All known standard library implementations of these functions can fail
with ENOMEM. A caller neglecting to check for failure would experience
missing output, information exposure, or a crash. Check return values
within wrappers and code, currently just snprintf.c, that bypasses the
wrappers. The wrappers do not return after an error, so their callers
need not check. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Popular free software standard library implementations do take pains to
bypass malloc() in simple cases, but they risk ENOMEM for floating point
numbers, positional arguments, large field widths, and large precisions.
No specification demands such caution, so this commit regards every call
to a printf family function as a potential threat.
Injecting the wrappers implicitly is a compromise between patch scope
and design goals. I would prefer to edit each call site to name a
wrapper explicitly. libpq and the ECPG libraries would, ideally, convey
errors to the caller rather than abort(). All that would be painfully
invasive for a back-patched security fix, hence this compromise.
Security: CVE-2015-3166
Each of the libraries incorporates src/port files, which often check
FRONTEND. Build systems disagreed on whether to build libpgtypes this
way. Only libecpg incorporates files that rely on it today. Back-patch
to 9.0 (all supported versions) to forestall surprises.
When ecpg was rewritten to the new protocol version not all variable types
were corrected. This patch rewrites the code for these types to fix that. It
also fixes the documentation to correctly tell the status of array handling.
Up to now, PG has assumed that any given timezone abbreviation (such as
"EDT") represents a constant GMT offset in the usage of any particular
region; we had a way to configure what that offset was, but not for it
to be changeable over time. But, as with most things horological, this
view of the world is too simplistic: there are numerous regions that have
at one time or another switched to a different GMT offset but kept using
the same timezone abbreviation. Almost the entire Russian Federation did
that a few years ago, and later this month they're going to do it again.
And there are similar examples all over the world.
To cope with this, invent the notion of a "dynamic timezone abbreviation",
which is one that is referenced to a particular underlying timezone
(as defined in the IANA timezone database) and means whatever it currently
means in that zone. For zones that use or have used daylight-savings time,
the standard and DST abbreviations continue to have the property that you
can specify standard or DST time and get that time offset whether or not
DST was theoretically in effect at the time. However, the abbreviations
mean what they meant at the time in question (or most recently before that
time) rather than being absolutely fixed.
The standard abbreviation-list files have been changed to use this behavior
for abbreviations that have actually varied in meaning since 1970. The
old simple-numeric definitions are kept for abbreviations that have not
changed, since they are a bit faster to resolve.
While this is clearly a new feature, it seems necessary to back-patch it
into all active branches, because otherwise use of Russian zone
abbreviations is going to become even more problematic than it already was.
This change supersedes the changes in commit 513d06ded et al to modify the
fixed meanings of the Russian abbreviations; since we've not shipped that
yet, this will avoid an undesirably incompatible (not to mention incorrect)
change in behavior for timestamps between 2011 and 2014.
This patch makes some cosmetic changes in ecpglib to keep its usage of
datetime lookup tables as similar as possible to the backend code, but
doesn't do anything about the increasingly obsolete set of timezone
abbreviation definitions that are hard-wired into ecpglib. Whatever we
do about that will likely not be appropriate material for back-patching.
Also, a potential free() of a garbage pointer after an out-of-memory
failure in ecpglib has been fixed.
This patch also fixes pre-existing bugs in DetermineTimeZoneOffset() that
caused it to produce unexpected results near a timezone transition, if
both the "before" and "after" states are marked as standard time. We'd
only ever thought about or tested transitions between standard and DST
time, but that's not what's happening when a zone simply redefines their
base GMT offset.
In passing, update the SGML documentation to refer to the Olson/zoneinfo/
zic timezone database as the "IANA" database, since it's now being
maintained under the auspices of IANA.
The code wrote a value into the caller's field[] array before checking
to see if there was room, which of course is backwards. Per report from
Michael Paquier.
I fixed the equivalent bug in the backend's version of this code way back
in 630684d3a1, but failed to think about ecpg's copy. Fortunately
this doesn't look like it would be exploitable for anything worse than a
core dump: an external attacker would have no control over the single word
that gets written.
Commit 453a5d91d4 made it available to the
src/test/regress build of pg_regress, but all pg_regress builds need the
same treatment. Patch 9.2 through 8.4; in 9.3 and later, pg_regress
gets pqsignal() via libpgport.
This reverts commit 4c5fde4e28.
It turns out that the %name-prefix syntax without "=" does not work
at all in pre-2.4 Bison. We are not prepared to make such a large
jump in minimum required Bison version just to suppress a warning
message in a version hardly any developers are using yet.
