diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c index 0267edb29cd..4bac15fc5c1 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password, * Compare the secret's Server Key with the one computed from the * user-supplied password. */ - return memcmp(computed_key, server_key, key_length) == 0; + return timingsafe_bcmp(computed_key, server_key, key_length) == 0; } @@ -1130,9 +1130,9 @@ verify_final_nonce(scram_state *state) if (final_nonce_len != client_nonce_len + server_nonce_len) return false; - if (memcmp(state->client_final_nonce, state->client_nonce, client_nonce_len) != 0) + if (timingsafe_bcmp(state->client_final_nonce, state->client_nonce, client_nonce_len) != 0) return false; - if (memcmp(state->client_final_nonce + client_nonce_len, state->server_nonce, server_nonce_len) != 0) + if (timingsafe_bcmp(state->client_final_nonce + client_nonce_len, state->server_nonce, server_nonce_len) != 0) return false; return true; @@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ verify_client_proof(scram_state *state) client_StoredKey, &errstr) < 0) elog(ERROR, "could not hash stored key: %s", errstr); - if (memcmp(client_StoredKey, state->StoredKey, state->key_length) != 0) + if (timingsafe_bcmp(client_StoredKey, state->StoredKey, state->key_length) != 0) return false; return true; diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c b/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c index 37ccec355c7..739a2e6fa8b 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c @@ -293,7 +293,8 @@ md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass, return STATUS_ERROR; } - if (strcmp(client_pass, crypt_pwd) == 0) + if (strlen(client_pass) == strlen(crypt_pwd) && + timingsafe_bcmp(client_pass, crypt_pwd, strlen(crypt_pwd)) == 0) { retval = STATUS_OK; @@ -372,7 +373,8 @@ plain_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass, *logdetail = errstr; return STATUS_ERROR; } - if (strcmp(crypt_client_pass, shadow_pass) == 0) + if (strlen(crypt_client_pass) == strlen(shadow_pass) && + timingsafe_bcmp(crypt_client_pass, shadow_pass, strlen(shadow_pass)) == 0) return STATUS_OK; else { diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c index 99103b7e2b6..08c7c666946 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input) /* Verify immediately that the server used our part of the nonce */ if (strlen(nonce) < strlen(state->client_nonce) || - memcmp(nonce, state->client_nonce, strlen(state->client_nonce)) != 0) + timingsafe_bcmp(nonce, state->client_nonce, strlen(state->client_nonce)) != 0) { libpq_append_conn_error(conn, "invalid SCRAM response (nonce mismatch)"); return false; @@ -896,8 +896,8 @@ verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match, pg_hmac_free(ctx); /* signature processed, so now check after it */ - if (memcmp(expected_ServerSignature, state->ServerSignature, - state->key_length) != 0) + if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_ServerSignature, state->ServerSignature, + state->key_length) != 0) *match = false; else *match = true;