subject formatting; which
--verify-x509-name already uses.
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1479217256-21298-1-git-send-email-davids@openvpn.net>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13070.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
This adds a --tls-crypt option, which uses a pre-shared static key (like
the --tls-auth key) to encrypt control channel packets.
Encrypting control channel packets has three main advantages:
* It provides more privacy by hiding the certificate used for the TLS
connection.
* It is harder to identify OpenVPN traffic as such.
* It provides "poor-man's" post-quantum security, against attackers who
will never know the pre-shared key (i.e. no forward secrecy).
Control channel packet encryption
---------------------------------
We propose to use the following encryption method, based on the SIV
construction [0], to achieve nonce misuse-resistant authenticated
encryption:
msg = control channel plaintext
header = opcode (1 byte) || session_id (8 bytes) || packet_id (8
bytes)
Ka = authentication key (256 bits)
Ke = encryption key (256 bits)
(Ka and Ke are pre-shared keys, like with --tls-auth)
auth_tag = HMAC-SHA256(Ka, header || msg)
IV = 128 most-significant bits of auth_tag
ciph = AES256-CTR(Ke, IV, msg)
output = Header || Tag || Ciph
This boils down to the following on-the-wire packet format:
-opcode- || -session_id- || -packet_id- || auth_tag || * payload *
Where
- XXX - means authenticated, and
* XXX * means authenticated and encrypted.
Which is very similar to the current tls-auth packet format, and has the
same overhead as "--tls-auth" with "--auth SHA256".
The use of a nonce misuse-resistant authenticated encryption scheme
allows us to worry less about the risks of nonce collisions. This is
important, because in contrast with the data channel in TLS mode, we
will not be able to rotate tls-crypt keys often or fully guarantee nonce
uniqueness. For non misuse-resistant modes such as GCM [1], [2], the
data channel in TLS mode only has to ensure that the packet counter
never rolls over, while tls-crypt would have to provide nonce uniqueness
over all control channel packets sent by all clients, for the lifetime
of the tls-crypt key.
Unlike with tls-auth, no --key-direction has to be specified for
tls-crypt. TLS servers always use key direction 1, and TLS clients
always use key direction 2, which means that client->server traffic and
server->client traffic always use different keys, without requiring
configuration.
Using fixed, secure, encryption and authentication algorithms makes both
implementation and configuration easier. If we ever want to, we can
extend this to support other crypto primitives. Since tls-crypt should
provide privacy as well as DoS protection, these should not be made
negotiable.
Security considerations:
------------------------
tls-crypt is a best-effort mechanism that aims to provide as much
privacy and security as possible, while staying as simple as possible.
The following are some security considerations for this scheme.
1. The same tls-crypt key is potentially shared by a lot of peers, so it
is quite likely to get compromised. Once an attacker acquires the
tls-crypt key, this mechanism no longer provides any security against
the attacker.
2. Since many peers potentially use the tls-crypt key for a long time, a
lot of data might be encrypted under the tls-crypt key. This leads
to two potential problems:
* The "opcode || session id || packet id" combination might collide.
This might happen in larger setups, because the session id contains
just 64 bits or random. Using the uniqueness requirement from the
GCM spec [3] (a collision probability of less than 2^(-32)),
uniqueness is achieved when using the tls-crypt key for at most
2^16 (65536) connections per process start. (The packet id
includes the daemon start time in the packet ID, which should be
different after stopping and (re)starting OpenPVN.)
And if a collision happens, an attacker can *only* learn whether
colliding packets contain the same plaintext. Attackers will not
be able to learn anything else about the plaintext (unless the
attacker knows the plaintext of one of these packets, of course).
Since the impact is limited, I consider this an acceptable
remaining risk.
* The IVs used in encryption might collide. When two IVs collide, an
attacker can learn the xor of the two plaintexts by xorring the
ciphertexts. This is a serious loss of confidentiality. The IVs
are 128-bit, so when HMAC-SHA256 is a secure PRF (an assumption
that must also hold for TLS), and we use the same uniqueness
requirement from [3], this limits the total amount of control
channel messages for all peers in the setup to 2^48. Assuming a
large setup of 2^16 (65536) clients, and a (conservative) number of
2^16 control channel packets per connection on average, this means
that clients may set up 2^16 connections on average. I think these
numbers are reasonable.
(I have a follow-up proposal to use client-specific tls-auth/tls-crypt
keys to partially mitigate these issues, but let's tackle this patch
first.)
References:
-----------
[0] Rogaway & Shrimpton, A Provable-Security Treatment of the Key-Wrap
Problem, 2006
(https://www.iacr.org/archive/eurocrypt2006/40040377/40040377.pdf)
[1] Ferguson, Authentication weaknesses in GCM, 2005
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/CWC-GCM/Ferg
uson2.pdf)
[2] Joux, Authentication Failures in NIST version of GCM, 2006
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/800-38_Serie
s-Drafts/GCM/Joux_comments.pdf)
[3] Dworking, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, 2007
(http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf)
Patch history:
--------------
v2 - processed Arne's review comments:
* Error out early with a clear error message when AES-256-CTR or
HMAC-SHA-256 are not supported by the crypto library.
