related struct definitions out into the MI path.
Invert the native ipc structs to the Linux ipc structs convesion logic.
Since 64-bit variant of ipc structs has more precision convert native ipc
structs to the 64-bit Linux ipc structs and then truncate 64-bit values
into the non 64-bit if needed. Unlike Linux, return EOVERFLOW if the
values do not fit.
Fix SYSV IPC for 64-bit Linuxulator which never sets IPC_64 bit.
MFC after: 1 month
the syscalls that are not implemented in Linux kernel itself.
Cleanup DUMMY() macros.
Reviewed by: dchagin, trasz
Approved by: dchagin
MFC after: 1 month
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9804
Linuxulator is x86 only.
The only notable differences in algnment for an LP64 64-bit system
when compared to a 32-bit system is an eight or large byte types
alignment.
MFC after: 1 month
would be useless anyway - there is no point in pretending to have block
devices; our "block" devices are in fact character ones, and can only
be accessed as such.
Discussed with: dchagin
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
parameter to mmap(2), even if MAP_FIXED is not explicitly specified.
Android ART is one example. Implement bug compatibility for this case
in linuxulator.
Reviewed by: dchagin@
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9373
Convert linux_recv(), linux_send() and linux_accept() system call arguments
to the register_t type too.
PR: 217161
MFC after: 3 days
xMFC with: r313284,r313285,r313684
getdents64() with wrapper over kern_getdirentries().
The patch was originally written by emaste@ and then adapted by trasz@
and me.
Note:
1. I divided linux_getdents() and linux_readdir() as in case when the
getdents() called with count = 1 (readdir() case) it can overwrite
user stack (by writing to user buffer pointer more than 1 byte).
2. Linux returns EINVAL in case when user supplied buffer is not enough
to contain fetched dirent.
3. Linux returns ENOTDIR in case when fd points to not a directory.
Reviewed by: trasz@
MFC after: 1 month
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2210
Rename kern_vm_* functions to kern_*. Move the prototypes to
syscallsubr.h. Also change Mach VM types to uintptr_t/size_t as
needed, to avoid headers pollution.
Requested by: alc, jhb
Reviewed by: alc
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9535
Members of the syscall argument structures are padded to a word size. So,
for COMPAT_LINUX32 we should convert user supplied system call arguments
which is 32-bit in that case to the array of register_t.
Reported by: Oleg V. Nauman
MFC after: 1 week
kern_vm_munmap(), and kern_vm_madvise(), and use them in various compats
instead of their sys_*() counterparts.
Reviewed by: ed, dchagin, kib
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9378
and wrong numbering for a few unimplemented syscalls.
For 32-bit Linuxulator, socketcall() syscall was historically
the entry point for the sockets API. Starting in Linux 4.3, direct
syscalls are provided for the sockets API. Enable it.
The initial version of patch was provided by trasz@ and extended by me.
Submitted by: trasz
MFC after: 2 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9381
and use it in compats instead of their sys_*() counterparts.
Reviewed by: kib, jhb, dchagin
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9383
of their sys_*() counterparts. The svr4 is left unchanged.
Reviewed by: kib@
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9379
instead of their sys_*() counterparts in various compats. The svr4
is left untouched, because there's no point.
Reviewed by: ed@, kib@
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9367
Right now size of the structure is 472 bytes on amd64, which is
already large and stack allocations are indesirable. With the ino64
work, MNAMELEN is increased to 1024, which will make it impossible to have
struct statfs on the stack.
Extracted from: ino64 work by gleb
Discussed with: mckusick
Tested by: pho
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Descriptor returned by accept(2) should inherits capabilities rights from
the listening socket.
PR: 201052
Reviewed by: emaste, jonathan
Discussed with: many
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D7724
Make the kern_fsync() function public, so that it can be used by other
parts of the kernel. Fix up existing consumers to make use of it.
Requested by: kib
FreeBSD support NX bit on X86_64 processors out of the box, for i386 emulation
use READ_IMPLIES_EXEC flag, introduced in r302515.
While here move common part of mmap() and mprotect() code to the files in compat/linux
to reduce code dupcliation between Linuxulator's.
Reported by: Johannes Jost Meixner, Shawn Webb
MFC after: 1 week
XMFC with: r302515, r302516
In Linux if this flag is set, PROT_READ implies PROT_EXEC for mmap().
Linux/i386 set this flag automatically if the binary requires executable stack.
READ_IMPLIES_EXEC flag will be used in the next Linux mmap() commit.
[1] Remove unneeded sockaddr conversion before kern_recvit() call as the from
argument is used to record result (the source address of the received message) only.
