when the compression buffer was reused for multiple statistics
requests, responses could grow beyond the correct size. this was
because the buffer was not cleared before reuse; compressed data
was still written to the beginning of the buffer, but then the size
of used region was increased by the amount written, rather than set
to the amount written. this caused responses to grow larger and
larger, potentially reading past the end of the allocated buffer.
(cherry picked from commit 47e9fa981e)
Limit the amount of database lookups that can be triggered in
fctx_getaddresses() (i.e. when determining the name server addresses to
query next) by setting a hard limit on the number of NS RRs processed
for any delegation encountered. Without any limit in place, named can
be forced to perform large amounts of database lookups per each query
received, which severely impacts resolver performance.
The limit used (20) is an arbitrary value that is considered to be big
enough for any sane DNS delegation.
(cherry picked from commit 3a44097fd6)
It is possible to bypass Response Rate Limiting (RRL)
`responses-per-second` limitation using specially crafted wildcard
names, because the current implementation, when encountering a found
DNS name generated from a wildcard record, just strips the leftmost
label of the name before making a key for the bucket.
While that technique helps with limiting random requests like
<random>.example.com (because all those requests will be accounted
as belonging to a bucket constructed from "example.com" name), it does
not help with random names like subdomain.<random>.example.com.
The best solution would have been to strip not just the leftmost
label, but as many labels as necessary until reaching the suffix part
of the wildcard record from which the found name is generated, however,
we do not have that information readily available in the context of RRL
processing code.
Fix the issue by interpreting all valid wildcard domain names as
the zone's origin name concatenated to the "*" name, so they all will
be put into the same bucket.
(cherry picked from commit baa9698c9d)
The zone 'retransfer3.' tests whether zones that 'rndc signing
-nsec3param' requests are queued even if the zone is not loaded.
The test assumes that if 'rndc signing -list' shows that the zone is
done signing with two keys, and there are no NSEC3 chains pending, the
zone is done handling the '-nsec3param' queued requests. However, it
is possible that the 'rndc signing -list' command is received before
the corresponding privatetype records are added to the zone (the records
that are used to retrieve the signing status with 'rndc signing').
This is what happens in test failure
https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/jobs/2722752.
The 'rndc signing -list retransfer3' is thus an unreliable check.
It is simpler to just remove the check and wait for a certain amount
of time and check whether ns3 has re-signed the zone using NSEC3.
(cherry picked from commit 8b71cbd09c)
set the magic number in a newly-created interface object
before appending it to mgr->interfaces in order to prevent
a possible assertion.
(cherry picked from commit 8c01662048)
The usage of xmlInitThreads() and xmlCleanupThreads() functions in
libxml2 is now marked as deprecated, and these functions will be made
private in the future.
Use xmlInitParser() and xmlCleanupParser() instead of them.
(cherry picked from commit a5d412d924)
Having implicit inline-signing set for dnssec-policy when there is no
update policy is confusing, so lets make this explicit.
(cherry picked from commit 5ca02fe6e7e591d1fb85936ea4dda720c3d741ef)
In several cases where IDNA2008 mappings do not exist whereas IDNA2003
mappings do, dig was failing to process the suplied domain name. Take a
backwards compatible approach, and convert the domain to IDNA2008 form,
and if that fails try the IDNA2003 conversion.
(cherry picked from commit 10923f9d87)
This should make sure that the memory context is not destroyed
before the memory pool, which is using the context.
(cherry picked from commit e97c3eea95)
YAML strings should be quoted if they contain colon characters.
Since IPv6 addresses do, we now quote the query_address and
response_address strings in all YAML output.
(cherry picked from commit 66eaf6bb73)
The dnstap query_message field was in some cases being filled in
with response messages, along with the response_message field.
The query_message field should only be used when logging requests,
and the response_message field only when logging responses.
(cherry picked from commit 3ccfff8ab6)
The RPZ documentation section with response policy rules and actions
is incomplete.
Add information about the 'RPZ-CLIENT-IP' rule, and 'TCP-Only' and
'DROP' actions.
(cherry picked from commit 0fbd07ac22)
There is no need for a release because this case was nearly impossible
to trigger (except for when 'sig-signing-type' was set to 0).
(cherry picked from commit 545ecb64b043617ea609f4f115d280bb5990e221)
There is one case in 'dns_nsec3_activex()' where it returns but forgets
to detach the db node. Add the missing 'dns_db_detachnode()' call.
This case only triggers if 'sig-signing-type' (privatetype) is set to 0
(which by default is not), or if the function is called with 'complete'
is set to 'true' (which at this moment do not exist).
(cherry picked from commit 0cf6c18ccb2205a1fc81431f908c8310f6136bbb)
The wait_for_zone_is_signed function was never called, which could lead
to test failures due to timing issues (where a zone was not fully signed
yet, but the test was trying to verify the zone).
Also add two missing set_nsec3param calls to ensure the ITERATIONS
value is set for these test cases.
(cherry picked from commit 08505651d1d9278314f61076ac7cd119a7790428)
Add two scenarios where we change the dnssec-policy from using RSASHA1
to something with NSEC3.
The first case should work, as the DS is still in hidden state and we
can basically do anything with DNSSEC.
The second case should fail, because the DS of the predecessor is
published and we can't immediately remove the predecessor DNSKEY. So
in this case we should keep the NSEC chain for a bit longer.
Add two more scenarios where we change the dnssec-policy from using
NSEC3 to something NSEC only. Both should work because there are no
restrictions on using NSEC when it comes to algorithms, but in the
cases where the DS is published we can't bluntly remove the predecessor.
Extend the nsec3 system test by also checking the DNSKEY RRset for the
expected DNSKEY records. This requires some "kasp system"-style setup
for each test (setting key properties and key states). Also move the
dnssec-verify check inside the check_nsec/check_nsec3 functions because
we will have to do that every time.
(cherry picked from commit 21729dd94efc9fc7b7317688dd9ff0ec45181bfd)
When doing a dnssec-policy reconfiguration from a zone with NSEC only
keys to a zone that uses NSEC3, figure out to wait with building the
NSEC3 chain.
Previously, BIND 9 would attempt to sign such a zone, but failed to
do so because the NSEC3 chain conflicted with existing DNSKEY records
in the zone that were not compatible with NSEC3.
There exists logic for detecting such a case in the functions
dnskey_sane() (in lib/dns/zone.c) and check_dnssec() (in
lib/ns/update.c). Both functions look very similar so refactor them
to use the same code and call the new function (called
dns_zone_check_dnskey_nsec3()).
Also update the dns_nsec_nseconly() function to take an additional
parameter 'diff' that, if provided, will be checked whether an
offending NSEC only DNSKEY will be deleted from the zone. If so,
this key will not be considered when checking the zone for NSEC only
DNSKEYs. This is needed to allow a transition from an NSEC zone with
NSEC only DNSKEYs to an NSEC3 zone.
(cherry picked from commit 09a81dc84ce0fee37442f03cdbd63c2398215376)