* Clarify that cipher_ctx_reset() sets the IV.
v3 - actually add error messages promised in v2...
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Message-Id: <1479216586-20078-1-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13069.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
With c99, "WIN32" is no longer automatically defined when (cross-)building
for Windows, and proper compilation relies on including <windefs.h>,
before checking the macro. "_WIN32" is the official define that is
guaranteed to be defined by the compiler itself, no includes are needed.
So, mechanically change all occurrances of "WIN32" to "_WIN32".
While at it, get rid of unused WIN32_0_1 #define in syshead.h
See also:
http://nadeausoftware.com/articles/2012/01/c_c_tip_how_use_compiler_predefi
ned_macros_detect_operating_system#WindowsCygwinnonPOSIXandMinGW
Trac #746
v2: rebased to master, merge the console[_builtin].c changes
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Message-Id: <20161113195228.74090-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13035.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Key method 2 has been the default since OpenVPN 2.0, and is both more
functional and secure. Also, key method 1 was only ever supported for
peer-to-peer connections (i.e. not for client-server).
Let's get rid of some legacy and phase out key method 1.
v2: add Changes.rst entry, and update man page
[ DS: Slightly modified patch, rewored the warning message and the
Changes.rst note to encourage not to set --key-method at all ]
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Message-Id: <1479153967-6788-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg13054.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
v4:
- Account for IP header offset in TAP mode
- Correct handle of non-IP protocols in TAP mode
v3: Use better way of figuring out IP proto version which
does not break TAP mode. Add an option to allow recursive
routing, could be useful when packets sent by openvpn itself
are not subject to the routing tables that would move packets
into the tunnel.
v2: better method naming
On certain OSes (Windows, OS X) when network adapter is
disabled (ethernet cable pulled off, Wi-Fi hardware switch disabled),
operating system starts to use tun as an external interface.
Outgoing packets are routed to tun, UDP encapsulated, given to
routing table and sent to.. tun.
As a consequence, system starts talking to itself on full power,
traffic counters skyrocket and user is not happy.
To prevent that, drop packets which have gateway IP as
destination address.
Tested on Win7/10, OS X, Linux.
Trac #642
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1478208503-25929-1-git-send-email-lstipakov@gmail.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg12894.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Just minor clarifications and corrections of the --keepalive option.
v2 - Changed from ps/pto to interval/timeout
- Rephrased the server-side timeout doubling parapgraph
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1478007489-17163-1-git-send-email-davids@openvpn.net>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg12866.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
This sets the flag if the OpenVPN server should create authentication
tokens on-the-fly on successful --auth-user-pass-verify or --plugin with
OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY processing.
If an OpenVPN server is running without this option, it should behave
as before. Next patches will implement the auth-token generation and
passing it on to the clients.
The --auth-gen-token can be given an optional integer argument which
defines the lifetime of generated tokens. The lifetime argument
must be given in number of seconds.
v2 - Update Changes.rst
- Improve man page in regards to lifetime argument
- Rename struct member auth_generate_token to auth_token_generate
to have a consistent naming scheme
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Message-Id: <1477684124-26083-2-git-send-email-davids@openvpn.net>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg12825.html
- Add `` to all options
- Sort and group new features
- Group changes a bit better
- Fix some formatting/formulation
Patch V2:
- add missing quote, noticed by Samuli
- add new windows services
- add ECDH
- add pushable compression
- add Android and AIX platform support
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Message-Id: <1477060957-6423-1-git-send-email-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg12766.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Following the earlier warning about small block ciphers, now limit the
--reneg-bytes value when using a cipher that susceptible to SWEET32-like
attacks. The 64 MB value has been selected with the researchers who
published the SWEET32 paper.
Note that this will not change a user-set --reneg-bytes value, to allow a
user to align a gun with his feet^w^w^w^w^w^w override this behaviour if
really needed.
v2: obey user-set --reneg-bytes 0 to revert to old behaviour, use more firm
language in warning message, and add URL to man page.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Message-Id: <1477655821-6711-1-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg12798.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
This option was useful when IPv6 tun support was non standard and was an
internal/user specified flag that tracked the Ipv6 capability of the tun
device.
All supported OS support IPv6. Also tun-ipv6 is pushable by the remote so
not putting tun-ipv6 does not forbid ipv6 addresses.
This commit also clean up a bit of the ipv6 related tun.c. Changes for
most platforms are minimal.
For linux a bit more cleanup is done:
- Remove compatibility defines that were added 2008
- Always use IFF_NO_PI for the linux tun and not only for IPv4 only tun
setups (Android also always IFF_NO_PI works fine with Ipv6).
This commit also remove a non ipv6 fallback for tap driver from OpenVPN
2.2-beta or earlier and only warns.