[2] In Linux the type of msg_namelen member of struct msghdr is signed but native
msg_namelen has a unsigned type (socklen_t). So use the proper storage to fetch fromlen
from userspace and than check the user supplied value and return EINVAL if it is less
than 0 as a Linux do.
Reported by: Thomas Mueller <tmueller at sysgo dot com> [1]
Reviewed by: kib@
Approved by: re (gjb, kib)
MFC after: 3 days
threads, to make it less confusing and using modern kernel terms.
Rename the functions to reflect current use of the functions, instead
of the historic KSE conventions:
cpu_set_fork_handler -> cpu_fork_kthread_handler (for kthreads)
cpu_set_upcall -> cpu_copy_thread (for forks)
cpu_set_upcall_kse -> cpu_set_upcall (for new threads creation)
Reviewed by: jhb (previous version)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Approved by: re (hrs)
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D6731
intention of the POSIX IEEE Std 1003.1TM-2008/Cor 1-2013.
A robust mutex is guaranteed to be cleared by the system upon either
thread or process owner termination while the mutex is held. The next
mutex locker is then notified about inconsistent mutex state and can
execute (or abandon) corrective actions.
The patch mostly consists of small changes here and there, adding
neccessary checks for the inconsistent and abandoned conditions into
existing paths. Additionally, the thread exit handler was extended to
iterate over the userspace-maintained list of owned robust mutexes,
unlocking and marking as terminated each of them.
The list of owned robust mutexes cannot be maintained atomically
synchronous with the mutex lock state (it is possible in kernel, but
is too expensive). Instead, for the duration of lock or unlock
operation, the current mutex is remembered in a special slot that is
also checked by the kernel at thread termination.
Kernel must be aware about the per-thread location of the heads of
robust mutex lists and the current active mutex slot. When a thread
touches a robust mutex for the first time, a new umtx op syscall is
issued which informs about location of lists heads.
The umtx sleep queues for PP and PI mutexes are split between
non-robust and robust.
Somewhat unrelated changes in the patch:
1. Style.
2. The fix for proper tdfind() call use in umtxq_sleep_pi() for shared
pi mutexes.
3. Removal of the userspace struct pthread_mutex m_owner field.
4. The sysctl kern.ipc.umtx_vnode_persistent is added, which controls
the lifetime of the shared mutex associated with a vnode' page.
Reviewed by: jilles (previous version, supposedly the objection was fixed)
Discussed with: brooks, Martin Simmons <martin@lispworks.com> (some aspects)
Tested by: pho
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
This is a minor follow-up to r297422, prompted by a Coverity warning. (It's
not a real defect, just a code smell.) OSD slot array reservations are an
array of pointers (void **) but were cast to void* and back unnecessarily.
Keep the correct type from reservation to use.
osd.9 is updated to match, along with a few trivial igor fixes.
Reported by: Coverity
CID: 1353811
Sponsored by: EMC / Isilon Storage Division
1. Limit secs to INT32_MAX / 2 to avoid errors from kern_setitimer().
Assert that kern_setitimer() returns 0.
Remove bogus cast of secs.
Fix style(9) issues.
2. Increment the return value if the remaining tv_usec value more than 500000 as a Linux does.
Pointed out by: [1] Bruce Evans
MFC after: 1 week
is always successfull.
So, ignore any errors and return 0 as a Linux do.
XXX. Unlike POSIX, Linux in case when the invalid seconds value specified
always return 0, so in that case Linux does not return proper remining time.
MFC after: 1 week
need to include it explicitly when <vm/vm_param.h> is already included.
Suggested by: alc
Reviewed by: alc
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D5379
and replace crcopysafe by crcopy as crcopysafe is is not intended to be
safe in a threaded environment, it drops PROC_LOCK() in while() that
can lead to unexpected results, such as overwrite kernel memory.
In my POV crcopysafe() needs special attention. For now I do not see
any problems with this function, but who knows.
Submitted by: dchagin
Found by: trinity
Security: SA-16:04.linux
The set_robust_list system call request the kernel to record the head
of the list of robust futexes owned by the calling thread. The head
argument is the list head to record.
The get_robust_list system call should return the head of the robust
list of the thread whose thread id is specified in pid argument.
The list head should be stored in the location pointed to by head
argument.
In contrast, our implemenattion of get_robust_list system call copies
the known portion of memory pointed by recorded in set_robust_list
system call pointer to the head of the robust list to the location
pointed by head argument.
So, it is possible for a local attacker to read portions of kernel
memory, which may result in a privilege escalation.
Submitted by: mjg
Security: SA-16:03.linux
