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9dad3ed1d1
Use priv_check_cred() with a new privilege (PRIV_SEEJAILPROC) instead of explicitly testing for UID 0 (the former has been the rule for almost 20 years). As a consequence, cr_canseejailproc() now abides by the 'security.bsd.suser_enabled' sysctl and MAC policies. Update the MAC policies Biba and LOMAC, and prison_priv_check() so that they don't deny this privilege. This preserves the existing behavior (the 'root' user is not restricted, even when jailed, unless 'security.bsd.suser_enabled' is not 0) and is consistent with what is done for the related policies/privileges (PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS, PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS). Reviewed by: emaste (earlier version), mhorne MFC after: 2 weeks Sponsored by: Kumacom SAS Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D40626 (cherry picked from commit 7974ca1cdbee949f5e453eea112be265b425c407) |
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| .. | ||
| audit | ||
| mac | ||
| mac_biba | ||
| mac_bsdextended | ||
| mac_ddb | ||
| mac_ifoff | ||
| mac_ipacl | ||
| mac_lomac | ||
| mac_mls | ||
| mac_none | ||
| mac_ntpd | ||
| mac_partition | ||
| mac_pimd | ||
| mac_portacl | ||
| mac_priority | ||
| mac_seeotheruids | ||
| mac_stub | ||
| mac_test | ||
| mac_veriexec | ||
| mac_veriexec_parser | ||