Patch V2: Integrate Gert's comments
Patch V3: Remove tun_ipv4 option. It only used for MTU discovery and there
it was wrong since it should on the transport protocol if at all
Patch V4: Completely remove support for NetBSD <= 4.0 and remove
NETBSD_MULTI_AF defines
Patch V5: Assume generic OS in tun.c is also IPv6 capable. Add changes to
man page. Fix typos/change message as suggest by David.
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1476377656-3150-1-git-send-email-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg12695.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
Before the connect-retry change to do exponential backup this was not
necessary since the time was fixed. With the exponential backoff the
UI needs either to implement its own exponential backoff mechanism
or needs a way of knowing the value of OpenVPN internal mechansim.
Patch V2: Fixed typos noticed by Selva
[DS: Fixed a couple of whitespace errors in management_hold() at commit time]
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <1476269227-13290-1-git-send-email-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg12675.html
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@openvpn.net>
As reported in trac #732, the man page text for --cipher is no longer
accurate. Update the text to represent current knowledge, about NCP and
SWEET32.
This does not hint at changing the default cipher, because we did not make
a decision on that yet. If we do change the default cipher, we'll have to
update the text to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1473605431-20842-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg12439.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Debian also incorrectly changes that the default for route parameters can
be specified by using "nil" instead of "default. The confusion is probably
coming from show_opt printing "nil" instead of "default". Change show_opt
to show "default (not set)" instead of "nil"
Original author: Alberto Gonzalez Iniesta <agi@inittab.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1468495519-25102-1-git-send-email-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=1468495519-25102-1-git-send-email-arne@rfc2549.org
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Pushes AES-256-GCM when a connection client advertises IV_NCP=2, and
supports serving connections to clients with different data channel
cipher configuration simultaneously.
v2:
* Update manpage
* Add Changes.rst entry
v3:
* Do not regenerate keys if the client sends a second pull request
* Don't postpone key generation if client has no IV_NCP support
v4:
* rebase on client-side NCP v4
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1467149771-10374-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/12009
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Add --ncp-disable to completely disable cipher negotiation, and
--ncp-ciphers to specify which ciphers to accept from the server.
v2:
* fix --disable-crypto builds
* use register_signal() instead of operating directly on c->sig
* add man-page entry for new options
v3:
* rebased on client-side NCP v3
v4:
* rebased on client-side NCP v4
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1467149700-10042-1-git-send-email-steffan@karger.me>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/12008
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
- When the number of retries per remote exceeds a limit
(hard coded to 5), double the restart pause interval
for each additional retry per remote.
- Trigger a SIGHUP to reset the retry count when the pause
interval exceeds 1024 times the base value of restart pause.
(removed in v2 of the patch)
The base value of restart pause is set using --connect-retry
(5 seconds by default).
v2 changes (based on suggestions from Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>)
- Do not throw SIGHUP.
- Add an optional argument to "--connect-retry n [m]" where 'm'
specifies the max value of restart pause interval (default
300 sec).
E.g., "--connect-retry 5 1800" will cause the restart pause to
scale up starting at 5 until it exceeds 1800 seconds at which
point it gets capped at 1800.
- If n == m no slow down will occur.
- While at it, fix typos and clarify the description of connect-retry-max
in the man page and Changes.rst
v3 changes (on further feedback from arne@rfc2549.org):
- Limiting the base value of retry wait interval to 16 bits moved
to options.c
- Apply backoff only in the udp and tcp-client modes. Backing off on
tcp-server could be exploited by a client in p2p-mode to maliciously
slow it down (thanks to Arne Schwabe for pointing this out.
- Fix typo in Changes.rst: "third argument" -> "second argument"
Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1467732770-19110-1-git-send-email-selva.nair@gmail.com>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/12050
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
These options were probably introduced long before we had multiple
remote/connection entries. For all other connection entries, OpenVPN will
go on with the next connection if it fails. For proxies, if it fails in
some ways it works the same, for other failures it completely stops.
Removing the *-proxy-retry and defaulting to retry makes the behavior more
predictiable. Stopping after one try (regardless of reason) can be achieved
with --max-connect-retry 1
V2: Add reason for removing, remove from manpage, give a hint at
--max-connet-retry
V3: Collapse the two ifs in options.c to one block
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1466771230-5266-1-git-send-email-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/11988
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
- Allow --management-external-cert as an alternative to --cert
- Also make sure --cert and --management-external-cert are not
both specified, and clarify in the man page that the latter
must be used with --management-external-key.
Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1466132093-1178-1-git-send-email-selva.nair@gmail.com>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/11929
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
With this change all timeouts before the first packet from the OpenVPN
server are unified into the server-poll-timeout option.
The default of 120s has been chosen to be a safe value is larger as it is
larger the sums of the old small timeouts.
V3: fix some whitespace/typos problems
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1465656195-12722-1-git-send-email-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/11899
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
