Fix assorted places that need to use palloc_array().

multirange_recv and BlockRefTableReaderNextRelation were incautious
about multiplying a possibly-large integer by a factor more than 1
and then using it as an allocation size.  This is harmless on 64-bit
systems where we'd compute a size exceeding MaxAllocSize and then
fail, but on 32-bit systems we could overflow size_t leading to an
undersized allocation and buffer overrun.

Fix these places by using palloc_array() instead of a handwritten
multiplication.  (In HEAD, some of them were fixed already, but
none of that work got back-patched at the time.)

In addition, BlockRefTableReaderNextRelation passes the same value
to BlockRefTableRead's "int length" parameter.  If built for
64-bit frontend code, palloc_array() allows a larger array size
than it otherwise would, potentially allowing that parameter to
overflow.  Add an explicit check to forestall that and keep the
behavior the same cross-platform.

Reported-by: Xint Code
Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Backpatch-through: 14
Security: CVE-2026-6473
This commit is contained in:
Tom Lane 2026-05-11 05:13:46 -07:00 committed by Noah Misch
parent 066b7b144f
commit c55cea5290
2 changed files with 16 additions and 1 deletions

View file

@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ multirange_recv(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
Oid mltrngtypoid = PG_GETARG_OID(1);
int32 typmod = PG_GETARG_INT32(2);
MultirangeIOData *cache;
uint32 range_count;
int32 range_count;
RangeType **ranges;
MultirangeType *ret;
StringInfoData tmpbuf;
@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ multirange_recv(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
cache = get_multirange_io_data(fcinfo, mltrngtypoid, IOFunc_receive);
range_count = pq_getmsgint(buf, 4);
/* palloc_array will enforce a more-or-less-sane range_count value */
ranges = palloc_array(RangeType *, range_count);
initStringInfo(&tmpbuf);

View file

@ -657,6 +657,20 @@ BlockRefTableReaderNextRelation(BlockRefTableReader *reader,
return false;
}
/*
* Sanity-check the nchunks value. In the backend, palloc_array would
* enforce this anyway (with a more generic error message); but in
* frontend it would not, potentially allowing BlockRefTableRead's length
* parameter to overflow.
*/
if (sentry.nchunks > MaxAllocSize / sizeof(uint16))
{
reader->error_callback(reader->error_callback_arg,
"file \"%s\" has oversized chunk size array",
reader->error_filename);
return false;
}
/* Read chunk size array. */
if (reader->chunk_size != NULL)
pfree(reader->chunk_size);