Highlights from the release notes are reproduced below. Some security
and bug fixes were previously merged into FreeBSD and have been elided.
See the upstream release notes for full details
(https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html).
---
Future deprecation notice
=========================
OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in
early 2025.
Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------
* sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that
repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever
completing authentication or that crash the server. See the
discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information.
Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or
servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or
proxies may need to consider these settings.
* sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary, sshd(8),
and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much
smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to support the SSH
protocol. As part of this work, support for disabling privilege
separation (which previously required code changes to disable) and
disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further
separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is
planned for the future.
* sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some
log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process
named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd".
* ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines
containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard error.
This release now emits them to standard output, but adds a new
"-q" flag to silence them altogether.
* sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use argv[0]
as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5)
directive allows selecting the service name at runtime. This
defaults to "sshd". bz2101
New features
------------
* sshd(8): sshd(8) will now penalise client addresses that, for various
reasons, do not successfully complete authentication. This feature is
controlled by a new sshd_config(5) PerSourcePenalties option and is
on by default.
* ssh(8): allow the HostkeyAlgorithms directive to disable the
implicit fallback from certificate host key to plain host keys.
Portability
-----------
* sshd(8): expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 always to PAM auth modules
unconditionally. The previous behaviour was to expose it only when
particular authentication methods were in use.
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): allow the presence of the WAYLAND_DISPLAY
environment variable to enable SSH_ASKPASS, similarly to the X11
DISPLAY environment variable. GHPR479
---
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D48914
(cherry picked from commit 0fdf8fae8b569bf9fff3b5171e669dcd7cf9c79e)
(cherry picked from commit b4bb480ae9294d7e4b375f0ead9ae57517c79ef3)
(cherry picked from commit e95979047aec384852102cf8bb1d55278ea77eeb)
(cherry picked from commit dcb4ae528d357f34e4a4b4882c2757c67c98e395)
Approved by: re (accelerated MFC)
Description of FIDO/U2F support (from OpenSSH 8.2 release notes,
https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-8.2):
This release adds support for FIDO/U2F hardware authenticators to
OpenSSH. U2F/FIDO are open standards for inexpensive two-factor
authentication hardware that are widely used for website
authentication. In OpenSSH FIDO devices are supported by new public
key types "ecdsa-sk" and "ed25519-sk", along with corresponding
certificate types.
ssh-keygen(1) may be used to generate a FIDO token-backed key, after
which they may be used much like any other key type supported by
OpenSSH, so long as the hardware token is attached when the keys are
used. FIDO tokens also generally require the user explicitly
authorise operations by touching or tapping them.
Generating a FIDO key requires the token be attached, and will
usually require the user tap the token to confirm the operation:
$ ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk -f ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
Generating public/private ecdsa-sk key pair.
You may need to touch your security key to authorize key generation.
Enter file in which to save the key (/home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk):
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in /home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
Your public key has been saved in /home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
This will yield a public and private key-pair. The private key file
should be useless to an attacker who does not have access to the
physical token. After generation, this key may be used like any
other supported key in OpenSSH and may be listed in authorized_keys,
added to ssh-agent(1), etc. The only additional stipulation is that
the FIDO token that the key belongs to must be attached when the key
is used.
To enable FIDO/U2F support, this change regenerates ssh_namespace.h,
adds ssh-sk-helper, and sets ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL (unless building
WITHOUT_USB).
devd integration is not included in this change, and is under
investigation for the base system. In the interim the security/u2f-devd
port can be installed to provide appropriate devd rules.
Reviewed by: delphij, kevans
Relnotes: Yes
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D32509
directories to SUBDIR.${MK_TESTS} idiom
This is being done to pave the way for future work (and homogenity) in
^/projects/make-check-sandbox .
No functional change intended.
MFC after: 1 weeks
This change adds tests/ directories in the source tree to create various
subdirectories in /usr/tests/ and to install placeholder Kyuafiles for
them.
the relevant hierarchies are: cddl, etc, games, gnu and secure.
The reason for this is to simplify the addition of new test programs for
utilities or libraries under any of these directories. Doing so on a
case by case basis is unnecessary and is quite an obscure process.
Previously, there were two copies of telnet; a non-crypto version
that lived in the usual places, and a crypto version that lived in
crypto/telnet/. The latter was built in a broken manner somewhat akin
to other "contribified" sources. This meant that there were 4 telnets
competing with each other at build time - KerberosIV, Kerberos5,
plain-old-secure and base. KerberosIV is no longer in the running, but
the other three took it in turns to jump all over each other during a
"make buildworld".
As the crypto issue has been clarified, and crypto _calls_ are not
a problem, crypto/telnet has been repo-copied to contrib/telnet,
and with this commit, all telnets are now "contribified". The contrib
path was chosen to not destroy history in the repository, and differs
from other contrib/ entries in that it may be worked on as "normal"
BSD code. There is no dangerous crypto in these sources, only a
very weak system less strong than enigma(1).
Kerberos5 telnet and Secure telnet are now selected by using the usual
macros in /etc/make.conf, and the build process is unsurprising and
less treacherous.
