at least in some Windows versions, these functions are capable of returning
a failure indication without setting errno. That puts us into an infinite
loop if the previous value happened to be EINTR. Per report from Brendan
Hill.
Back-patch to 8.2. We could take it further back, but since this is only
known to be an issue on Windows and we don't support Windows before 8.2,
it does not seem worth the trouble.
attacks where an attacker would put <attack>\0<propername> in the field and
trick the validation code that the certificate was for <attack>.
This is a very low risk attack since it reuqires the attacker to trick the
CA into issuing a certificate with an incorrect field, and the common
PostgreSQL deployments are with private CAs, and not external ones. Also,
default mode in 8.4 does not do any name validation, and is thus also not
vulnerable - but the higher security modes are.
Backpatch all the way. Even though versions 8.3.x and before didn't have
certificate name validation support, they still exposed this field for
the user to perform the validation in the application code, and there
is no way to detect this problem through that API.
Security: CVE-2009-4034
It seems the flex developers have decided to change yyleng from int to size_t.
This has already happened in the latest release of OS X, and will start
happening elsewhere once the next release of flex appears. Rather than trying
to divine how it's declared in any particular build, let's just remove the one
existing not-very-necessary external usage.
Back-patch to all supported branches; not so much because users in the field
are likely to care about building old branches with cutting-edge flex, as
to keep OSX-based buildfarm members from having problems with old branches.
to the documented API value. The previous code got it right as
it's implemented, but accepted too much/too little compared to
the API documentation.
Per comment from Zdenek Kotala.
Per Microsoft knowledge base article Q201213, early versions of
Windows fail when we do this. Later versions of Windows appear
to have a higher limit than 64Kb, but do still fail on large
sends, so we unconditionally limit it for all versions.
Patch from Tom Lane.
to explicitly cast the output back to char before comparing it to a char
value, else we get the wrong result for high-bit-set characters. Found by
Rolf Jentsch. Also, fix several places where <ctype.h> functions were being
called without casting the argument to unsigned char; this is likewise
unportable, but we keep making that mistake :-(. These found by buildfarm
member salamander, which I will desperately miss if it ever goes belly-up.
work with the PQExpBuffer code instead of fighting it. This avoids an
unnecessary limit on message length and fixes the latent bug that
errorMessage.len wasn't getting set.
the patch for those features put its cleanup code into freePGconn() which is
really the wrong place. Remove redundant code from freePGconn() and add
comments in hopes of preventing similar mistakes in future.
Noticed while trying (futilely) to reproduce bug #3902.
are known to write on the socket sometimes and thus we are vulnerable to
being killed by the signal if the server happens to go away unexpectedly.
Noticed while trying (futilely) to reproduce bug #3902.
This bug has been there all along, but since the situation is usually
only of interest to developers, I chose not to back-patch the changes.