When 3.0 gets more popular, we'll figure out a way to deal with this.
In the meantime, BISONFLAGS=-Wno-deprecated is recommendable for
anyone using 3.0 who doesn't want to see the warning.
%name-prefix doesn't use an "=" sign according to the Bison docs, but it
silently accepted one anyway, until Bison 3.0. This was originally a
typo of mine in commit 012abebab1, and we
seem to have slavishly copied the error into all the other grammar files.
Per report from Vik Fearing; analysis by Peter Eisentraut.
Back-patch to all active branches, since somebody might try to build
a back branch with up-to-date tools.
Commit 4318daecc9 broke it. The change in
sub-second precision at extreme dates is normal. The inconsistent
truncation vs. rounding is essentially a bug, albeit a longstanding one.
Back-patch to 8.4, like the causative commit.
This was not changed in HEAD, but will be done later as part of a
pgindent run. Future pgindent runs will also do this.
Report by Tom Lane
Backpatch through all supported branches, but not HEAD
When array of char * was used as target for a FETCH statement returning more
than one row, it tried to store all the result in the first element. Instead it
should dump array of char pointers with right offset, use the address instead
of the value of the C variable while reading the array and treat such variable
as char **, instead of char * for pointer arithmetic.
Patch by Ashutosh Bapat <ashutosh.bapat@enterprisedb.com>
Coverity identified a number of places in which it couldn't prove that a
string being copied into a fixed-size buffer would fit. We believe that
most, perhaps all of these are in fact safe, or are copying data that is
coming from a trusted source so that any overrun is not really a security
issue. Nonetheless it seems prudent to forestall any risk by using
strlcpy() and similar functions.
Fixes by Peter Eisentraut and Jozef Mlich based on Coverity reports.
In addition, fix a potential null-pointer-dereference crash in
contrib/chkpass. The crypt(3) function is defined to return NULL on
failure, but chkpass.c didn't check for that before using the result.
The main practical case in which this could be an issue is if libc is
configured to refuse to execute unapproved hashing algorithms (e.g.,
"FIPS mode"). This ideally should've been a separate commit, but
since it touches code adjacent to one of the buffer overrun changes,
I included it in this commit to avoid last-minute merge issues.
This issue was reported by Honza Horak.
Security: CVE-2014-0065 for buffer overruns, CVE-2014-0066 for crypt()
Many server functions use the MAXDATELEN constant to size a buffer for
parsing or displaying a datetime value. It was much too small for the
longest possible interval output and slightly too small for certain
valid timestamp input, particularly input with a long timezone name.
The long input was rejected needlessly; the long output caused
interval_out() to overrun its buffer. ECPG's pgtypes library has a copy
of the vulnerable functions, which bore the same vulnerabilities along
with some of its own. In contrast to the server, certain long inputs
caused stack overflow rather than failing cleanly. Back-patch to 8.4
(all supported versions).
Reported by Daniel Schüssler, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0063
While working on most platforms the old way sometimes created alignment
problems. This should fix it. Also the regresion tests were updated to test for
the reported case.
Report and fix by MauMau <maumau307@gmail.com>
variables is varchar. This fixes this test case:
int main(void)
{
exec sql begin declare section;
varchar a[50], b[50];
exec sql end declare section;
return 0;
}
Since varchars are internally turned into custom structs and
the type name is emitted for these variable declarations,
the preprocessed code previously had:
struct varchar_1 { ... } a _,_ struct varchar_2 { ... } b ;
The comma in the generated C file was a syntax error.
There are no regression test changes since it's not exercised.
Patch by Boszormenyi Zoltan <zb@cybertec.at>
I fixed this code back in commit 841b4a2d5, but didn't think carefully
enough about the behavior near zero, which meant it improperly rejected
1999-12-31 24:00:00. Per report from Magnus Hagander.
Instead of continuing if the next character is not an array boundary get_data()
used to continue only on finding a boundary so it was not able to read any
element after the first.
Investigation shows that some intermittent build failures in ecpg are the
result of a gmake bug that was reported quite some time ago:
http://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?30653
Preventing parallel builds of the ecpg subdirectories seems to dodge the
bug. Per yesterday's pgsql-hackers discussion, there are some other things
in the subdirectory makefiles that seem rather unsafe for parallel builds
too, but there's little point in fixing them as long as we have to work
around a make bug.
Back-patch to 9.1; parallel builds weren't very well supported before
that anyway.
Ever since we introduced real prepared statements this should work for
different connections. The old solution just emulating prepared statements,
though, wasn't able to handle this.
Closes: #6309
